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ABSTRACT 
  
 This dissertation evaluates the demand for crop insurance and designs and 
demonstrates a methodology to estimate the impacts of climate change on the federal crop 
insurance program (FCIP). An empirical model is built to estimate the demand for corn 
yield and revenue insurance and wheat yield insurance at each coverage level for the major 
production regions. Original Least Square regression is used. The results show that the 
elasticities of demand for federal crop insurance with respect to net premiums are 
significantly different across crops, coverage levels, insurance plans, and regions. At the 
75% coverage level, the elasticity of demand for corn yield and revenue insurance with 
respect to net premium is -0.654 and -0.670, respectively, in the Southern Plains. The 
absolute values of the elasticities of demand for corn insurance (0.654 and 0.670) are much 
higher than the elasticities reported in the majority of the previous studies which do not 
separate coverage levels and regions in the crop insurance demand analysis. At the 80% 
coverage level, the elasticity of demand for corn yield insurance with respect to net 
premium is -0.230, -0.158, and -0.259 in the Corn Belt, Lake States, and Northern Plains, 
respectively, which are much smaller than the elasticity at the 75% coverage level in the 
Southern Plains (based on absolute values).  
 For wheat yield insurance, the elasticity of demand with respect to net premium is 
-0.264 and -0.145 at the 75% coverage level in the Southern Plains and Northern Plains, 
respectively. In the Northern Plains, wheat producers would reduce their demand for 
federal yield insurance by 2.610%, 4.800%, and 7.211% at the 70%, 75%, 80% coverage 
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level, respectively, given a 10 percentage points reduction. Producers in the Southern 
Plains are expected to reduce their demand for federal wheat yield insurance by 3.153% 
and 2.636% at the 70% and 75% coverage level, respectively, given a 10 percentage points 
cut in the subsidy rates.  
 A methodology is built and demonstrated to evaluate the impats of climate change 
on the FCIP for a representative grain sorghum farm. Different user interfaces of the 
APEX model are use to simulate crop yields for a representative farm. The simulated 
yields are further used to calculate the representative farm’s insurance premiums, 
indemnities, and loss ratios. The results indicate that the approved APH yields and federal 
yield protection insurance premiums would decrease as the grain sorghum yields trend to 
decrease as climate change continues. Federal crop insurance loss ratios are statistically 
different in year 2020, 2030, and 2040 for each climate change scenario. Therefore, which 
climate change scenario is assumed for analyses of the impacts of climate change on the 
FCIC would result in statistically different conclusions. The study also shows that the 
efficiency of the current APH formula will not be negated by climate change since no 
extreme yield change occurs during 2020 – 2040 based on the climate change forecasts.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Federal crop insurance has been an important tool for agricultural risk management 
with a long history. It was first authorized in the 1930s to protect farmers against low 
yields and to reduce producers’ risk. In its first 50 years, the program developed very 
slowly. Only few counties and crops were eligible for crop insurance. To encourage 
participation, the 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA) included many more regions 
and crops in the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) and initialized federal premium 
subsidies (Coble and Knight 2002). Although the participation rate (enrolled acres/eligible 
acres) increased from 16% in 1981 to 25% in 1988, the 25% participation rate was still 
significantly lower than the 50% participation rate envisioned by Congress (Glauber 
2013). Economists suggested that crop insurance premium subsidies had to be greatly 
increased to deliver the 50% participation in the FCIP (Glauber 2013). To further expand 
participation, crop insurance premium subsidies were increased through several policies. 
Figure 1 shows the total insured acres and the federal premium subsidies in 1981 to 2013. 
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Figure 1. Total Insured Acres and Federal Premium Subsidies for the FCIP 
 
Source: USDA, Risk Management Agency, Summary of Business files; Glauber (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 With government support, the crop insurance program has made considerable 
progress and has been one of the most important tools for farmers to manage agricultural 
risks. In 2015, 298,718,502 acres were enrolled in the FCIP, and the participation rate of 
eligible acres was 86%. However, there are questions about the federal crop insurance 
program.  
First of all, there are questions about the efficiency of government spending on 
crop insurance premium subsidies. With increases in crop insurance participation and 
premium subsidy rates, the federal subsidized crop insurance has become more expensive 
than the Title I programs in the 2014 Farm Bill. The heavily subsidized crop insurance 
program was singled out for an $18 billion reduction in the Obama administration’s 2017 
budget proposal. If subsidies for crop insurance are reduced, the current coverage levels 
that farmers are buying will become more costly. Therefore, there are questions as to the 
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likely change in the types of coverage and levels of protection farmers would purchase in 
the absence of subsidies.  
 Secondly, there are questions about the accuracy of the current premium 
ratemaking process under the impacts of climate change. Farming is risky due to the 
impacts of climate conditions, especially in rain-fed agricultural regions. In the U.S., 
floods and droughts have resulted in sever crop damage and large crop insurance losses. 
Figure 2 displays the national crop insurance loss ratios for all crops, all plans and all 
coverages. Relatively large losses and loss ratios occurred in 1988 at 2.45, 1993 at 2.19, 
2002 at 1.39 and 2012 at 1.58. The large losses were mainly due to weather extremes 
(figure 2). Moreover, these historical loss ratios were constructed based on gross premium, 
which are the ratios of crop insurance indemnities to gross premium. If we look at the net 
loss ratios, which are the rates of crop insurance indemnities to net premium (gross 
premium - government subsidies), the losses of crop insurance were even higher when 
extreme weather happened. For example, the national net loss ratios were 3.25, 2.98, 3.46, 
and 4.22 in 1988, 1993, 2002 and 2012, respectively. 
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Figure 2. National Crop Insurance Gross Loss Ratios 
Source: USDA, RMA, Summary of Business Reports. 
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Studies show that climate change is inevitable and climate variability would 
increase with global warming (e.g., Thornton et al. 2014). So farming would be more risky 
and historical patterns of yield would be less reliable in the estimation of future production. 
Therefore, how to adjust the current premium ratemaking process has become an 
important issue.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to partially address these questions. In particular, 
the first two chapters estimate the elasticities of demand for corn and wheat insurance at 
each coverage level across major agricultural production regions. The third chapter 
examines how the impacts of climate change affect RMA’s ratemaking process by using 
grain sorghum as an example. This study is the first one that explicitly discusses the 
regional demand for federal corn as well as wheat insurance at each coverage level, and it 
is the first study that explicitly presents the possible impacts of climate changes on crop 
insurance premiums. Considering that federal subsidy rates are specified for each coverage 
level, the detailed demand analysis at each coverage level could provide critical 
information for policy makers and private insurance companies.  
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CHAPTER II  
HOW DO PREMIUM SUBSIDIES AFFECT CROP INSURANCE DEMAND AT 
DIFFERENT COVERAGE LEVELS: THE CASE OF CORN 
 
Introduction 
 
 The U.S. federal crop insurance program plays a critical part in providing farmers 
protection against agricultural risk. Despite the higher participation with higher premium 
subsidies (figure 1), this program has been criticized as inefficient because of the massive 
government spending and poor actuarial performance (Glauber 2004). On average, the 
adjusted loss ratio is 2.07 over 2000 – 2013 (figure 2), which means producers tend to 
collect $2.07 in indemnity payments for each dollar of their premium payment. Therefore, 
understanding the effects of subsidies on demand is essential for policy makers and the 
private sectors.  
 Previous studies examined the demand for crop insurance, however, the majority 
of the existing studies did not report the effects of premium at each coverage level. 
Consequently, it is not clear whether there are differences among the price elasticities of 
crop insurance demand across coverage levels. The only two known studies which account 
for the differences show that the demand for grape insurance in eleven California counties 
is price-elastic at the catastrophic (CAT) level of insurance. However, at higher coverage 
levels, the demand for grape insurance is price-inelastic (Knox and Richards 1999; 
Richards 2000). Although the majority of existing studies find that the aggregated demand 
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for the federal crop insurance is price-inelastic, the elasticities of demand for crop 
insurance at different coverage levels could be significantly different. Moreover, since the 
federal premium subsidy rates are specified at each coverage level, understanding the 
elasticities across coverage levels is critical for future policy making.  
The major objective of this chapter is to analyze the demand for federal corn 
insurance across different coverage levels and regions. This chapter is the first one that 
differentiates the demand for corn insurance policies for each coverage level and insurance 
plans (APH and CRC). Since federal subsidy rates are specified for coverage levels, 
detailed information at each coverage level could provide more reliable information for 
policy makers and private sectors.  
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Background 
 
 The FCIP is an important safety net for agricultural producers. To encourage 
greater participation, crop insurance premium subsidies were increased through the 
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA) of 1994 (Nickerson et al. 2011). The FCIRA 
also authorized a catastrophic risk protection (CAT), which guaranteed 50% of a 
producer’s approved yields at 60% of projected market prices (Glauber 2004). The 
premium for basic CAT insurance was subsidized by the federal government, and $50 
administrative fee per crop per county was paid by enrolled producers (Just and Pope 
2013). Participation in the FCIP was required under the 1994 Act for producers to be 
eligible for government payments, such as deficiency payments (Glauber 2007). In 1996, 
the mandatory require for crop insurance participation were eliminated (Glauber 2004), 
resulting in a significant decline of the enrollment in CAT insurance (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Acres Enrolled in CAT Coverage Level 
Source: USDA, Risk Management Agency, Summary of Business files, 1989-2013. 
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 To further increase the participation rate, crop insurance premium subsidies were 
increased by the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000 (Babcock, Hart, and 
Hayes 2004; Coble and Barnett 2013). According to Babcock and Hart (2005), “One of 
the policy objectives of the ARPA was to induce producers to buy more insurance 
coverage in which one measure of ‘more insurance’ is the proportion of acres insured at 
levels greater than 65%.” Table 1 provides a comparison between the percentages of the 
premium paid by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) at various coverage 
levels at 100% of price coverage pre- and post- ARPA. For corn insurance, coverage is 
available in 5% increments from 50% to 85%. Before the ARPA, the dollar amount of 
subsidies were the same among coverage levels higher than or equal to 65%. The dollar 
amount of subsidies was accomplished by setting different subsidy rates at each coverage 
level (Babcock and Hart 2005). Under the ARPA, the subsidy level was increased by 12 
percentage points at the 50% coverage level in the Actual Production History (APH) 
policy, while it increased by 37 percentage points at the 75% level under the Crop Revenue 
Coverage (CRC) policy. Moreover, under the ARPA, the increase in the insurance 
premium at higher coverage levels is generally less than the associated increase in subsidy 
rates. Therefore, producers would benefit more from purchasing higher coverage levels 
(Babcock, Hart, and Hayes 2004). Another significant change is that the subsidy level, as 
a percentage of the full premium, is now the same for both the yield insurance program 
(APH) and the revenue polices (CRC). Besides, the administrative fee for CAT insurance 
was increased from $50 to $100 per crop per county.    
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Table 1. Basic Unit Subsidy Levels Pre- and Post-ARPA 
 
Coverage Level Pre-ARPA Post-ARPA 
 APH CRC  
50/100 55% 42% 67% 
65/100 42% 32% 59% 
70/100 32% 25% 59% 
75/100 24% 18% 55% 
85/100 13% 10% 38% 
 
Source: Kelly 2001 
  
 Not surprisingly, the changes in quantity demanded differed among coverage 
levels with the uneven changes on subsidies. Thirty percent of total insured acres were 
enrolled in the CAT coverage level in 1998, while less than 15% of total insured acres 
enrolled in the CAT in 2002. Less than 15% of total demand was enrolled in the high-
coverage category (coverage levels higher than 65%) in 1998, while the percentage 
participation increased to 62% in 2002 (Figure 4). Comparing the percentage of insured 
acres in each category pre- and post- ARPA, the purchase shares (insured acres devided 
by the total insured acres) for the CAT and low coverage categories decreased, while the 
purchase shares for the high coverage category increased.  
 11 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of Enrolled Acres in Each Category 
Source: USDA’s RMA, Summary of Business Reports. 
 
 The changes not only varied among different coverage levels, but also among 
different insurance plans. APH and CRC are the two most popular crop insurance policies 
during this time period (Babcock, Hart, and Hayes 2004). Figure 5 shows the total enrolled 
acres in different categories under APH policies and CRC polices. Compared with 1998, 
the total insured acres enrolled in APH medium coverage category decreased, while the 
total insured acres enrolled in CRC medium coverage category increased. Before ARPA, 
the per acre dollar amounts of CRC premium subsidies cannot be higher than the subsidy 
amounts of APH (Babcock and Hart 2005). After ARPA, the subsidy rates for APH and 
CRC were the same. Because the CRC premium was greater than APH premium, the per 
acre subsidies under CRC were also greater.  
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Figure 5. Total Insured Acres under APH and CRC in 1998 and 2002. 
Source: USDA’s RMA, Summary of Business Reports. 
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Although ARPA was implemented in 2000, it remains the most recent and broadest 
reform in premium (O’Donoghue 2014). Furthermore, there are very few studies which 
explore the impacts of subsidy adjustments on crop insurance demand and none of them 
differentiated coverage levels and plans. Therefore, this study examines the effects of 
increased subsidies among coverage levels and insurance plans.  
 
Literature Review 
 
 A number of papers examined the demand for crop insurance, but the potential 
differences in crop insurance demand among coverage levels and policy plans received 
limited empirical attention. Table 2 shows the elasticities reported in the literature. Among 
all the available studies, the crop insurance demand is price-inelastic if coverage levels are 
not specified. Only two known studies which differentiate coverage levels show that the 
demand for grape insurance is price-elastic at the 50% coverage level, while the demand 
is price-inelastic among higher coverage levels.  
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Table 2. Estimated Price Elasticities of Crop Insurance Demand in Literature 
 
Crop 
Estimated price 
elasticity of 
demand 
Coverage Level Location Years examined 
Journal 
publication date 
Author(s) 
Corn -0.32 (acreage) - IA 1985-1990 1993 Goodwin 
 
-0.73 (liability) - 
        
 
-0.28 (liability) - Heartland 1985-1993 2004 Goodwin et al. 
 
-0.24 (liability) - IL, IN, IA 1996-1998 2001 Goodwin 
 
-0.27 (acreage) - IL, IN, IA, OH 1997, 2002 2014 
O'Donoghue 
 -0.13 (liability) -     
 
-0.24 
- MI, MN, WI   
(liability) 
 
-0.25 
- KS, NE, SD   
(liability) 
Soybeans 
-0.33 (liability) - Heartland 1985-1993 2004 Goodwin et al. 
-0.20 (liability) - IL, IN, IA 1996-1998 2001 Goodwin 
-0.26 (liability) - MI, MN, WI 
1997, 2002 
2014 O'Donoghue 
-0.17 
- KS, NE, SD   
(liability) 
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Table 2. Continued. 
Crop 
Estimated price 
elasticity of demand 
Coverage Level Location Years examined 
Journal 
publication date 
Author(s) 
Grape 
-1.25 
50% 
CA 1986-1996 1999 
Knox and 
Richards 
(proportion of 
acreage) 
-0.28 (proportion of 
acreage) 
65% 
-0.49 (proportion of 
acreage) 
75% 
-1.68 (liability)  50% 
CA 1986-1996 2000 Richards 
 
65% 
-1.42 (proportion of 
acreage) 
-0.67 (liability)  
-0.44 (proportion of 
acreage) 
75% -0.50(liability)  
-0.41 (proportion of 
acreage) 
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Table 2. Continued. 
 
Crop 
Estimated price 
elasticity of demand 
Coverage Level Location Years examined 
Journal 
publication date 
Author(s) 
Soybeans, 
cotton, wheat, 
tobacco, 
peanuts 
-0.92 (acreage) - U.S. 1979 1986 
Gardner and 
Kramer 
Wheat, corn, 
sorghum,  
soybeans 
-0.21 
- KS 1993-2000 2003 
Serra, 
Goodwin, and 
Featherstone 
(proportion of 
acreage) 
 
Source: O'Donoghue 2014 plus additional update from the list.  
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 To empirically estimate the demand for crop insurance, Gardner and Kramer 
(1986) sampled 57 counties in 1979 over soybeans, cotton, wheat, tobacco, and peanuts 
across 13 states. The percentage of insured acres was used as the dependent variable to 
measure the quantity of insurance. The ratio of expected indemnities less premium to 
liability (expected rate of return) was used as the price variable. The results suggest that 
the participation rate would increase by 18.5% with a 1% increase in the rate of return. 
Therefore, Gardner and Kramer suggested that the subsidy rate should be greater than 50% 
to achieve a majority of farmers’ participation.  
Knox and Richards (1999) and Richards (2000) applied a two-stage selection 
approach to estimate grape insurance demand in California. In the first stage, they 
estimated the probability that growers choose each coverage level. Then the fitted 
probability was used in the second stage, with linear models used to estimate the amount 
of insurance bought at each coverage level. The major difference between these two 
studies is that they used different models in the first stage. Multinomial logit model and 
ordered probit model were used by Knox and Richards (1999) and Richards (2000), 
respectively. Their procedures were similar to the Heckman correction approach, but the 
selection process was multinomial rather than binomial. The proportion of insured acres 
was used as the dependent variables and the expected net premium was used to measure 
the price of insurance in both studies. Furthermore, in Richards’ (2000) study, he also 
estimated the elasticities of demand for grape insurance with the liability per acre as the 
dependent variable. The county-level panel data used in the analysis consisted of 11 years 
(1986-1996) for the eleven largest grape-growing counties in California. With the 
 18 
 
 
dependent variable defined as the proportion of eligible acres insured in each county, the 
estimated price elasticities were -1.252, -0.276, and -0.492 at the 50%, 65%, and 75% 
coverage levels, respectively, in Knox and Richards’ (1999) study. The elasticities were 
reported as -1.420, -0.436, and -0.408 at the 50%, 65%, and 75% coverage levels, 
respectively, in the Richards’ (2000) study. Overall, these studies find that the demand for 
50% coverage level is price-elastic, while the demand is price-inelastic for higher 
coverage levels (65% and 75%). These studies also find that expected net premium, the 
variance of returns, and the first two moments of the expected market returns influenced 
producers’ choices of coverage levels. In addition, the mean and variance of indemnities, 
and farm income effected the producers’ quantity purchases in the second stage.  
Goodwin (1993) utilized county-level corn data for 99 Iowa counties during 1985 
to 1990 to estimate the demand for crop insurance. Purchases of insurance were measured 
by both the ratio of insured to planted corn acres and the liability per planted acre of corn. 
The average price per insured acre was used as the relevant price variable in the first 
equation, and the dollars per hundred dollars of liability (premium rate) was used as the 
correspondence in the second equation. Fixed effect regression was applied to the models. 
The estimated elasticities were -0.32 and -0.73 in the acreage equation and the liability 
equation, respectively.  
Smith and Baquet (1996) was the first study which used the Heckman two-stage 
approach to model the wheat producer’s participation and coverage-level decisions 
separately. The probit model was applied in the first stage to estimate the probability of 
purchasing MPCI. Then the estimated inverse Mills ratio was fitted in the second stage to 
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adjust for the sample selection problem. Maximum likelihood procedures were utilized in 
the models. The cross-sectional data consisted of 370 individual wheat farms in Montana. 
They conclude that premium rates do not have significant impacts on crop insurance 
participation, while the premium rates have influence on producers’ decisions on coverage 
level. They refer to this as “lead to a decision to use multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) 
more intensively.” In addition, the results suggest that operator age and farm size didn’t 
have a statistically significant effect either on producers’ decisions of participation or on 
coverage-level selection.  
Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone (2003) used farm-level data in Kansas from 
1993 to 2000 to analyze the demand for insurance during the 1990s. The ratio of county 
average net premium over the total liability across all crops and insurance plans (county 
average premium rate) was used as the price of insurance. The likelihood of a farm’s 
participation in crop insurance is considered in the two-stage model. The two-stage model 
used in the study was proposed by Nelson and Olson (1978) but it did not yield reliable 
estimates of the variance of parameters. To address this problem, Serra, Goodwin, and 
Featherstone (2003) used Monte Carlo bootstrapping procedures to obtain consistent 
variance covariance estimates for the parameters in the model. Their results show that the 
absolute values of elasticities of the demand for crop insurance decreased from 1993 to 
2000 with the exception of 1996. The price elasticity is -0.57 and -0.13 in 1993 and 2000, 
respectively. They suggest that it is hard to increase crop insurance participation through 
premium subsidies or premium discounts.  
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Studies done by Babcock, Hart, and Hayes (2004) and Just, Calvin, and Quiggin 
(1999) imply that increasing net income instead of reducing risk is the major reason for 
crop insurance participation. Babcock, Hart, and Hayes also attribute the increase in crop 
insurance participation in high coverage levels in 2000 and 2001 to the decreased crop 
insurance premiums in the ARPA.  
Babcock and Hart (2005) examined the impacts of increased subsidies on 
producers’ coverage level decisions. County-level crop insurance participation data in 
1998 and 2002 were used in their analysis. Crop insurance coverage levels at or greater 
than 65% are referred as buy-up insurance. The percentage subsidy was used as an 
independent variable in the model to estimate how the percentage subsidy influences the 
proportion of insured acres above 65% in the total buy-up insured acres. The study implies 
that the demand for buy-up crop insurance policies would be increased by four times 
across corn, soybenas, and wheat if actuarially fair premiums are adopted. Since the 
proportions are used as the dependent variables, a two-limit Tobit model is constructed in 
their study due to the censoring in the data. The study also find that producers who 
participate in revenue insurance policies prefer high coverage levels. Babcock and Hart’s 
(2005) study implies that crop insurance subsidies have an effect on producers’ purchasing 
decisions and selections 
Most recently, O’Donoghue (2014) used county-level data in 1997 and 2002 to 
examine the impacts of crop insurance premium subsidies on the demand for crop. First 
differencing is applied in this analysis to control for time-invariant effects. Results show 
that the increases in subsidy rates under ARPA induced producers to participate in high 
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coverage levels and the influence varies across regions and crops. The elasticities of 
demand for corn liabilities with respect to subsidies are 0.13, 0.24, 0.25 in the Midwest 
(IL, IN, IA, OH), Lake (MI, MN, WI), and Northern Plains (KS, NE, SD), respectively. 
The elasticity of demand for wheat liabilities with respect to subsidies are 0.27 in the 
Northern Plains (KS, NE, ND, SD). The elasticities of demand for soybeans are 0.26 and 
0.17 in the Lake (IL, IN, IA, OH) and Northern Plains (KS, NE, ND, SD). 
Many of the existing studies find that the demand for crop insurance is price-
inelastic. Table 2 shows the elasticities reported by existing studies. The demand for crop 
insurance is price-inelastic if coverage levels are not differentiated. The only two studies 
which differentiate coverage levels show that demand for grape insurance is price-elastic 
at the 50% coverage level.  
Overall, coverage levels have received limited research efforts regarding the 
demand for crop insurance. Although the majority of the existing studies show that the 
demand for crop insurance is price-inelastic, elasticities may be different across levels of 
coverage.  
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Empirical Modeling Framework 
 
 Expected utility maximization is usually the theoretical framework in which the 
determinants of insurance purchases are examined. A representative producer is subject to 
constraints imposed by characteristics of marketing and production environment, such as 
commodity prices. Following Goodwin (1993), the maximization of the expected utility 
yields a linear equation, which is a function of the representative producer’s risk attitudes, 
and the production and marketing characteristics. The demand for corn insurance is given 
by 
 
i i iy X      
yi is the insurance purchase decision made by the producer under the utility maximization 
problem. iX  is a vector of factors that influence the expected utility of insurance and 1k is 
a random error term.  
Following Gardner and Kramer (1986) and Goodwin (1993), each county is treated 
as a representative farm. Although the utilization of county-level data could reduce the 
variation, compared to farm-level data, given the data availability, the county-level dataset 
is the best one which can be used for estimation of crop insurance demand. Since insurance 
premium and agricultural practice vary across crops, focusing on one crop could provide 
more reliable estimation results compared to mixed crops.  
The measure defined to quantify the crop insurance demand varies in previous 
studies, such as the percentage of insured acres used in Gardner and Kramer (1986), and 
premium less expected indemnities per dollar of liability in Cannon and Barnett (1995). 
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In this study, the quantity variable is constructed as the per dollar liabilities (liabilities 
divided by projected prices) per enrolled acre. Liabilities are the amount of indemnities if 
all losses occur, and are determined by the production conditions of insured acres, the 
product of insured acres, the projected price of the product. As Goodwin (1993) 
mentioned, the liability should be the true measure as the level of insurance. In Goodwin 
(1993), the dependent variable is the liability per planted acre of corn. However, insured 
acres should be preferred to the planted acres at the county-level to adjust liabilities as 
liabilities are determined by the characteristics of the insured acres, not the total planted 
acres, and the total corn planted acres are also controlled in the model. Moreover, the 
liabilities per enrolled acres are divided by the corn projected price in each county to 
estimate the per dollar purchases.  
 The definitions of the price variable in the analysis of crop insurance demand are 
as diverse as the measure for the quantity. The premium rate per acre (liabilities times the 
premium rate) is the commonly used term to measure the cost of insurance, such as in 
Smith and Baquet (1996). In this study, the normalized net premium (gross premium less 
subsidies) per insured acre divided by the projected price is used to estimate the cost of 
insurance per insured dollar. The premium per acre is the acre unit price, while the net 
premium per acre per (insured) dollar is the dollar unit price. So the normalized net 
premium per insured acre per insured dollar should be the true dollar unit price faced by 
producers. The net premium is calculated by subtracting the subsidies from the premium. 
All monetary variables in this study are normalized using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
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Following Babock and Hart (2005), insurance participation data in 1998 and 2002 
are selected for the present analysis based on the following reasons. The ARPA was 
authorized in June of 2000 and the implementation would be even later. Corn producers 
already made their decisions on insurance selection in 2000 before the application of 
ARPA (Appendix 1 for corn usual planting and harvesting dates, by states). Since the 
industry needs time to accommodate the changes, the participation data in 2001 is not as 
reflective of the changes in subsidies in crop demand as it is in later years. Therefore, 2002 
crop year data would be more reasonable to be used in the analysis.  
An ad hoc premium reduction program was introduced both in 1998 and 1999.  In 
1999, some producers might have not been aware of the premium reduction program. So 
the insurance participation data in the 1999 crop year may not fully reflect producers’ 
decisions with respect to premiums. Although the program also exited in 1998, it was 
introduced after producers made their participation decisions (Babcock and Halt 2005). 
Therefore, we could assume that producers made their participation decisions based on 
full information in 1998.  
In the literature, different estimation approaches were used. For example, a two-
stage model was used in Richards (1999) and Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone (2003) to 
adjust the non-participation problem. However, county-level data are used in this study 
and there is no server non-participation problem at the county level. The fixed effect model 
was used by Goodwin (1993) to estimate the demand for corn insurance by using panel 
data during 1985-1990. Since cross-sectional data (consisted of data for 1998 and 2002) 
are used to analyze the effects of subsidies in the ARPA in this study, fixed effects and 
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random effects are not considered in the present study. Therefore, OLS regression is used 
for the estimation of the demand for corn insurance in this study.  
In this study, APH and CRC are the focus because they were the two most popular 
insurance policies in 1998 and 2002. Considering the APH insurance plan provides yield 
protection for corn producers, while the CRC insurance plan provides revenue protection, 
instead of using the aggregate data, an improvement is that the two insurance plans are 
separated into different equations. 
 
Table 3. Definition of Variables in the Models 
Variables Definition Notation in this study 
dependent variable normalized liabilities per acre/projected price liab_cpi_acre_price 
price 
normalized net premium per acre/projected 
price 
netprem_cpi_acre_price 
expected yield average yield in the preceding three years mean_lag_yd3 
expected revenue average revenue in the preceding three years mean_lag_rev_cpi3 
cv of yield 
coefficient of variance for corn yield (1989-
2013) cv_yield 
cv of revenue 
coefficient of variance for revenue (1989-
2013) cv_rev 
planted acres planted acres acreplt 
enrolled acres in CRP enrolled acres in CRP crp 
percentage of irrigated 
cropland 
the ratio of acres of irrigated cropland to acres 
of total cropland in each county irr_per 
percentage of cropland 
operated by females 
the ratio of acres operated by females to acres 
of total cropland in each county fe_per 
 
 
 Table 3 provides a summary of the definition of each variable. The preceding 
three-year’s average yield is incorporated in the model to estimate producer’s expected 
yield (e.g., for 1998, the years 1997, 1996, and 1995 are used). One year lagged yield is a 
common term to estimate producer’s expectation of yield in the literature (e.g. Wang et. 
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al. 1998), however, the preceding three-year’s average yield should be preferable to the 
one year lagged term because agricultural production is quite variable and the preceding 
one year’s yield does not fully reflect the producer’s expectation of the yield and the 
variability of yield. Meanwhile, as the technology developments, the preceding three-
year’s average yield should be preferable to the mean of historical yield used in previous 
studies, such as the average yield in the preceding 10 years used by Goodwin, Vandeveer, 
and Deal (2004). Similarly, the preceding three-year’s revenue is used to estimate 
producers’ revenue expectation in the CRC equations.   
O’Donoghue (2014) as well as Goodwin and Ker (1998) included the yield 
variance in the study of crop insurance. The coefficient of variance (CV) for yield is 
included in the current model to estimate the relative yield risk of the county. Using the 
CV for yield is better than the yield variance because the CV estimates the relative yield 
risk while the variance of yield reflects the absolute yield risk. Because of the significant 
difference in the mean yield in the four regions, relative yield risk is preferable to the 
absolute yield risk. In this study, historical corn yield data in 1989 through 2013 are used 
to compute the CV for each county.  
The total corn planted acres are incorporated in the model since a potential 
correlation is expected between the planted acres and the insurance purchases.  The 
enrolled acres of CRP are used as an independent variable because it is impossible to 
purchase insurance protection for acres enrolled in the CRP.  
The percentage of irrigated cropland in each county is controlled in the model as 
this item could reflect the production environment and affect the distribution of yield. 
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Women tend to be more risk averse than men (Charness and Gneeze 2012), thus the 
percentage of cropland operated by females is also incorporated in the equations.  
 
Data 
 
 The data utilized in this analysis were drawn from three major sources. The 
primary data source is USDA, Risk Management Agency (RMA) administrative data. The 
individual data are aggregated to the county-level by crop type and crop insurance policy 
at each coverage level. Information about insured acres, total premium, liabilities, and 
subsidies is available from RMA’s Summary of Business Report (SBR) publications. The 
SBR publications report participation data from 1989 through 2014 and contain spatially 
identifying information. Thus the participation data can be combined with other datasets. 
There are about 2,000 observations for each year during the time period in the SBR 
publication. Among all the counties, the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and 
Southern Plains are the focus of this study. The states in each region are reported in table 
4.  
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Table 4. Regional Division Definition 
Regions States Included 
Corn Belt (CB) Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio 
Lake States (LS) Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin 
Northern Plains (NP) Kansas, and Nebraska, and South Dakoda 
Southern Plains (SP) New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas 
 
 
 USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) surveys provide county-
level data about crop yield and total planted acres in each crop. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) provides the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI). In this study, all 
monetary variables are normalized by deflating with the CPI. Data about irrigated 
cropland and acres operated by females and males are obtained from National Agricultural 
Statistics Services (NASS)’s 1997 and 2002 Censuses of Agriculture. County-level data 
on participation in Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is collected from USDA, Farm 
Service Agency (FSA) to estimate the effect of CRP acreage on insurance demand.   
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Demand Estimation 
 
 Figure 6 shows the county average yield in 1989-2013. Figure 7 shows the 
coefficient of variation (CV) of yield at the county level. The CV is calculated as the ratio 
of the standard deviation of yield to the mean of yield. The standard deviation and the 
mean of yield are calculated using the historical data from 1989 to 2013. As shown in 
figures 6 and 7, agricultural crop production is concentrated by region. To target the 
estimation on moderately homogeneous regions, the empirical model was applied in the 
four following regions: Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains 
(estimation results for other regions are also reported in the appendix). Table 4 lists the 
states included in each region. The four regions account for more than 80% of total corn 
planted acres both in 1998 and 2002. Detailed production information is presented in Table 
5.  
 
 
Figure 6. County Average Yield in 1989-2013 (irrigated and non-irrigated) 
Source: USDA NASS. 
 30 
 
 
 
Figure 7. County Average Coefficients of Variation (CV) of Yield in 1989-2013 
Source: USDA NASS. 
 
 
Table 5. Corn Planted Acres in Each State 
States Planted Acres in 
1998 
Percentage of 
Total Planted 
Acres in 1998 
Planted Acres in 
2002 
Percentage of 
Total Planted 
Acres in 2002 
IL 10,600,000 13.22% 11,100,000 14.07% 
IN 5,800,000 7.24% 5,400,000 6.84% 
IA 12,500,000 15.59% 12,200,000 15.46% 
MS 2,650,000 3.31% 2,800,000 3.55% 
OH 3,550,000 4.43% 3,250,000 4.12% 
MI 2,300,000 2.87% 2,250,000 2.85% 
MN 7,300,000 9.11% 7,200,000 9.13% 
WI 3,700,000 4.62% 3,650,000 4.63% 
KS 3,000,000 3.74% 3,250,000 4.12% 
NE 8,800,000 10.98% 8,400,000 10.65% 
SD 3,900,000 4.86% 4,450,000 5.64% 
NM 140,000 0.17% 140,000 0.18% 
OK 270,000 0.34% 240,000 0.30% 
TX 2,400,000 2.99% 2,050,000 2.60% 
SUM 
 
83.47% 
 
84.14% 
 
Source: USDA NASS. 
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 Figure 8 shows the total planted acres in the four regions. The Corn Belt is the 
major corn production region in the U.S., and the average planted acres in this region is 
more than 80 million acres in 1980-2014. On average, the planted acres in the Corn Belt 
account for more than 40% of the total corn planted acres in the U.S. during this period. 
The Lake States was the second largest corn production area, but it has been surpassed by 
the Northern Plains since 1996. The planted acres in the Lake States account for 17% of 
the total planted acres in the country. The Northern Plains is also a major corn production 
area. On average, it accounts for 19% of total corn planted acres in 1980-2014. Planted 
acres in the Southern Plains is stable, and it only accounts for 3% of the total planted acres 
in the U.S. on average.  
 
 
Figure 8. Corn Planted Acre in 1980-2014 
Source: USDA, NASS. 
 
 
 
0.00E+00
5.00E+06
1.00E+07
1.50E+07
2.00E+07
2.50E+07
3.00E+07
3.50E+07
4.00E+07
A
cr
es
Corn Belt Lake States Northern Plains Southern Plains
 32 
 
 
 Figure 9 shows the mean yield in the four regions in 1989-2013. The average yield 
in the Corn Belt is the highest (132 bu/acre). The average yield in the Lake States is 119 
bu/acre, which is slightly higher than it is in the Northern Plains. The yield in the Southern 
Plains is the lowest (94 bu/acre).  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Average Corn Yield (average over 1989-2013) 
Source: USDA, NASS. 
 
 
 
 Not only the mean yield varies across the regions, the coefficient of variation (CV) 
of yield also differs. Figure 10 shows the values of the CV of yield in each region. 
Although the Corn Belt has the highest yield, it has the lowest CV among the four regions, 
while the Sourthern Plains has the highest relative risk.  
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Figure 10. Average Coefficient of Variation of Yield (average over 1989-2013) 
Source: USDA, NASS. 
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Table 6. Estimation Results for Corn APH in the Corn Belt 
  Coverage Level 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.047** -0.018 -0.170*** -0.114*** -0.137*** -0.149*** -0.230*** 0.017 
 -0.021 -0.05 -0.049 -0.027 -0.028 -0.055 -0.074 -0.101 
lg_mean_lag_yd3 0.416*** 0.493** 0.341** 0.276*** 0.300*** 0.534*** 0.730*** 0.237 
 -0.067 -0.202 -0.146 -0.061 -0.087 -0.093 -0.225 -0.247 
lg_cv_yield -0.080* -0.048 -0.077 -0.130*** -0.097* -0.112** 0.035 -0.204* 
 -0.041 -0.122 -0.078 -0.041 -0.05 -0.051 -0.103 -0.105 
lg_acreplt 0.067*** 0.117*** 0.051** 0.063*** 0.030** 0.021 0.029 0.100*** 
 -0.013 -0.040 -0.023 -0.011 -0.015 -0.018 -0.037 -0.029 
lg_crp_acre -0.012** -0.028* -0.022** 0.0004 0.004 0.010 -0.010 -0.022 
 -0.006 -0.016 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.013 -0.018 
irr_per -0.100 -0.171 0.026 0.065 0.060 0.112 -0.159 -0.174 
 -0.085 -0.178 -0.126 -0.076 -0.064 -0.102 -0.144 -0.313 
fe_per -0.148 0.609 -0.162 0.064 -0.705 -0.843 0.075 -0.671 
 -0.498 -0.895 -1.159 -0.444 -0.588 -0.753 -0.757 -1.485 
Constant 1.251*** 0.543 2.201*** 2.147*** 2.587*** 1.568*** 1.186 2.073* 
 -0.302 -0.993 -0.682 -0.265 -0.414 -0.475 -1.157 -1.124 
         
Observations 399 141 225 456 376 363 98 73 
R-squared 0.536 0.482 0.44 0.621 0.467 0.557 0.522 0.442 
F-stats 66.91 12.7 27.2 83.83 32.52 49.55 18.62 10.09 
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-
Weisberg Test X X X X X X X X 
Model Specification Test   X X           
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (Robust) standard errors presented below the 
parameters estimated. 
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Table 7. Estimation Results for Corn APH in Lake States 
  Coverage Level 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price 
-
0.180*** 
-
0.138*** 
-
0.138*** 
-
0.153*** 
-0.114** 
-
0.157*** 
-0.203** 
-
0.192 
 
-0.031 -0.049 -0.043 -0.025 -0.045 -0.053 -0.08 
-
1.463 
lg_mean_lag_yd3 0.418*** 0.336*** 0.644*** 0.557*** 0.551*** 0.756*** 0.583 
-
0.186 
 
-0.102 -0.129 -0.145 -0.071 -0.127 -0.145 -0.395 
-
5.717 
lg_cv_yield -0.098** -0.188** 0.056 0.072 -0.064 0.019 -0.248 
-
0.103 
 
-0.041 -0.078 -0.109 -0.087 -0.068 -0.074 -0.161 -0.91 
lg_acreplt 0.023* 0.055*** 0.055** 0.060*** 0.097*** 0.033 0.233*** 
-
0.047 
 
-0.013 -0.021 -0.023 -0.014 -0.027 -0.025 -0.073 
-
0.579 
lg_crp_acre -0.014** -0.018* -0.020** -0.011** -0.024** -0.002 -0.095** 0.009 
 
-0.005 -0.01 -0.01 -0.005 -0.01 -0.011 -0.035 
-
0.348 
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Table 7. Continued. 
  Coverage Level 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
irr_per -0.273** -0.121 -0.166 0.007 -0.099 -0.031 0.196 -2.186 
 -0.112 -0.129 -0.165 -0.089 -0.134 -0.182 -0.351 -13.961 
fe_per -0.172 0.418 0.606 0.655 0.986* -1.171 4.523** -5.217 
 -0.45 -0.806 -0.739 -0.401 -0.584 -0.906 -1.825 -16.13 
Constant 1.833*** 1.777*** 0.862 1.301*** 0.817 0.736 -0.339 6.433 
 -0.439 -0.631 -0.67 -0.306 -0.635 -0.624 -1.866 -33.493 
         
Observations 283 170 186 286 180 153 39 9 
R-squared 0.618 0.497 0.506 0.686 0.575 0.533 0.651 0.678 
F-stats 52.23 20.45 24.98 64.37 18.66 25.7 8.28 0.3 
[p-value] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8888 
Breusch-
Pagan/ 
Cook-
Weisberg 
Test 
X X X X X X 
  
Model 
Specification 
Test 
      X X   X   
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (Robust) standard errors presented below the 
parameters estimated. 
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Table 8. Estimation Results for Corn APH in Northern Plains 
 
  Coverage Level 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.121** -0.004 
-
0.305*** 0.001 -0.097 -0.188* 
-
0.259** -0.284** 
 -0.053 -0.09 -0.071 -0.032 -0.09 -0.104 -0.111 -0.125 
lg_mean_lag_yd3 0.698*** 0.724*** 0.599*** 0.848*** 0.720*** 0.530*** 0.890** -0.257* 
 -0.116 -0.17 -0.151 -0.051 -0.147 -0.173 -0.336 -0.15 
lg_cv_yield 
-
0.319*** -0.257 -0.164 
-
0.174*** -0.057 -0.174 0.082 -0.618*** 
 -0.068 -0.159 -0.117 -0.038 -0.075 -0.107 -0.247 -0.148 
lg_acreplt 0.068*** 0.047 0.051** 0.029*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 0.002 -0.005 
 -0.017 -0.034 -0.026 -0.007 -0.025 -0.026 -0.056 -0.035 
lg_crp_acre 
-
0.032*** 
-
0.092*** 0.0005 -0.017** -0.007 -0.026 0.005 -0.041* 
 -0.012 -0.025 -0.021 -0.007 -0.013 -0.018 -0.024 -0.02 
irr_per -0.196** -0.238 -0.039 -0.041 -0.007 -0.054 0.142 -0.237 
 -0.082 -0.198 -0.155 -0.051 -0.092 -0.119 -0.244 -0.155 
fe_per 0.769 0.543 0.65 -0.018 1.247 1.209 2.436 1.366 
 -0.852 -1.454 -1.009 -0.39 -1.187 -1.123 -2.617 -1.314 
Constant -0.303 0.393 0.671 -0.336 0.114 1.206 0.533 5.798*** 
 -0.535 -0.735 -0.659 -0.238 -0.643 -0.76 -1.496 -0.951 
         
Observations 288 103 131 335 239 241 64 38 
R-squared 0.672 0.612 0.596 0.806 0.596 0.465 0.399 0.693 
F-stats 80.75 21.41 25.92 244.3 49.63 41.01 17.24 16.62 
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-
Weisberg Test X    X X X X 
Model specification test X     X         
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (Robust) standard errors presented below the 
parameters estimated. 
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Table 9. Estimation Results for Corn APH in Southern Plains 
  Coverage Level 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.221** -0.131 -0.248* -0.216* -0.155 -0.654*** 
 -0.102 -0.161 -0.127 -0.119 -0.134 -0.126 
lg_mean_lag_yd3 0.469*** 0.569** 0.455** 0.702*** 0.781*** 0.850*** 
 -0.109 -0.209 -0.167 -0.079 -0.132 -0.17 
lg_cv_yield -0.474*** -0.026 -0.167 -0.129* 0.09 0.002 
 -0.119 -0.231 -0.151 -0.0754 -0.13 -0.197 
lg_acreplt -0.007 0.0333 -0.021 0.016 0.001 -0.03 
 -0.023 -0.060 -0.042 -0.017 -0.0251 -0.0354 
lg_crp_acre 0.029** -0.005 0.040* 0.007 0.046*** 0.029* 
 -0.012 -0.028 -0.021 -0.01 -0.017 -0.017 
irr_per 0.312** 0.634** 0.615** 0.439*** 0.525** 0.232 
 -0.143 -0.279 -0.251 -0.132 -0.196 -0.228 
fe_per 0.426 -0.121 -1.175 0.586 1.553 -2.079* 
 -0.872 -1.63 -1.437 -0.683 -1.132 -1.03 
Constant 0.821 0.892 1.742* 0.55 0.225 1.757** 
 -0.505 -1.159 -0.888 -0.452 -0.695 -0.838 
       
Observations 111 31 39 143 54 35 
R-squared 0.832 0.759 0.864 0.748 0.829 0.894 
F-stats 104.62 10.36 28.25 90.9 31.91 32.66 
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test X   X   
Model Specification Test       X     
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (Robust) standard errors presented below the 
parameters estimate.
 39 
 
 
The Demand for Corn APH Insurance 
 
 The estimation results for APH demand are summarized in tables 6 through 9 for 
the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains, respectively. The prefix 
“lg_” denotes that the variable is measured in logarithm. Breusch-Pagan (1979) and Cook-
Weisberg (1983) test is applied to test for heteroskedasticity. The variances of error are all 
equal is assumed in the null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg test. 
“X”s in the rows of Breusch-Pagan/Cook Weisberg test in tables 6 through 9 indicate the 
regressions are rejected by the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence interval, and robust 
standard errors are used in these regressions.  
In this study, link tests are applied to test for model specification. The basic idea 
of the link test is that any additional independent variable should be statistically 
insignificant if the model is correctly specified (Bruin 2006). According to Bruin (2006), 
the link test creates two variables: predicted dependent variable (y_hat) and the square of 
the predicted dependent variable (y_hatsq). Then the model is refit only using these two 
variables as predictors. In this study, the results of link tests suggest that models are well 
specified excepted at the 55% and 60% coverage levels in the Corn Belt, at the 65%, 70%, 
and 80% coverage levels in the Lake States, at the 50% coverage level in the Northern 
Plains, and at the 65% coverage level in the Southern Plains.  
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To address the misspecification problem, linear-linear models are used at the 55% 
and 60% coverage levels in the Corn Belt (table 10), the linear-log models are used at the 
65%, 70%, and 80% coverage levels in the Lake States (table 11), the linear-log model is 
used at the 50% coverage level in the Northern Plains (table 12), and the log-linear model 
is used at the 65% coverage level in the Southern Plains (table 13). Furthermore, variance 
inflation factors are used to diagnose collinearity problem. Among all the estimations, the 
highest VIF is less than 10. Therefore, multicollinearity does not appear to be a 
considerable problem. Elasticities at the 55% and 60% coverage levels in the Corn Belt, 
the 50% coverage level in the Northern Plains, and the 65% coverage level in the Southern 
Plains are calculated at variable means at each coverage level and region and are reported 
in tables 14 through 17. 
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Table 10. Estimation Results for Corn APH in the Corn Belt (55% and 60%) 
  
Coverage Level 
 Variable 55% 60% 
   
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.579 -2.070*** 
 -0.516 -0.462 
mean_lag_yd3 0.174*** 0.175*** 
 -0.066 -0.055 
lg_cv_yield -5.798 -8.505* 
 -6.051 -4.614 
lg_acreplt 5.333*** 3.294*** 
 -1.33 -1.21 
lg_crp_acre -1.422** -1.458** 
 -0.683 -0.633 
irr_per -10.394 -1.042 
 -9.526 -7.889 
fe_per 6.366 6.304 
 -43.302 -58.792 
Constant -16.85 11.249 
 -15.151 -13.945 
   
Observations 141 225 
R-squared 0.53 0.459 
F-stats 21.44 41.14 
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test   X 
 
Note: Dependent variables are liab_cpi_acre_price in both regressions.  
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(Robust) standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. 
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Table 11. Estimation Results for Corn APH in the Lake States (65%, 70%, and 80%) 
  Coverage Level 
Variable 65% 70% 80% 
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -9.083*** -6.773** -14.086** 
 -1.355 -2.717 -6.381 
lg_mean_lag_yd3 33.320*** 40.167*** 49.572 
 -3.607 -7.351 -31.399 
lg_cv_yield 2.283 -2.219 -17.871 
 -3.211 -4.201 -12.752 
lg_acreplt 2.594*** 4.923*** 18.149*** 
 -0.696 -1.358 -5.829 
lg_crp_acre -0.474* -1.183** -6.948** 
 -0.246 -0.531 -2.745 
irr_per -1.353 -6.674 13.896 
 -4.663 -9.084 -27.894 
fe_per 18.565 54.16 329.995** 
 -20.198 -36.319 -144.933 
Constant -99.285*** -158.151*** -310.968** 
 -15.842 -36.275 -148.208 
    
Observations 286 180 39 
R-squared 0.701 0.554 0.638 
F-stats 81.67 27.3 7.79 
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test X X   
 
Note: Dependent variables are liab_cpi_acre_price in the regressions.  
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(Robust) standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. 
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Table 12. Estimation Results for Corn APH in the Northern Plains (50%) 
Variable 50% Variable 65% 
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -8.017*** netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.544 
 -1.965  -0.352 
lg_mean_lag_yd3 25.329*** mean_lag_yd3 0.433*** 
 -3.685  -0.025 
lg_cv_yield -13.578*** lg_cv_yield -8.293*** 
 -2.558  -1.941 
lg_acreplt 1.948*** lg_acreplt 0.909** 
 -0.573  -0.369 
lg_crp_acre -0.826* lg_crp_acre -0.339 
 -0.465  -0.36 
irr_per -1.404 irr_per 3.433 
 -3.5  -2.591 
fe_per 27.311 fe_per 4.258 
 -28.124  -19.801 
Constant -100.762*** Constant -6.48 
 -16.684  -5.718 
    
Observations 288 Observations 335 
R-squared 0.699 R-squared 0.838 
F-stats 92.76 F-stats 241.26 
[p-value] 0.0000 [p-value] 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg 
Test   
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg 
Test   
 
 Note: Dependent variables are liab_cpi_acre_price in the regressions.  
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. 
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Table 13. Estimation Results for Corn APH in the Southern Plains (65%) 
Variable 65% 
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.037** 
 -0.019 
mean_lag_yd3 0.007*** 
 -0.001 
cv_yield 0.307 
 -0.455 
lg_acreplt 0.007 
 -0.017 
lg_crp_acre 0.016 
 -0.013 
irr_per 0.569*** 
 -0.159 
fe_per 0.01 
 -0.813 
Constant 3.007*** 
 -0.255 
  
Observations 144 
R-squared 0.722 
F-stats 104.46 
[p-value] 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test X 
 
Note: Dependent variable is lg_liab_cpi_acre_price. 
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. 
 
  
 In the Lake States, there are only nine observations at the 85% coverage level, 
which results in limited power for the F-test (table 7). Among all the other coverage levels 
and regions, the p-values of the F-tests are zero to four decimal places (table 6-13), which 
mean that the models are statistically significant. In table 6-13, the coefficients of 
determination, or R2, range from 0.399 (at the 80% coverage level in the Northern Plains) 
to 0.894 (at the 75% coverage level in the Southern Plains), which suggests that the model 
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could explain from 39.9% to 89.4% of the total variation in the demand for liabilities by 
the variation in the independent variables. The results indicate that explanatory variables 
explain the demand for corn APH insurance fairly well. 
The elasticities of demand with respect to each variable are reported in tables 14 
through 17 for the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains, 
respectively. The negative correlation between the per dollar net premium and the amount 
of per dollar liability purchases (table 14-17) is consistent with theoretical expectations. 
In the Corn Belt (table 14), the elasticity of demand with respect to per dollar net premium 
at the 50% coverage level is small (-0.047), and the elasticity at the 55% is statistically 
insignificant (-0.028). The results in table 14 imply that corn producers in the Corn Belt 
are not likely to significantly change their demand for corn APH insurance at the 50% and 
55% coverage levels due to the changes in subsidies. These producers may purchase the 
low coverage levels to meet the requirements for loan applications. As shown in table 14, 
the price elasticities are statistically significant but inelastic at the 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 
and 80% coverage levels (-0.106, -0.114, -0.137, -0.149, -0.230, respectively). Although 
they are all price-inelastic, the elasticity at 80% coverage level (-0.230) is about five times 
of the elasticity at the 50% coverage level (-0.047). The results imply that producers are 
more sensitive to changes in premium at high coverage levels (e.g. 80% coverage level) 
than low coverage levels (e.g. 50% and 55%) in the Corn Belt. The results also prove the 
importance of differentiating coverage levels in the analysis of demand for corn insurance 
(table 14).   
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Table 14. Estimated Demand for Corn APH Insurance in the Corn Belt 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.047** -0.028 -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.137*** -0.149*** -0.230*** 0.017 
mean_lag_yd3 0.416*** 0.377*** 0.347*** 0.276*** 0.300*** 0.534*** 0.730*** 0.237 
cv_yield -0.080* -0.096 -0.128* -0.130*** -0.097* -0.112** 0.035 -0.204* 
acreplt 0.067*** 0.088*** 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.030** 0.021 0.029 0.100*** 
crp_acre -0.012** -0.024*** -0.022** 0.0004 0.004 0.01 -0.01 -0.022 
irr_per -0.100 -0.172 -0.016 0.065 0.06 0.112 -0.159 -0.174 
fe_per -0.148 0.105 0.095 0.064 -0.705 -0.843 0.075 -0.671 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors presented below the 
parameters estimated. 
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 In table 14, the elasticities of demand with respect to the preceding three-year’s 
average yield is statistically significant in the Corn Belt at each coverage level, except for 
the 85% coverage level (0.416, 0.377, 0.347, 0.276, 0.300, 0.534, and 0.730, respectively). 
So except for the 85% coverage level, corn producers in the Corn Belt with higher 
expected yield tend to purchase more APH insurance.  
In the Corn Belt, the relative yield risk has statistically significant effects at each 
coverage level, except for the 55% and 80% coverage levels (table 14). Corn producers 
with higher relative yield risk tend to insure less acres at these coverage levels (50%, 60%, 
65%, 70%, 75%, and 85%), but the magnitude is modest (table 14). As shown in table 14, 
the magnitude of relative yield risk elasticity is the largest at the 85% coverage level 
(-0.204), and it is more than 2.5 times the elasticity at the 50% coverage level (-0.080), 
which implies that producers’ purchase decisions on per dollar liabilities at the 85% 
coverage level are more responsive of the relative yield risk. 
The signs for corn planted acres in the Corn Belt are in line with expectations (table 
14 row 5). The elasticities of demand with respect to corn planted acres range from 0.021 
to 0.100 (at the 75% and 85% coverage level, respectively). With a 10% increase in the 
corn planted acres, the purchases of per dollar liabilities would be increased by 1.00% at 
the 85% coverage level.  
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In the Corn Belt, the enrolled acres of CRP have only modest effects on the demand 
for corn insurance (table 14 row 6), and there are only statistically significant effects at 
the relatively low coverage levels (50%, 55%, and 60%). The per dollar liability purchases 
would decrease by 0.12%, 0.24%, and 0.22% with a 10% increase in the CRP enrolled 
acres at the 50%, 55%, and 60% coverage level, respectively. And the correlation between 
the enrolled acres in CRP and the APH purchases is not statistically significant at high 
coverage levels, such as the 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels.  
Although the percentage of irrigated cropland could reflect the production 
environment and the percentage of cropland operated by females could affect the risk 
averse coefficients, the two variables have statistically insignificant effects on the demand 
for corn APH insurance across all coverage levels in the Corn Belt (table 14 rows 7 and 
8).  
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Table 15. Estimated Demand for Corn APH in the Lake States 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.180*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.147*** -0.094** -0.157*** -0.158** 
mean_lag_yd3 0.418*** 0.336*** 0.644*** 0.540*** 0.558*** 0.756*** 0.557 
cv_yield -0.098** -0.188** 0.056 0.037 -0.031 0.019 -0.201 
acreplt 0.023* 0.055*** 0.055** 0.042*** 0.068*** 0.033 0.204*** 
crp_acre -0.014** -0.018* -0.020** -0.008* -0.016** -0.002 -0.078** 
irr_per -0.273** -0.121 -0.166 -0.022 -0.093 -0.031 0.156 
fe_per -0.172 0.418 0.606 0.301 0.752 -1.171 3.709** 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors presented below the 
parameters estimated. 
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 There is no effective sample size for regression at the 85% coverage level in the 
Lake States with nine observations, so the estimated elasticities at the 85% coverage level 
are not reported in table 15. In the Lake States (table 15), the premium effects are 
statistically significant and negative across all coverage levels. The elasticities of demand 
for corn APH insurance with respect to per dollar premium vary across coverage levels 
(table 15). For example, the elasticity of demand for corn APH insurance with respect to 
per dollar premium is -0.180 at the 50% coverage level in the Lake States, while the 
corresponding elasticity is -0.094 at the 70% coverage level in this region (table 15). The 
magnitude of elasticities of demand for corn APH insurance with respect to per dollar 
premium are relatively large at the lowest coverage level and the highest coverage levels.  
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The average yield in the preceding three years appears to have statistically 
significant and positive effects on the demand for crop insurance with the exception of the 
80% coverage level. Among the other six coverage levels (50% to 75%), the elasticities 
for the average yield in the preceding three years range from 0.336 (55% coverage level) 
to 0.756 (75% coverage level), which are inelastic (table 15). The relative yield risk only 
has statistically significant effects at the 50% and 55% coverage levels, and the elasticity 
of demand for corn APH insurance with respect to relative yield risk is -0.098 and -0.188 
at the 50% and 55% coverage level, respectively (table 15). As expected, the elasticities 
of demand for corn APH insurance with respect to planted acres are statistically significant 
and positive (table 15 row 4) except for the 75% coverage level. The elasticities of demand 
for corn APH insurance with respect to the enrolled acres of CRP are in line with 
expectations. The elasticities of demand for corn APH insurance with respect to the 
irrigated acres are only statistically significant at the 10% confidence interval at the 50% 
coverage level in the Lake States. So with a ten percentage point increase in irrigated acres, 
the per dollar liability purchase for corn APH insurance is expected to decrease by 2.73% 
at the 50% coverage land (table 15). As shown in table 15, the elasticity of demand for 
corn APH insurance with respect to percentage of female operated cropland only has a 
statistically significant effect at the 80% coverage level and it is elastic (3.709). With a 
one percentage point increase in the percentage of female operated cropland, the purchase 
for corn APH insurance would increase by 3.71% at the 80% coverage level in the Lake 
States.  
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Table 16. Estimated Demand for Corn APH in the Northern Plains 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.170*** -0.004 -0.305*** -0.038 -0.097 -0.188* -0.259** -0.284** 
mean_lag_yd3 0.538*** 0.724*** 0.599*** 0.809*** 0.720*** 0.530*** 0.890** -0.257* 
cv_yield -0.289*** -0.257 -0.164 -0.137*** -0.057 -0.174 0.082 -0.618*** 
acreplt 0.041*** 0.047 0.051** 0.015*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 0.002 -0.005 
crp_acre -0.018* -0.092*** 0.0005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.026 0.005 -0.041* 
irr_per -0.030 -0.238 -0.039 0.057 -0.007 -0.054 0.142 -0.237 
fe_per 0.581 0.543 0.650 0.070 1.247 1.209 2.436 1.366 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors presented below the 
parameters estimated. 
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 The elasticities of demand for APH insurance in the Northern Plains are 
summarized in table 16. The elasticity of demand with respect to per dollar premium at 
the 85% coverage level (-0.284) is approximately 1.7 times of the elasticity at the 50% 
coverage level (-0.170). The average corn yield in the preceding three years has 
statistically significant effects at each coverage level, but the effects change across 
coverage levels (table 16). The per dollar purchase of corn APH insurance is expected to 
increase by 0.809% with 1% increase in the yield expectation at the 65% coverage level, 
while it is expected to increase by 0.257% with 1% increase in the yield expectation at the 
85% coverage level. As shown in table 16, the relative yield risk has statistically 
significant effects on the demand at the 50%, 65%, and 85% coverage levels (-0.289, -
0.137, and -0.618, respectively). The elasticity of demand with respect to relative risk at 
the 85% coverage level (-0.618) is approximately 4.5 times of the elasticity at the 65% 
coverage level which is -0.137 (table 16). The elasticity of demand with respect to the 
enrolled acres in CRP is only statistically significant at the 50%, 55%, and 85% coverage 
levels and the magnitude of elasticity varies across these three coverage levels (table 16). 
Similar as the Corn Belt, the percentage of the irrigated cropland and the percentage of 
female operated cropland do not have statistically significant effect on producers’ 
purchase decisions on corn APH insurance.  
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Table 17. Estimated Demand for Corn APH in the Southern Plains 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.221** -0.131 -0.248* -0.227** -0.155 -0.654*** 
mean_lag_yd3 0.469*** 0.569** 0.455** 0.711 0.781*** 0.850*** 
cv_yield -0.474*** -0.026 -0.167 0.09 0.0898 0.00228 
acreplt -0.00714 0.0333 -0.0209 0.007 0.0012 -0.0298 
crp_acre 0.0286** -0.0047 0.0402* 0.016 0.0456*** 0.0287* 
irr_per 0.312** 0.634** 0.615** 0.569*** 0.525** 0.232 
fe_per 0.426 -0.121 -1.175 0.010 1.553 -2.079* 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Robust standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. 
 
 In the Southern Plains, coverage levels are only available for 50% to 75% with a 
5% increment (table 17). The elasticity of demand with respect to per dollar liabilities at 
the 75% coverage level (-0.654) is approximately three times of the elasticity at the 50% 
coverage level (-0.221). The historical average yield has statistically significant effects at 
each coverage level (0.469, 0.569, 0.455, 0.711 0.781, and 0.850 at the 50%, 55%, 60%, 
65%, 70%, and 75%, respectively). The relative yield risk only has statistically significant 
effects at the 50% coverage level (-0.474) (table 17). There is no statistically significant 
effects of corn planted acres on the demand for APH insurance in the Southern Plains 
(table 17). The elasticities of demand for corn APH insurance with respect to the enrolled 
acres of CRP are statistically significant and positive at the 50%, 60%, 70% and 75% 
coverage levels (table 17). Producers normally enroll cropland with low productivity in 
the CRP program. As more land enrolled in the CRP program, the expected yield for the 
remaining cropland would increase. At the 50%, 60%, 70% and 75% coverage levels, the 
relationship between the expected yield and the demand for corn APH insurance is 
statistically significant and positive. So that more acres enrolled in the CRP program 
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would results in higher expected yield and more corn APH insurance purchases in the 
Southern Plains.  
 Unlike other regions, the elasticities of demand for corn APH insurance with 
respect to the percentage of irrigated cropland is statistically significant at most coverage 
levels (55%, 60%, 65%, and 70%). The elasticities of demand for corn APH insurance 
with respect to the percentage of irrigated cropland are inelastic (0.312, 0.634, 0.615, 
0.569, 0.525, and 0.232 at the 55%, 60%, 65%, and 70%, respectively). The female effects 
are statistically significant and negative at the 75% coverage level (table 17).  
Table 18 reproduces the results in table 14 through 17 for the elasticities of demand 
for APH insurance with respect to per dollar net premium, the planted acres, and the 
average yield in the preceding three years, and the relative yield risk across regions.  
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Table 18. Estimation Elasticities of Demand for APH Insurance 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Robust standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. 
 
  
Generally, the elasticities of corn APH insurance demand with respect to per dollar 
of net premium change across coverage levels and regions (table 18). Although the 
premium effects vary among coverage levels and regions, there is a pattern. The 
elasticities of demand for corn APH insurance with respect to per dollar net premium tend 
to be larger at relatively high coverage levels (table 18). Take the Corn Belt as an example 
to illustrate the changes among coverage levels. As shown in table 18, the elasticity of 
demand for corn APH insurance with respect to per dollar net premium is -0.230 at the 
80% coverage level, which is about five times of the elasticity at the 50% coverage level 
(-0.047). Also, in the Southern Plains the elasticity of demand with respect to per dollar 
premium is -0.654 at the 75% coverage level, which is approximately three times of the 
elasticity at the 50% coverage level (-0.221) (table 18). The elasticities of demand for corn 
APH_50 APH_55 APH_60 APH_65 APH_70 APH_75 APH_80 APH_85
netprem_cpi_acre_price Corn Belt -0.047** -0.028 -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.137*** -0.149*** -0.230*** 0.017
Lake States -0.180*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.147*** -0.094** -0.157*** -0.158**
Northern Plains -0.170*** -0.004 -0.305*** -0.038 -0.097 -0.188* -0.259** -0.284**
Southern Plains -0.221** -0.131 -0.248* -0.227** -0.155 -0.654***
acreplt Corn Belt 0.067*** 0.088*** 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.030** 0.021 0.029 0.100***
Lake States 0.023* 0.055*** 0.055** 0.042*** 0.068*** 0.033 0.204***
Northern Plains 0.041*** 0.047 0.051** 0.015*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 0.002 -0.005
Southern Plains -0.007 0.033 -0.021 0.007 0.001 -0.030
mean_lag_yd3 Corn Belt 0.416*** 0.377*** 0.347*** 0.276*** 0.300*** 0.534*** 0.730*** 0.237
Lake States 0.418*** 0.336*** 0.644*** 0.54*** 0.558*** 0.756*** 0.557
Northern Plains 0.538*** 0.724*** 0.599*** 0.809*** 0.720*** 0.530*** 0.890** -0.257*
Southern Plains 0.469*** 0.569** 0.455** 0.711 0.781*** 0.850***
cv_yield Corn Belt -0.080* -0.096 -0.128* -0.130*** -0.097* -0.112** 0.035 -0.204*
Lake States -0.098** -0.188** 0.056 0.037 -0.031 0.019 -0.201
Northern Plains -0.289*** -0.257 -0.164 -0.137*** -0.057 -0.174 0.082 -0.618***
Southern Plains -0.474*** -0.026 -0.167 0.090 0.090 0.002
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APH insurance with respect to per dollar net premium also tend to be larger in riskier 
regions. In table 18, at the 75% coverage level, the magnitude of elasticities of corn APH 
insurance with respect to per dollar net premium are -0.149, -0.157, -0.188, and -0.654 in 
the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains, respectively. The 
increasing magnitude is consistent with increasing relative yield risk and the decreasing 
expected yield through the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains 
(figures 9 and 10). As shown in figures 9 and 10, the corn production in the Corn Belt has 
the highest expected yield and lowest relative yield risk among the four regions, while 
corn production exhibits the lowest expected yield and the highest relative yield risk in the 
Southern Plains. Corn producers are exposed to higher risk in the Southern Plains and are 
more responsive to the changes in premium than producers in the other three regions.  
Generally, more corn planted acres would induce more insured acres among most 
coverage levels in the Corn Belt, Lake States, and Northern Plains, but the relationship 
between the planted acres and the demand for corn APH insurance is statistically 
insignificant in the Southern Plains (table 18). As the total corn planted acres decrease 
through the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains, the effects of 
the planted acres on the demand for corn insurance diminish. For example, at the 65% 
coverage level the elasticities of demand for corn APH insurance with respect to corn 
planted acres are 0.063, 0.042, 0.015 and 0.007 (statistically insignificant), respectively, 
in the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains and Southern Plains, respectively (table 18). 
The largest elasticities of corn APH insurance with respect to the expected yield 
are 0.730, 0.756, 0.890, and 0.850 in the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and 
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Southern Plains, respectively (table 18). Although producers’ expected yield also has 
different effects on the demand for corn APH insurance at different coverage levels and 
regions, the magnitude of the largest elasticities in each region is similar. The elasticities 
of corn APH demand are positive among most coverage levels and regions with an 
exception of the 85% coverage level in the Northern Plains. Corn producers in the 
Northern Plains with higher yield expectations tend to purchase less APH insurance at the 
85% coverage level. 
As shown in table 18, at the 50% coverage level, as the relative yield risk increases 
through the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains, the magnitude 
of elasticities of demand with respect to relative yield risk increases (-0.078, -0.100, -
0.257, and -0.503 in the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains, 
respectively) (table 18). The largest elasticity of corn APH insurance with respect to the 
relative yield risk is in the Northern Plains at the 85% coverage level (-0.618). With higher 
production risk, corn producers tend to purchase less APH insurance at the 85% coverage 
level in the Northern Plains. 
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Table 19. Estimation for Corn CRC Insurance Demand in the Corn Belt 
 Coverage Level 
Variable 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.015 0.033 -0.040 -0.083** -0.167*** -0.255*** -0.226*** -0.083 
 -0.036 -0.040 -0.032 -0.036 -0.034 -0.078 -0.059 -0.069 
lg_mean_lag_rev_cpi3 -0.088 -0.082 -0.194*** -0.113*** -0.152*** -0.194*** 0.436*** 0.440*** 
 -0.065 -0.070 -0.062 -0.034 -0.031 -0.044 -0.102 -0.138 
lg_cv_rev -0.009 0.226** 0.168* -0.023 0.033 -0.062 0.038 -0.054 
 -0.081 -0.091 -0.092 -0.044 -0.034 -0.041 -0.044 -0.048 
lg_acreplt 0.148*** 0.127*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.017 0.061** 
 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.023 -0.025 
lg_crp_acre -0.037*** -0.059*** -0.045*** -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.019** -0.001 0.004 
 -0.010 -0.012 -0.014 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 
irr_per -0.204 -0.177 -0.109 0.099 0.004 0.157 -0.037 0.099 
 -0.126 -0.177 -0.125 -0.092 -0.068 -0.115 -0.082 -0.106 
fe_per 1.239* -0.066 -0.305 -0.902* -1.469*** -0.226 -1.701*** -1.635* 
 -0.748 -0.688 -0.931 -0.536 -0.381 -0.623 -0.527 -0.838 
Constant 3.301*** 3.866*** 4.772*** 4.219*** 4.948*** 5.405*** 2.545*** 1.670* 
 -0.45 -0.42 -0.392 -0.279 -0.252 -0.351 -0.708 -0.904 
Observations 182 91 187 422 363 330 163 143 
R-squared 0.345 0.439 0.335 0.487 0.567 0.42 0.627 0.539 
F-stats 12.54 9.28 12.65 43.01 48.33 20.04 26.11 17.09 
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test X  X X X X X X 
Model Specification Test           X X   
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (Robust) standard errors 
presented below the parameters estimated
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Table 20. Estimation for Corn CRC Insurance Demand in the Lake States 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors presented below the parameters 
estimated. 
LS_CRC_50 LS_CRC_55 LS_CRC_60 LS_CRC_65 LS_CRC_70 LS_CRC_75 LS_CRC_80 LS_CRC_85
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.213*** -0.323*** -0.190*** -0.239*** -0.285*** -0.229*** -0.208*** -0.177
-0.054 -0.084 -0.058 -0.042 -0.062 -0.062 -0.071 -0.148
lg_mean_lag_rev_cpi3 -0.129 0.014 -0.005 0.031 -0.113 0.052 1.104*** 0.363
-0.083 -0.19 -0.097 -0.046 -0.087 -0.081 -0.244 -0.562
lg_cv_rev 0.018 -0.023 0.295** 0.221*** 0.406*** 0.334*** 0.123 -0.066
-0.134 -0.217 -0.129 -0.083 -0.114 -0.118 -0.134 -0.373
lg_acreplt 0.120*** 0.078** 0.077** 0.105*** 0.075* 0.031 -0.075 0.043
-0.030 -0.038 -0.030 -0.018 -0.040 -0.026 -0.047 -0.080
lg_crp_acre -0.021* -0.015 -0.037*** -0.019* -0.011 0.029** 0.040 0.014
-0.013 -0.017 -0.013 -0.011 -0.017 -0.013 -0.025 -0.074
irr_per -0.227 -2.096*** -0.307 -0.176 -0.258** -0.193 -0.238 0.029
-0.229 -0.631 -0.188 -0.118 -0.129 -0.161 -0.249 -0.677
fe_per 1.283 3.198** 0.675 0.583 0.212 0.829 -0.308 -0.562
-0.922 -1.377 -0.997 -0.633 -1.051 -0.776 -1.186 -2.917
Constant 3.960*** 3.807*** 4.150*** 3.688*** 5.126*** 4.262*** -0.665 2.453
-0.445 -1.076 -0.605 -0.306 -0.598 -0.495 -1.308 -3.247
Observations 141 57 128 240 148 126 55 28
R-squared 0.428 0.489 0.29 0.451 0.338 0.382 0.569 0.237
F-stats 12.18 6.70 7.00 19.92 12.75 8.16 8.86 0.89
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5352
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test X X X X
Model specification test
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Table 21. Estimation for Corn CRC Insurance Demand in the Northern Plains 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (Robust) standard errors presented below the 
parameters estimated. 
 
NP_CRC_50 NP_CRC_55 NP_CRC_60 NP_CRC_65 NP_CRC_70 NP_CRC_75 NP_CRC_80 NP_CRC_85
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.042 -0.205 -0.290*** -0.005 -0.051 0.176 0.075 0.009
-0.095 -0.140 -0.094 -0.061 -0.07 -0.119 -0.076 -0.139
lg_mean_lag_rev_cpi3 0.074 0.140 0.186** 0.230*** 0.141** 0.054 0.839*** 0.686***
-0.081 -0.128 -0.083 -0.038 -0.054 -0.065 -0.100 -0.210
lg_cv_rev -0.014 -0.011 0.046 -0.142*** 0.002 -0.035 0.061 -0.108
-0.115 -0.114 -0.082 -0.050 -0.047 -0.052 -0.053 -0.096
lg_acreplt 0.024 0.039 0.035 0.036** 0.022 0.084*** 0.069*** -0.004
-0.029 -0.042 -0.025 -0.014 -0.017 -0.022 -0.016 -0.042
lg_crp_acre 0.002 0.011 0.014 -0.008 0.017* -0.011 0.002 0.02
-0.021 -0.037 -0.019 -0.010 -0.010 -0.014 -0.011 -0.024
irr_per 0.491*** 0.241 0.348*** 0.398*** 0.455*** 0.487*** -0.031 0.176
-0.113 -0.203 -0.108 -0.047 -0.052 -0.063 -0.076 -0.151
fe_per 0.314 0.043 2.140* 0.859 0.987 2.817*** 1.045 -3.308**
-1.397 -1.572 -1.269 -0.764 -0.692 -0.796 -0.822 -1.626
Constant 3.177*** 2.893*** 2.889*** 2.414*** 3.096*** 2.646*** -1.215** 0.520
-0.588 -0.845 -0.617 -0.314 -0.374 -0.532 -0.601 -1.249
Observations 177 78 157 319 250 226 97 76
R-squared 0.244 0.227 0.387 0.439 0.437 0.421 0.663 0.379
F-stats 7.8 2.41 13.43 46.22 33.41 29.82 25.04 5.93
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0288 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test X X X X
Model specification test X X X
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Table 22. Estimation for Corn CRC Insurance Demand in the Southern Plains 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors presented below the parameters 
estimated.
SP_CRC_50 SP_CR_55 SP_CRC_60 SP_CRC_65 SP_CRC_70 SP_CRC_75
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_liab_cpi_acr
e_price
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.331** -0.094 -0.373*** -0.242* -0.501*** -0.670***
-0.136 -0.364 -0.122 -0.122 -0.155 -0.216
lg_mean_lag_rev_cpi3 0.333*** 0.564*** 0.797*** 0.519*** 0.819*** 0.613**
-0.078 -0.131 -0.110 -0.083 -0.095 -0.225
lg_cv_rev 0.229* -0.067 -0.005 0.160** -0.171* 0.023
-0.115 -0.194 -0.105 -0.064 -0.086 -0.150
lg_acreplt 0.074** 0.050 0.021 0.080*** -0.008 -0.021
-0.028 -0.093 -0.024 -0.022 -0.022 -0.044
lg_crp_acre 0.072*** 0.068 0.036** 0.041*** 0.021 0.053**
-0.020 -0.059 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.024
irr_per 0.741*** 0.738* 0.361* 0.471*** 0.669*** 0.364
-0.242 -0.381 -0.204 -0.175 -0.183 -0.297
fe_per -0.031 -3.435 3.341** 3.776*** 1.629 2.844*
-1.406 -2.521 -1.326 -1.073 -1.017 -1.430
Constant 0.924 -0.432 -0.705 0.092 0.273 1.968
-0.594 -1.089 -0.652 -0.609 -0.801 -1.622
Observations 61 16 44 95 54 27
R-squared 0.786 0.946 0.885 0.777 0.877 0.852
F-stats 44.7 19.92 56.09 43.23 46.98 15.58
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test X X
Model specification test
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The Demand for Corn CRC Insurance 
  
 Estimation results for CRC insurance demand are summarized in tables 19-22 for 
the Corn Belt, Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains, respectively. In tables 
19-22, “X”s in the rows of Breusch-Pagan/Cook Weisberg test indicate heteroscedasticity 
occurs, and robust standard errors are used. The estimations for corn CRC insurance at the 
75% and 80% coverage levels in the Corn Belt and at 65%, 70% and 75% coverage levels 
in the Northern Plains are rejected by the null hypothesis of link tests at the 95% 
confidence interval. To deal with the misspecification problem, linear-linear models are 
used at the two coverage levels (75% and 80%) in the Corn Belt (table 23), and log-log, 
linear-log, and linear-linear models are used at the 65%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels in 
the Northern Plains (table 24), respectively. The variance inflation factors (VIF <10) show 
no evidence of serious multicollinearity between any of the model variables.  
  
  
64 
 
Table 23. Estimation Results for Corn in the Corn Belt (75% and 80%) 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Robust standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. 
  
CB_CRC_75 CB_CRC_80
liab_cpi_acre_p
rice
liab_cpi_acre_p
rice
netprem_cpi_acre_price -1.500*** -1.817***
-0.349 -0.431
mean_lag_rev_cpi3 -0.044*** 0.129***
-0.008 -0.026
lg_cv_rev -1.963 5.546
-3.202 -3.593
lg_acreplt 8.220*** 0.993
-1.294 -1.676
lg_crp_acre -2.228*** -0.077
-0.496 -0.563
irr_per 7.669 -5.822
-8.478 -8.503
fe_per -54.858 -168.593***
-46.207 -46.817
Constant 55.668*** 79.975***
-14.811 -21.041
Observations 330 163
R-squared 0.44 0.643
F-stats 31.26 36.66
[p-value] 0 0
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg testX X
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Table 24. Results for CRC in the Northern Plains (65%, 70%, and 75%) 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(Robust) standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. 
  
 The coefficients of determination, or R2, range from 0.227 to 0.946 in tables 19 
through 24, which suggest that the model could explain from 22.7% (at 55% coverage 
level in the Northern Plains) to 94.6% (at 55% coverage level in the Southern Plains) of 
the total variation in the demand of per dollar liabilities by the variation in the independent 
variables. In tables 19 through 24, the F-tests are statistically significant (p-values are zero 
to four decimal places) except for the 85% coverage level in the Lake States and the 55% 
coverage level in the Northern Plains (the p-value of the F-test is 0.5352 and 0.0288, 
respectively). Overall, the model explains the demand for corn CRC insurance fairly well.  
lg_liab_cpi_ liab_cpi_acr liab_cpi_acr
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price 0.017 lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -3.535 netprem_cpi_acre_price 0.869
-0.058 -4.5070 -0.6050
lg_mean_lag_rev_cpi3 0.236*** lg_mean_lag_rev_cpi3 10.533*** lg_mean_lag_rev_cpi3 5.016
-0.040 -3.4640 -4.4940
lg_cv_rev -0.129** lg_cv_rev 0.488 lg_cv_rev -2.145
-0.051 -3.5160 -4.5660
lg_acreplt 0.049*** lg_acreplt 0.825 lg_acreplt 5.316***
-0.014 -0.9260 -1.2940
lg_crp_acre -0.020** lg_crp_acre 1.566** lg_crp_acre 0.107
-0.010 -0.7600 -0.9540
lg_irr_per 0.066*** irr_per 38.376*** irr_per 43.813***
-0.010 -4.3340 -5.3100
lg_fe_per 0.029* fe_per 47.014 fe_per 209.705***
-0.017 -46.1510 -63.8570
Constant 2.687*** Constant -9.353 Constant -30.771
-0.337 -25.1720 -29.9180
Observations 319 Observations 250 Observations 226
R-squared 0.435 R-squared 0.4620 R-squared 0.4520
F-stats 39.040 F-stats 29.6700 F-stats 25.6800
[p-value] 0.000 [p-value] 0.0000 [p-value] 0.0000
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test X Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test
NP_CRC_65 NP_CRC_70 NP_CRC_75
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Table 25. Estimated Elasticities of Demand for Corn CRC in the Corn Belt 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 The elasticities of demand for corn CRC insurance in the Corn Belt with respect 
to each variable are reported in table 25. In the Corn Belt, the net premium effects are 
statistically significant for the relatively high coverage levels, such as 65%, 70%, 75%, 
and 80% with the elasticity of -0.083, -0.167, -0.146, and -0.200, respectively. The effects 
of expected revenue has statistically significant effects at most coverage levels, except for 
the two lowest coverage levels (50% and 55%) (table 25). The elasticity of demand for 
corn CRC insurance with respect to expected revenue is -0.194, -0.113, -0.152, -0.195, 
0.432, and 0.440 at the 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels, 
respectively. Generally, with higher expected revenue, corn producers in the Corn Belt 
purchase more insurance at high coverage levels and less at low coverage levels to better 
protect their revenue. More specifically, the purchases of corn CRC insurance at the 80% 
and 85% coverage levels are expected to increase, while the purchases of corn CRC 
liabilities at lower coverage levels (e.g., 60%, 65%, 70%, and 75%) would decrease, and 
there would be no statistically significant changes at the 50% and 55% coverage levels 
(table 25). Thus, with higher expected revenue, corn producers’ purchases move from low 
coverage levels to high coverage levels. The variability of expected revenue on the 
CB_CRC_50 CB_CRC_55 CB_CRC_60 CB_CRC_65 CB_CRC_70 CB_CRC_75 CB_CRC_80 CB_CRC_85
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.015 0.033 -0.040 -0.083** -0.167*** -0.146*** -0.200*** -0.083
mean_lag_rev_cpi3 -0.088 -0.082 -0.194*** -0.113*** -0.152*** -0.195*** 0.432*** 0.440***
cv_rev -0.009 0.226** 0.168* -0.023 0.033 -0.020 0.051 -0.054
acreplt 0.148*** 0.127*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.009 0.061**
crp_acre -0.037*** -0.059*** -0.045*** -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.001 0.004
irr_per -0.204 -0.177 -0.109 0.099 0.004 0.080 -0.054 0.099
fe_per 1.239* -0.066 -0.305 -0.902* -1.469*** -0.572 -1.551*** -1.635*
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demand for corn CRC insurance also proves the importance of differentiating coverage 
levels in corn insurance analysis. The elasticities of demand for corn CRC insurance with 
respect to the relative revenue risk are positive and significant at the 55% and 60% 
coverage levels. The total corn planted acres tend to affect producers’ purchases of CRC 
insurance statistically significantly with the exception of the 80% coverage level, and 
producers are more responsive to the changes in corn planted acres in relatively low 
coverage levels than high coverage levels (0.148, 0.127, 0.110, 0.108, 0.088, 0.086, and 
0.061 at the 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, and 85% coverage levels, respectively) 
(table 25). The enrolled acres in CRP have statistically significant effects on the demand 
for CRC insurance at the 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels, and the 
elasticities are -0.037, -0.059, -0.045, -0.022, -0.017, and -0.023, respectively) (table 25). 
There is no statistically significant relationship between the percentage of irrigated 
cropland and the demand for corn CRC insurance due to the limited use of irrigation in 
the region. The female effects change significantly across the 50%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80% 
and 85% coverage levels in the Corn Belt (table 25). A one percentage point increase in 
the percentage of cropland operated by female, the demand for corn CRC insurance would 
be expected to increase by 1.24% at the 50% coverage level, while the demand for corn 
CRC insurance would decrease at 65%, 70%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels by 0.90%, 
1.47%, 1.55%, and 1.64%, respectively (table 25).  
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Table 26. Elasticities of Demand for Corn CRC in the Lake States 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Estimation results for the Lake States are summarized in table 26. Since there are 
only 28 observations at the 85% coverage level in the Lake States, the estimated elasticities 
are not reported in table 26 at this coverage level. The elasticities of demand for CRC 
insurance with respect to per dollar net premium are -0.213,  -0.323, -0.190, -0.239, -
0.285, -0.229, and -0.208 at the 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, and 80% coverage 
levels, respectively (table 26). The magnitude of the elasticity of demand for CRC 
insurance in the Lake States is larger than the elasticity of demand for APH insurance at 
each coverage level (table 15 and 26). For instance, at the 55% coverage level, the 
elasticity of demand for APH insurance with respect to per dollar net premium is -0.180 
and for CRC insurance, the elasticity is -0.323, which is 1.8 times the elasticity of demand 
for APH insurance. The relationship between the demand for corn CRC insurance and the 
expected revenue is only statistically significant at the 80% coverage level in the Lake 
States as shown in table 26. As the relative revenue risk increases, the demand for corn 
CRC insurance increases, and the elasticities of demand for corn CRC insurance with 
respect to the relative revenue risk are 0.295, 0.221, 0.406, and 0.334 at the 60%, 65%, 
70%, and 75% coverage level, respectively (table 26). The effects of corn planted acres 
LS_CRC_50 LS_CRC_55 LS_CRC_60 LS_CRC_65 LS_CRC_70 LS_CRC_75 LS_CRC_80 LS_CRC_85
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.213*** -0.323*** -0.190*** -0.239*** -0.285*** -0.229*** -0.208*** -0.177
mean_lag_rev_cpi3 -0.129 0.014 -0.005 0.031 -0.113 0.052 1.104*** 0.363
cv_rev 0.018 -0.023 0.295** 0.221*** 0.406*** 0.334*** 0.123 -0.066
acreplt 0.120*** 0.078** 0.077** 0.105*** 0.075* 0.031 -0.075 0.043
crp_acre -0.021* -0.015 -0.037*** -0.019* -0.011 0.029** 0.04 0.014
irr_per -0.227 -2.096*** -0.307 -0.176 -0.258** -0.193 -0.238 0.029
fe_per 1.283 3.198** 0.675 0.583 0.212 0.829 -0.308 -0.562
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are in line with expectations and the elasticities of demand for corn CRC insurance with 
respect to the total corn planted acres are 0.120, 0.078, 0.077, 0.105, and 0.075 at the 50%, 
55%, 60%, 65%, and 70%, respectively (table 26). The effects of the enrolled acres in 
CRP are negative at the 50%, 60%, and 65% (-0.021, -0.037,-0.019, respectively) while 
the effects are positive at the 75% coverage level, which prove the importance of 
differentiating coverage levels in the analysis of corn insurance (table 26). With higher 
percentage of irrigated cropland, the demand for corn CRC insurance is expected to 
decrease at the 55% and 70% coverage levels (-2.096 and -0.258, respectively). The 
demand for corn CRC insurance with respect to the percentage of cropland operated by 
females is elastic at the 55% coverage level, and the elasticity is 3.198.  
 
Table 27. Estimated Elasticities of Demand for Corn CRC in the Northern Plains 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 In the Northern Plains (table 27), the net premium effects are only significant at 
the 60% coverage level and the elasticity of demand for corn CRC insurance with respect 
to per dollar net premium is -0.290. With higher expected revenue, corn producers would 
purchase higher liabilities in the Northern Plains (table 27). The relative revenue risk only 
statistically significantly affects corn producers’ purchase decisions on CRC insurance at 
the 65% coverage level with an elasticity of -0.129 (table 27). The effects of corn planted 
NP_CRC_50 NP_CRC_55 NP_CRC_60 NP_CRC_65 NP_CRC_70 NP_CRC_75 NP_CRC_80 NP_CRC_85
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.042 -0.205 -0.290*** 0.017 -0.044 0.097 0.075 0.009
mean_lag_rev_cpi3 0.074 0.14 0.186** 0.236*** 0.132*** 0.058 0.839*** 0.686***
cv_rev -0.014 -0.011 0.046 -0.129** 0.006 -0.025 0.061 -0.108
acreplt 0.024 0.039 0.035 0.049*** 0.01 0.061*** 0.069*** -0.004
crp_acre 0.002 0.011 0.014 -0.020** 0.020** 0.001 0.002 0.020
irr_per 0.491*** 0.241 0.348*** 0.263*** 0.480*** 0.503*** -0.031 0.176
fe_per 0.314 0.043 2.140* 0.923* 0.588 2.406*** 1.045 -3.308**
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acres are modest on the demand for corn CRC insurance in the Northern Plains, and the 
elasticities of demand for CRC insurance with respect to corn planted acres are 0.049, 
0.061, and 0.069 at the 65%, 75%, and 80% coverage levels. The elasticities of demand 
for corn CRC insurance with respect to the enrolled acres in CRP are positive and 
statistically significant at the 65% and 70% coverage levels (table 27). The percentage of 
irrigated cropland has positive and statistically significant effects at the 50%, 60%, 65%, 
70%, and 75% coverage levels (table 27). Similar to the Corn Belt, with higher percentage 
of cropland operated by females, the demand for CRC insurance would increase at lower 
coverage levels (60%, 65%, and 75%), and decrease at the 85% coverage levels. The 
elasticities of demand for corn CRC insurance with respect to the percentage of cropland 
operated by females are quite elastic at the 75% and 85% coverage levels (2.406 
and -3.308, respectively) (table 27).  
 
Table 28. Estimated Elasticities for Corn CRC in the Southern Plains 
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Elasticities of demand for the Southern Plains are summarized in table 28. The R2 
values in the Southern Plains are relatively high, compared to other three regions (the Corn 
Belt, Lake States, and Northern Plains), ranging from 0.777 to 0.946 (table 22). The per 
SP_CRC_50 SP_CR_55 SP_CRC_60 SP_CRC_65 SP_CRC_70 SP_CRC_75
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.331** -0.094 -0.373*** -0.242* -0.501*** -0.670***
mean_lag_rev_cpi3 0.333*** 0.564*** 0.797*** 0.519*** 0.819*** 0.613**
cv_rev 0.229* -0.067 -0.005 0.160** -0.171* 0.023
acreplt 0.074** 0.050 0.021 0.080*** -0.008 -0.021
crp_acre 0.072*** 0.068 0.036** 0.041*** 0.021 0.053**
irr_per 0.741*** 0.738* 0.361* 0.471*** 0.669*** 0.364
fe_per -0.031 -3.435 3.341** 3.776*** 1.629 2.844*
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dollar net premium effects are statistically significant at each coverage level with an 
exception of the 55% coverage level, and the elasticity is -0.331, -0.373, -0.242, -0.501, 
and -0.670 at the 50%, 60%, 65%, 70%, and 75% coverage level, respectively (table 28). 
In the Southern Plains, the magnitude of elasticities of demand for CRC insurance is larger 
than the magnitude for the elasticity of demand for APH insurance at each coverage level 
(tables 22 and 28). The enrolled acres in CRP have a positive and statistically significant 
effect at the 50%, 60%, 65%, and 75% coverage levels. The percentage of irrigated 
cropland has statistically significant positive effects at the 50%-70% coverage levels. The 
elasticities of demand for CRC insurance with respect to irrigation percentage are 0.741, 
0.738, 0.361, 0.471, and 0.669 at the 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, and 70%, respectively. With 
higher percentages of cropland operated by females, the demand for corn CRC insurance 
would increase at the 60%, 65%, and 75% coverage levels with elasticities of demand of 
3.341, 3.776, and 2.844, respectively.  
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Table 29. Estimated Elasticities of Demand for CRC Insurance  
 
 
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Table 29 summarizes the elasticities of demand with respect to per dollar net 
premium, total corn planted acres, expected revenue, and relative revenue risk reported in 
tables 25-28. First of all, the results fail to reject the hypothesis that the elasticities of corn 
insurance demand change over coverage levels and regions. In the Corn Belt, the effects 
of the per dollar net premium are statistically significant over the relatively high coverage 
levels (65%, 70%, 75%, and 80% coverage levels). In the Lake States, the effects of the 
per dollar net premium are statistically significant over all coverage levels with the 
exception of the 85% coverage level. In the Northern Plains, the effects are only 
statistically significant at the 60% coverage level. In the Southern Plains, the effects are 
statistically significant at each coverage level with the exception of the lowest coverage 
level (55%).  
Among all the statistically significant effects, the magnitude of elasticities of the 
demand for CRC insurance with respect to per dollar net premium changes across regions. 
CRC_50 CRC_55 CRC_60 CRC_65 CRC_70 CRC_75 CRC_80 CRC_85
netprem_cpi_acre_price Corn Belt -0.015 0.033 -0.04 -0.083** -0.167***-0.146***-0.200*** -0.083
Lake States -0.213***-0.323***-0.190***-0.239***-0.285***-0.229***-0.208*** -0.177
Northern Plains -0.042 -0.205 -0.290*** 0.017 -0.044 0.097 0.075 0.009
Southern Plains -0.331** -0.094 -0.373*** -0.242* -0.501***-0.670***
acreplt Corn Belt 0.148*** 0.127*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.009 0.061**
Lake States 0.120*** 0.078** 0.077** 0.105*** 0.075* 0.031 -0.075 0.043
Northern Plains 0.024 0.039 0.035 0.049*** 0.01 0.061*** 0.069*** -0.004
Southern Plains 0.074** 0.05 0.021 0.080*** -0.008 -0.021
mean_lag_rev_cpi3 Corn Belt -0.088 -0.082 -0.194***-0.113***-0.152***-0.195*** 0.432*** 0.440***
Lake States -0.129 0.014 -0.005 0.031 -0.113 0.052 1.104*** 0.363
Northern Plains 0.074 0.14 0.186** 0.236*** 0.132*** 0.058 0.839*** 0.686***
Southern Plains 0.333*** 0.564*** 0.797*** 0.519*** 0.819*** 0.613**
cv_rev Corn Belt -0.009 0.226** 0.168* -0.023 0.033 -0.02 0.051 -0.054
Lake States 0.018 -0.023 0.295** 0.221*** 0.406*** 0.334*** 0.123 -0.066
Northern Plains -0.014 -0.011 0.046 -0.129** 0.006 -0.025 0.061 -0.108
Southern Plains 0.229* -0.067 -0.005 0.160** -0.171* 0.023
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Take the 60% and 75% coverage levels as an example (table 29). In the Corn Belt, the 
effects of per dollar net premium are statistically insignificant at the 60% coverage level, 
while the elasticities increase through the Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern 
Plains (-0.190, -0.290, and -0.373, respectively). At the 75% coverage level, the elasticity 
of demand with respect to per dollar net premium in the Southern Plains is -0.670, which 
is about 4.6 times the elasticity in the Corn Belt (-0.146) (table 29). Therefore, 
differentiating coverage levels and regions in the analysis of corn CRC insurance demand 
would be essential.  
The elasticities of corn CRC insurance demand with respect to total corn planted 
acres are inelastic and tend to decrease with increasing coverage levels in the Corn Belt 
and Lake States (table 29). Take the Corn Belt as an example. The elasticity of CRC 
insurance demand with respect to the total corn planted acres at the 50% coverage level is 
0.148, which is about 2.4 times the elasticity at the 85% coverage level (0.061). The total 
corn planted acres only have statistically significant effects at some coverage levels in the 
Northern Plains and Southern Plains (65%, 75%, and 80% coverage levels in the Northern 
Plains, and 50% and 65% coverage levels in the Southern Plains). The Corn Belt has the 
largest corn planted acres and the largest elasticities of demand for corn CRC insurance 
with respect to corn planted acres compared to the other three regions at each coverage 
level.  
 The elasticities of corn CRC insurance demand with respect to expected revenue 
reported in table 29 are inelastic for all coverage levels in the four regions, except for the 
elasticity at the 80% coverage level in the Lake States, which is elastic (1.104). The 
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negative and statistically significant expected revenue effects only appear in the Corn Belt 
at 60%, 65%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels (-0.194, -0.113, -0.152, and -0.195, 
respectively). With higher expected revenue, corn producers in the Corn Belt would 
purchase less per dollar liabilities at the 60%, 65%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels, while 
they would purchase more insurance at the 80% and 85% coverage (0.432 and 0.440, 
respectively) (table 29). There is a positive relationship between the expected revenue and 
the purchases of insurance in the other three regions (the Lake States, Northern Plains, and 
Southern Plains).  
The effects of relative revenue risk on the demand for CRC insurance change 
significantly across coverage levels and regions. The elasticities of demand for CRC 
insurance with respect to relative revenue risk are statistically significant at the 55% and 
60% coverage level (0.226 and 0.168, respectively) in the Corn Belt (table 29). The 
elasticities are statistically significant and positive at the 60%, 65%, 70%, and 75% (0.295, 
0.221, 0.406, and 0.334, respectively). The elasticities of demand for corn CRC insurance 
with respect to relative revenue risk is statistically significant and negative at the 65% 
coverage level in the Northern Plains (-0.129). In the Southern Plains, the elasticities are 
statistically significant and positive at the 50% and 65% coverage levels (0.229 and 0.160, 
respectively), while the demand for corn CRC insurance is negative at the 70% coverage 
level in the Southern Plains (-0.171) (table 29). Generally, relative revenue risk does not 
have statistically significant effects on the two tails of coverage levels, which means 
producers who tend to purchase relatively low or high coverage levels are not affected by 
the change of relative revenue risk significantly. But producers’ purchase decisions are 
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affected by relative revenue risk if they intended to purchase medium coverage levels of 
corn CRC insurance.  
 
Comparison of APH and CRC Elasticities of Demand 
 
 The elasticities of demand for insurance with respect to per dollar net premium not 
only change across coverage levels and regions, but the elasticities also change between 
insurance plans (table 30). In the Corn Belt and Northern Plains, the demand for corn APH 
insurance is more price responsive than the demand for corn CRC insurance, while the 
elasticities of demand for corn CRC insurance with respect to per dollar net premium are 
larger than the corresponding elasticities for corn APH insurance in the Lake States and 
Southern Plains. For example, in the Southern Plains, the elasticity of corn APH insurance 
with respect to per dollar net premium is -0.248, while the corresponding elasticity for 
corn CRC insurance is -0.373 at the 60% coverage level (table 30).  
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Table 30. Estimated Elasticities of Demand for APH and CRC Insurance 
 
  
 Results presented in table 30 also indicate the necessity for separating insurance 
plans, regions, and coverage levels in the analysis of corn insurance demand, which was 
overlooked in previous studies. The elasticity of demand for corn CRC insurance with 
respect to per dollar net premium is -0.670 at the 75% coverage level in the Southern 
Plains and it is -0.047 at the 50% coverage level in the Corn Belt (table 30). Although the 
elasticities are price-inelastic, a 1% change in the net premium would induce 14 times 
larger effect at the 75% coverage level in the Southern Plains than the effect at the 50% 
coverage level in the Corn Belt (table 30).  
 
50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85%
Corn Belt APH -0.047** -0.028 -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.137*** -0.149*** -0.230*** 0.017
CRC -0.015 0.033 -0.04 -0.083** -0.167*** -0.146*** -0.200*** -0.083
Lake States APH -0.180*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.147*** -0.094** -0.157*** -0.158**
CRC -0.213*** -0.323*** -0.190*** -0.239*** -0.285*** -0.229*** -0.208*** -0.177
Northern Plains APH -0.170*** -0.004 -0.305*** -0.038 -0.097 -0.188* -0.259** -0.284**
CRC -0.042 -0.205 -0.290*** 0.017 -0.044 0.097 0.075 0.009
Southern Plains APH -0.221** -0.131 -0.248* -0.227** -0.155 -0.654***
CRC -0.331** -0.094 -0.373*** -0.242* -0.501*** -0.670***
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Summary 
 
 This study evaluated the demand for corn insurance in the major corn production 
regions. The estimated elasticities of demand for corn APH insurance with respect to per 
dollar net premium range from -0.654 (75% coverage level in the Southern Plains) 
to -0.047 (50% coverage level in the Corn Belt). The elasticities of demand for corn CRC 
insurance with respect to per dollar net premium range from -0.670 (75% coverage level 
in the Southern Plains) to -0.083 (65% coverage level in the Corn Belt) (table 30). The 
estimated average demand elasticities for liability per planted acre are -0.73 in Iowa in 
Goodwin (1993), -0.24 in Heartland in Goodwin (2001), -0.13 in Illinois, Idaho, Iowa, and 
Ohio in O’Donoghue (2014). Since this study is the only one that separated coverage levels 
in the analysis of corn insurance demand, it is difficult to compare the estimated elasticities 
of corn insurance demand at each coverage level with existing studies at each coverage 
level. But overall, the elasticities derived in this analysis are basically consistent with 
results reported in other studies.  
 Results also suggest that producers in riskier regions are more responsive to the 
change of per dollar net premium. For instance, with a 1% decrease in the per dollar net 
premium, producers in the Corn Belt would increase their purchase for corn APH 
insurance at the 50% coverage level by 0.047%, while producers in the Southern Plains 
would increase the purchase by 0.221%. So the change in the Southern Plains is 
quadrupled compared to the change in the Corn Belt. In O’Donoghue (2014), the 
elasticities of demand for corn insurance measured as liabilities per acre are -0.13, -0.24, 
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and -0.25 in the Midwest, Lake, and Northern Plains, respectively, which also exhibit the 
patterns that producers in riskier regions tend to be more responsive to corn insurance, 
although the pattern was not mentioned in his study.  
Results in this study also show the importance of separating coverage levels, 
regions, and insurance plans in the study for corn insurance demand. Although the 
elasticities of demand for APH and CRC insurance with respect to per dollar premium are 
price-inelastic, the elasticities vary significant across coverage levels and regions. For 
example, the elasticity of demand for CRC insurance at the 75% coverage level in the 
Southern Plains is -0.670, which is more than 14 times of the elasticity of demand for APH 
insurance at the 50% in the Corn Belt (-0.047). However, the differences were overlooked 
in current related studies.  
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In the literature, females are considered to be more risk averse than males (e.g., 
Holt and Laury 2002; Charness and Gneeze 2012). Results from O’Donoghue (2014) 
suggest that there is positive correlation between the acres operated by females and the 
demand for crop insurance. However, the female effects have a different story if the 
coverage levels are differentiated. In the Corn Belt, the expected corn yield is high and the 
relative yield risk is relatively low comparing to other regions. Higher percentage of 
female operated cropland would induce more corn CRC insurance purchased at the low 
coverage level, such as the 50% coverage level, and result in less insurance purchased at 
the high coverage levels, such as the 80% and 85% coverage levels. Females may tend to 
be more protective by purchasing crop insurance, but they would like to purchase more 
corn CRC insurance at low coverage levels in the Corn Belt.  
Furthermore, this study proposes a different way to measure the quantity of 
insurance purchase and the price of crop insurance. In the study both the quantity of 
insurance purchase and premium are normalized by divided by the projected prices, 
considering the projected price could affect these two variables simultaneously.  
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Policy Implications 
 
 Federal crop insurance has undergone scrutiny regarding the significantly 
increased government costs. Critics of federal crop insurance continually propose bills to 
cut government subsidies on crop insurance premiums, such as Senate Bill 666 and Senate 
Bill 2244 in the 114th Congress. Reforms are proposed in the recently released Obama 
Administration’s 2017 Budget, and the reforms call for an $18 billion cut to the FCIP over 
10 years, according to the Administration. Under this situation, it is important to have a 
general view of the changes in demand if premium subsidies are reduced.  
In CRS Report R43951 (Shields 2015), a 10 percentage point reduction in crop 
insurance premium subsidies is proposed. Table 31 shows how the purchases of corn crop 
insurance would likely change with a 10 percentage points decrease in federal premium 
subsidies.  
  
Table 31. Estimated Changes of Corn Insurance Demand  
    50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
APH Corn Belt -0.701% - -1.656% -1.932% -2.322% -2.709% -4.792% - 
 Lake States -2.687% -2.156% -2.156% 2.492% -1.593% -2.855% -3.292% - 
 Northern Plains -2.537% - -4.766% - - -3.418% -5.396% -7.474% 
  Southern Plains -3.299%  - -3.875% -3.847% -  -11.891% -  - 
CRC Corn Belt - - - -1.407% -2.831% -2.655% -4.167% - 
 Lake States -3.179% -5.047% -2.969% -4.051% -4.831% -4.164% -4.333% - 
 Northern Plains - - -4.531% - - - - - 
  Southern Plains -4.940%  - -5.828% -4.102% -8.492% -12.182% -  - 
 
Note: “-” denotes statistically insignificant change. 
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 A uniform percentage point reduction in the federal premium subsidy rate across 
coverage levels would result in significantly different responses in producers' participation 
in the FCIP by region and insurance type. For example, in the Corn Belt, the changes at 
relatively high coverage levels (75% and 80%) are greater than they are at the 50% 
coverage level, both for corn yield and revenue insurance policies. Thus, a small reduction 
in premium subsidy rates across coverage levels would result in a greater reduction in 
participation in high coverage policies in the Corn Belt, which contradicts a major purpose 
of the 2000 ARPA. (One of the major objectives of the 2000 ARPA was to encourage 
more participation at coverage levels higher than the 65% coverage level.) 
 A uniform percentage point reductions in the premium subsidy rates across 
coverage levels would also lead to significantly different purchase decisions across 
regions. For example, for yield insurance, the expected change at the 75% coverage level 
in the Southern Plains (-11.891%) would be 17 times greater than it is at the 50% coverage 
level in the Corn Belt (-0.701%). The significantly different effects could also be expected 
for the demand for revenue insurance. Therefore, the government may consider applying 
different changes to the subsidy rates across regions, coverage levels, and insurance types 
to insure significant use of crop insurance. 
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Conclusions 
 
 The highly subsidized crop insurance program has been one of the most expensive 
agricultural programs, thus it is important to determine the need for high premium 
subsidies. Although several studies examined the elasticities of corn insurance demand, 
none of them differentiated coverage levels, and few of them separated insurance plans. 
Consequently, this undermines the effectiveness of the implications provided in the 
existing studies. In this study the demand for corn insurance is estimated at each coverage 
level, region, and insurance plan. This analysis finds empirical support for varying 
elasticities of corn insurance demand among coverage levels, insurance plans, and regions, 
Therefore, the change of subsidies could have significantly different effects across 
coverage levels, insurance plans, and regions. The demand for corn yield insurance at low 
coverage levels in less risky regions, such as the 50% coverage level in the Corn Belt, is 
expected to have modest response to the change of subsidies, while the demand for corn 
yield insurance at high coverage levels in riskier regions, such as the 75% coverage level 
in the Southern Plains, would be more price-sensitive. Therefore, changing subsidies at 
different coverage levels in different regions would trigger significantly different purchase 
responses. 
 Government Accountability Office (GAO 2015) claims that the federal 
government costs in the crop insurance program are “substantially” higher in regions with 
higher crop production risks than in other regions by providing cheaper crop insurance. 
The “cheaper” insurance is realized by setting the county base premium rates much lower 
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than the target premium rates. Although RMA disagrees with GAO’s claim, it does not 
have more information to refute GAO’s argument since RMA does not monitor and report 
government costs in riskier regions. This study shows that in order to keep high 
participation and high coverage levels, the government premium subsidies should be 
higher in riskier regions since the demand for corn insurance is more price sensitive in 
riskier regions and higher coverage levels. But how large the differences should be to 
balance participation and actuarial fairness between different risk regions deserves more 
attention and future research. 
To estimate the elasticities of demand for corn insurance, this study assumes there 
is no adverse selection in the corn insurance market. However, the existence of adverse 
selection is one of the longstanding problems in the analysis of crop insurance. The study 
would be improved if adverse selection is incorporated in the estimation of demand for 
corn insurance.  
  
  
84 
 
CHAPTER III 
 THE DEMAND FOR WHEAT CROP INSURANCE 
 
Introduction 
 
 The federal crop insurance program (FCIP) has been expanded significantly in 
recent decades. In 1990, 101.36 million acres of land were enrolled in the crop insurance 
program with a liability of $12.82 billion. In 2015, the corresponding figures are 296.04 
million acres of land with a liability of $96.54 billion. Figure 11 shows the total enrolled 
acres in the federal crop insurance program in 1981 through 2015 and figure 12 shows the 
liabilities purchased during the same time period. Overall, the federal crop insurance 
program has been a popular risk management tool for farmers.  
 
 
Figure 11. Total Enrolled Acreage in the FCIP 
Source: USDA’s RMA, Summary of Business Reports and Data; Glauber (2004). 
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Figure 12. Total Crop Insurance Liabilities in the Federal Crop Insurance 
Source: USDA’s RMA, Summary of Business Reports and Data; Glauber (2004). 
 
 
With the implementation of the 2014 Farm Bill, the importance of the FCIP was 
strengthen by offering more options and replacing previous farm programs (Goodwin 
2014; Orden and Zulauf 2015), such as the direct payment and countercyclical payment 
programs. However, the crop insurance program has been criticized because of its high 
costs and high loss ratio.  
Figure 13 shows the premium subsidies of the federal crop insurance program. 
Figure 14 shows the loss ratio and adjusted loss ratio history of the crop insurance 
program.1 The federal crop insurance program is highly subsidized from the US Treasury. 
The annual subsidy cost increased from $215.10 million to $6.01 billion from 1990 to 
                                                 
1 The loss ratio is computed as indemnities divided by premium and the adjusted loss ratio is computed as 
indemnities divided by net premium. 
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2015 (figure 13) and the adjusted loss ratio increased from 1.57 to 2.35 from 1990 to 2014 
(figure 14). The average subsidy rate in the most recent ten years (2006-2015) is 61%.2 
The average subsidy rate increased from 26% in 1990 to 62% in 2015.  
 
 
Figure 13. Federal Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies 
Source: USDA’s RMA, Summary of Business Reports and Data. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Federal Crop Insurane Loss Ratios and Adjusted Loss Ratios  
Source: USDA’s RMA, Summary of Business Reports and Data; Glauber (2004). 
 
                                                 
2 The subsidy rate is computed as premium subsidies divided by gross premium 
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Under the current farm bill, federal crop insurance is the most expensive 
agriculture program according to Congressional Budget Office (CBO)’s cost estimate. 
With the large spending on the crop insurance program, proposals to reduce or limit crop 
insurance subsidy were submitted (Shields 2015; Davis, Anderson, and Young 2014). For 
example, Senators Shaheen and Coburn proposed to set a $70,000 per farm premium 
subsidies. Although no premium subsidy reduction or limits were applied by the 2014 
Farm Bill, there could be future amendments on premium subsidies, and Congress needs 
to find “what reductions (if any) to premium subsidies can be tolerated” (Shields 2015). 
Therefore, knowledge of how producers may respond to subsidy changes could provide 
important insights for future policy making. In this study, wheat is chosen as an example, 
and the method of analysis could be applied to other field crops.  
 
  
88 
 
Background 
 
Wheat Production in the U.S. 
 
 Wheat is one of the most important crops in the United States. It ranks third in both 
planted acreage and gross value, behind corn and soybeans. In 2015, the total planted 
acreage for wheat is approximately 56 million, and the planted acreage for corn and 
soybeans are 89 million and 84 million, respectively. Figure 15. Total Planted Acreage of 
Wheat in 1970-2015 
 shows the planted acreage of wheat in 1970-2015. The total planted acres of wheat 
decreased from its historical high in 1981 with 88 million acres because of the decreased 
returns relative to other crops and government policies. Wheat farmers had to idle a certain 
portion of their wheat land to participate in the voluntary wheat program under the 1981 
Agriculture and Food Act (Johnson, Rizzi, Short, and Fulton 1982). In 1985, 90% of wheat 
planted acreage was enrolled in the set-aside program with 20%-35% set aside levels 
(Babcock, Carter, and Schmitz 1990; Outlaw et al. 2008).  
  
  
89 
 
 
Figure 15. Total Planted Acreage of Wheat in 1970-2015 
Source: USDA’s NASS. 
 
Wheat is produced in almost every state, but the production practices, costs, and 
yield varies across regions (Vocke and Ali 2013). Figure 16 shows the planted acreage in 
each state in 2015. The Northern Plains and Southern Plains are major wheat producing 
regions. In the present study, three major wheat producing regions are analyzed, including 
the Pacific Northwest, the Northern Plains, and the Southern Plains. Table 32 shows the 
definition of each region.  
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Figure 16. Wheat Planted Acreage in 2015 
Source: USDA’s NASS. 
  
 
Table 32. The Definition of Regions 
Regions States  
Pacific Northwest California, Oregon, Washington 
Northern Plains Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, South Dakota 
Southern Plains Oklahoma, Texas 
 
 
There are ten states included in the three regions. These ten states are among the 
11 leading states in terms of the average gross value of wheat in the most recent five years 
(2010-2014). The gross value is calculated as the product of the average state yield, the 
wheat planted acres, and the price received by producers. Figure 17 shows the average 
gross values for the 11 leading states.  
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Figure 17. Leading Gross Values of Wheat in the U.S. (averaged over 2010-2014) 
Source: USDA’s NASS. 
 
 
The Northern Plains is a major wheat producing region. In the present study, 
Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, and South Dakota are grouped in this region. 
The average planted acres in the most recent five years (2010-2014) in the Northern Plains 
account for 48% of the average annual planted acres in the United States. The Southern 
Plains and the Pacific Northwest account for 20% and 7% of the average annual planted 
acres of wheat, respectively. 
 Wheat yield varies widely across the United States with a national average yield 
of 43.5 bushels per acre in the most recent five years (2010-2014). During 2010 to 2014, 
the Pacific Northwest region had the highest average yield (71.75 bushels per acre), 
followed by the Northern Plains (40.95 bushels per acre) and the Southern Plains (28.80 
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bushels per acre).  According to Vocke and Ali (2013), the Northern Plains had the highest 
production cost per bushel compared to other regions due to the high costs for fertilizer, 
herbicides, and fungicides.  
Figure 18 shows the marketing year average wheat price from 1980 to 2014. The 
wheat price reached a historical high in 2012 with $7.77 per bushel and the average wheat 
price received by farmers was $6.71/bushel in 2010-2014. In 2014, the total supply in the 
United States was 2,760 million bushels and 1,153 million bushels were used 
domestically. Approximately 35% of total wheat supply was used as food, 3% of total 
wheat supply was used as seed, and 4% was used as feed and residual.  
 
 
Figure 18. Marketing Year Weighted Average Prices of Wheat in the U.S. 
Source: USDA’s ERS. 
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Wheat Insurance 
 
 In general, the participation rate increased over time with a jump in 1995. Figure 
19 shows total wheat planted acreage of wheat and the total enrolled acreage in the federal 
crop insurance program of wheat in the U.S. during 1989 to 2015. Figure 20 shows the 
participation rate of wheat which is measured as the ratio of wheat enrolled acreage in the 
federal crop insurance to the total planted acreage of wheat. In 1990, the total wheat 
planted acreage was 77,041,000, and the enrolled acreage of wheat in the federal crop 
insurance program was 36,379,062. Thus, approximately 47% of wheat planted acreage 
was covered by the federal insurance program. In 2015, the ratio of wheat insured acreage 
to the wheat planed area is about 82% as the planted acreage is 56,079,000 and the insured 
acreage is 46,090,746. 
 
 
Figure 19. Wheat Planted Acreage and Enrolled Acreage in the U.S. in 1989-2015 
Source: USDA’s NASS; USDA’s RMA, Summary of Business Reports and Data. 
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Figure 20. The Federal Wheat Insurance Participation Rate  
Source: USDA’s NASS; USDA’s RMA, Summary of Business Reports and Data. 
 
With the implementation of the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act 
(FCIRA), the participation rate of wheat doubled from 42% in 1994 to 84% in 1995. First 
of all, the FCIRA increased federal premium subsidies. Premium rates are set based on the 
average historical rate of loss (Hazell, Pomareda, and Valdes 1986). Producers who enroll 
in the federal crop insurance program only pay a portion of the gross premium since the 
enactment of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA) in 1980. So the federal crop 
insurance is cheaper to wheat producers when the FCIRA increased subsidy rates. 
Secondly, the FCIRA introduced the Catastrophic Level of Coverage (CAT) which is fully 
subsidized by the government. In 1995, more than 27 million acres of wheat planted area 
were enrolled under the CAT coverage, which accounts for 47% of total wheat insured 
acreage. Thirdly, the FCIRA made the participation in the crop insurance program 
mandatory to be eligible for deficiency payments, certain loans, and other benefits. With 
the three major changes, the participation rate of wheat increased dramatically in 1995.  
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The mandatory participation requirement was repealed by Congress in the 1996 
Farm Bill (Sherrick et. al. 2004), and the participation rate of wheat decreased from 84% 
in 1995 to 67% in 1998. The wheat insurance participation rate increased at the end of the 
1990s when the revenue insurance policy (CRC), group risk plan (GRP), and income 
protection (IP) were introduced in 1997 (Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone 2003). The 
wheat crop insurance participation rate increased from 67% in 1998 to 74% in 1999. 
The Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000 substantially increased 
premium subsidies to expand crop insurance coverage. For example, the subsidy rate at 
the 75% coverage level under the APH plan was increased by 31 percentage point. The 
changes of subsidy rates under the ARPA are reported in table 33. On average, about 56% 
of the gross premium is subsidized by the government.  
  
Table 33. Basic Unit Subsidy Levels Pre- and Post-ARPA 
Coverage Level Pre-ARPA Post-ARPA 
  APH CRC 
 
50/100 55% 42% 67% 
65/100 42% 32% 59% 
70/100 32% 25% 59% 
75/100 24% 18% 55% 
85/100 13% 10% 38% 
 
Source: Kelly 2001; Jose 2001. 
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Literature Review 
 
 Patrick (1988) used a Tobit model to estimate the demand for crop and rainfall 
insurance for wheat producers in Malee in 1958-1959 and 1977-1978. Patrick’s study 
estimated the premium producers would like to pay for crop insurance. The results show 
that producers were willing to pay less premium with higher expected yield. The results 
also show that wheat farm characteristics and growers’ risk attitude have effects on the 
amount of premium that wheat producers were willing to pay.  
Smith and Baquet (1996) analyzed the demand for wheat insurance on 370 
Montana wheat farms by using the Heckman two-stage approach. This is the first study 
that analyzed the participation and coverage levels simultaneously. However, there is no 
elasticity reported at each coverage level. A mailed survey was used to collect wheat 
farmers’ purchase decisions in 1990. The probability of purchasing wheat insurance is 
estimated in the first stage and the liability purchases were estimated in the second stage. 
In the estimation, they also separated producers with positive expected returns and 
negative expected returns from crop insurance programs. The results indicate that the 
demand for coverage levels were expected to decrease when premiums increased. Results 
also show that the elasticity of demand for wheat insurance with respect to price increases 
when the yield is more variable for producers with negative expected returns, while the 
elasticity of demand for wheat insurance decreases when the yield is more variable for 
producers with positive expected returns. The results also show that operator age, years of 
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farming experience, farm size, and off-farm income have statistically insignificant effects 
on the demand for wheat insurance in Montana.  
Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone (2003) used simultaneous equation probit 
models and farm level data to estimate the changes in the participation for crop insurance 
of Kansas farmers in 1993 through 2000. During this period, many policy changes 
happened as discussed earlier, such as the launch of the CAT coverage and the revenue 
protection program. The probability of purchasing crop insurance was estimated in the 
first stage and the choice of the coverage level was estimated in the second stage.  The 
major crops in Kansas including wheat, corn, sorghum, and soybeans were estimated 
together in their study, and a normalized yield was used. The mean coefficient of variation 
of yields in the preceding 10 years was utilized to measure the production risk level. The 
results show that the relationship between premium rates and the demand for crop 
insurance is statistically insignificant in 1995 and 1996 when the mandatory requirement 
was applied. The results also show that the magnitude of elasticities of demand for crop 
insurance with respect to premium rate decreased by the end of the 1990s when new 
insurance policies were introduced and subsidy rates increased. They also found that the 
use of inputs has statistically insignificant effects on the demand for crop insurance.  
The acreage response, insurance participation, the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) enrollment, and input use were analyzed simultaneously in multiequation models 
by Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004). Corn and soybean produced in the Corn Belt 
and wheat as well as barley produced in the Northern Great Plains are estimated in the 
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study. The elasticity of demand for wheat insurance measured in terms of liabilities per 
planted acre with respect to premium rate was -0.12.  
County-level insurance participation data in 1997 and 2002 were used to estimate 
the demand for federal corn, soybean, and wheat insurance by O’Donoghue (2014). 
Results show that the demand for federal crop insurance varied among production regions 
and crops. The elasticities of demand for wheat insurance were -0.15 and -0.27 in the 
Southern Plains and the Northern Plains, respectively, if the liabilities per acre were used 
to measure the insurance purchases. The elasticities of demand for wheat insurance 
were -0.19 and -0.14 in the Southern Plains and the Northern Plains, respectively, if the 
acres of buy-up coverage were used.   
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Model Framework 
 
 Wheat producers are assumed to maximize their utility by making decisions, 
subject to farm and market constraints. A linear equation is commonly used in the study 
of the demand for crop insurance (e.g., O’Donoghue 2014). Assume the demand for wheat 
insurance can be represent by: 
(1) 
i i iy X      
where yi is the choice of wheat insurance under the maximization problem. iX is a vector 
matrix including factors affecting producers’ decisions on crop insurance and 1k is the 
residual term. Following previous studies, we assume the demand for wheat insurance is 
affected by the characteristics of the wheat insurance program, market environment, and 
factors for the farms, which are grouped into the iX  matrix.  
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One of the problems in the study of crop insurance is how to define the price and 
quantity relevant variables for the crop insurance demand. Insured acreage (e.g., Goodwin 
1993), participation rate (e.g., Smith and Baquet 1996), and liability purchases (e.g., 
Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal 2004) are commonly used to measure the quantity of 
insurance demanded. Goodwin (1993) pointed out that liability is the “true measure” of 
the quantity purchases of crop insurance. However, the unit quantity is computed as the 
liability divided by the total planted acres in Goodwin (1993). In the present study, the 
insured acreage is used to adjust the unit price instead of total planted acreage because 
producers purchase crop insurance to protect the yield loss on insured cropland, not the 
total planted area.  
In Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone (2003), the price relevant variable is 
measured by the ratio of the net premium to the liability. In a recent study by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the cost related variable is constructed as the 
costs per dollar of crop value. In the present study, the unit price is computed as the 
normalized net premium per acre per dollar of crop value (normalized premium divided 
by the product of insured acres and projected prices of wheat). Both liabilities and 
premium are normalized by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The net premium is 
calculated as the gross premium minus government premium subsidies.  
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Variable Selection 
 
 Table 34 presents the construction of each variable in the present study. The 
selection of the relevant variables considered the related existing studies on the demand 
for crop insurance. The total planted acreage is a common variable in the analysis of the 
demand for crop insurance since the insured acres and the planted acres should have direct 
relationship. The mean yield in the preceding three years was used to measure producers’ 
expectation of wheat yield. Since there are technology development, the mean in recent 
years should be preferred to the yield averaged over a long period, such as the ten years’ 
average yield used in Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004). Considering the possible 
low yield in one year due to unfavorable weather, the mean yield in the previous three 
years would be more reasonable to be incorporated in the model than the lagged yield used 
in previous studies (e.g., Goodwin 1993; Wang et. al. 1998).  
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Table 34. Variable Definition 
Variables Definition Notation in this study 
Dependent variable normalized liabilities per 
acre/projected price 
liab_cpi_acre_price 
Price relevant variable normalized net premium per 
acre/projected price 
netprem_cpi_acre_price 
Expected yield average yield in the preceding 
three years 
mean_lag_yd3 
CV of yield coefficient of variation of 
historical corn yield 
cv_yield 
Planted acres planted acres of wheat 
acreplt 
Enrolled acres in CRP enrolled acres in CRP 
crp 
Percentage of irrigated 
cropland 
the ratio of acres of irrigated 
cropland to acres of total 
cropland in each county 
irr_per 
Percentage of cropland 
operated by females 
the ratio of acres operated by 
females to acres of total 
cropland in each county 
fe_per 
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Variability of yield is an important variable in the study of crop insurance. The 
coefficient of variations (CV) of historical yield is utilized to represent the relative yield 
risk (table 34). The CV of yield is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation of yield 
to the average yield at the county level (1989-2013). Since the study is constructed over 
regions, the relative yield risk should be preferable to the variance of yield used in some 
studies, such as O’Donoghue (2014).  
CRP idles land from agricultural production. Thus increasing CRP enrollment 
decreases the number of acres that can buy crop insurance. CRP idles marginal land with 
low agricultural production value (Baker and Galik 2009). If land enrolled in the CRP was 
used to grow wheat it would probably decrease the county average wheat yield. So 
reducing marginal land will increase the county average yield and reduce the risk of wheat 
production for the county. Thus the greater the CRP acreage in a county, the higher county 
average yield and lower yield risk. 
The percentage of irrigated cropland in the county is incorporated in the model 
because irrigated wheat yields are higher and have lower relative risk. Similar variables 
were also included in other studies, such as O’Donoghue (2014) and Goodwin (1993). The 
female effect is considered in recent crop insurance studies as females are assumed to be 
more risk averse than males (Eckel and Grossman 2008, Charness and Gneeze 2012, 
O’Donoghue 2014) . If females are more willing to participate in crop insurance programs 
than males, the percentage of cropland operated by females in a county would affect the 
insurance purchases at the county level. 
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To guarantee the variability of the price relevant variable, the pooled cross-
sectional data in 1998 and 2002 are used as the ARPA was launched in 2000. The net 
premium paid by producers changed as the premium subsidies changed for the ARPA. 
The changes for the subsidy rates are shown in table 33. Specially, this study focuses on 
buy-up coverage since the premium for CAT coverage is fully subsidized by the 
government and producers only need to pay the administration fee. Both APH and CRC 
were available for wheat producers in 1998 and 2002. APH protects producers from low 
yield and CRC is a revenue protection. Considering these two insurance plans are different 
in terms of premium rates and insurance guarantees, the results could be biased if the two 
policies are combined in the study of the demand for wheat insurance. However, there is 
not enough data to estimate the demand for CRC insurance policy independently as the 
APH insurance policy is more popular than the CRC insurance policy. For example, in 
1998, the total insured acres for federal wheat insurance and the APH policy were 
44,355,379 and 39,397,331, respectively. Thus, about 89% of total enrolled acres in the 
federal crop insurance program was under the APH policy in 1998. Therefore, the demand 
for APH is the focus of this study. 
Due to the data limitation, each county is treated as an individual. Although using 
farm level data could increase the variation, there is no available secondary data at the 
farm-level to conduct this study. Since the purpose of this study is to get an approximation 
of the demand for wheat yield insurance over the major wheat producing regions, the use 
of county level data is appropriate. 
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Logarithmical transformation is popular in demand analysis. The natural logarithm 
transformation of each variable is used in the basic form of the model. Thus, the beta 
coefficients are elasticities directly. Linear-linear and log-linear forms are also used in this 
study at some coverage levels. In the linear-linear transformation, the model takes the form 
as shown in equation (1) and the elasticity is calculated by  
(2) 
x
E
y
  
where x  and y  denotes the mean of the independent and dependent variables.  
If the model is regressed in the log-linear form, the model takes the form as  
(3) log( )i i iy X      
then the elasticity is calculated by  
(4) E x  
where x represents the mean of the independent variable.  
As the data are compiled at the county-level, non-participation is not a significant 
problem. Thus, there is no need to adjust for non-participation in the model. Cross-
sectional data are used in this analysis and Ordinary Least Square regression is used for 
the estimation of the demand for wheat yield insurance.  
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Data 
 
 The study uses a pooled cross-sectional data at the county-level. The data are 
drawn from several sources. Crop insurance participation information at the county level 
is drawn from the files compiled by USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA). In the 
data files, information about crop insurance liabilities, premium, premium subsidies, and 
insured acres at each individual coverage level is aggregated to the county level by RMA.  
 Wheat yield, crop prices, and total planted acreage at the county level are collected 
from the QuickStats tool available through the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics 
Survey (NASS) website and are used to compute producers’ expectation of yield and the 
relative yield risk for each county.  
 Annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) is obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) to adjust the deflation of monetary variables. Information about irrigated 
cropland and cropland operated by females and males are derived from the 1997 and 2002 
Census of Agriculture conducted by the USDA’s NASS. CRP participation information is 
obtained from the files compiled by the USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA). The 
projected prices are computed followed the Commodity Exchange Price Provisions 
(CEPP).  
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Results and Discussions 
 
The Pacific Northwest 
 The estimation results for the Pacific Northwest are reported in table 35. The prefix 
“lg_” denotes the natural logarithm of the variable. There are only 13, 11, and 14 
observations at the 55%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels for the Pacific Northwest in the 
dataset, so these three coverage levels are not included in the estimation. To test for 
homoscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan (1979) and Cook-Weisberg (1983) test is applied 
for each coverage level. The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan (1979) and Cook-
Weisberg (1983) test assumes the variance of the error term is constant. The null 
hypothesis is not rejected at the 95% confidence interval for each coverage level in the 
Pacific Northwest region.  
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To test for the specification of the models, two variables are created after 
regression: predicted dependent variable (liabilities per acre per dollar of wheat value) and 
the squared term of the predicted dependent variable. The liabilities per acre per dollar of 
wheat value is regressed on the predicted variable and the squared term. The procedures 
are also called “Specification Link Test.” If the beta coefficient of the squared term is 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval, the model is considered to be 
misspecified; otherwise, the null hypothesis that the model is well specified cannot be 
rejected. In the Pacific Northwest, the squared terms do not have statistically significant 
effects on the liability purchases at each coverage level. Therefore, the models are assumed 
to be well specified for the Pacific Northwest.  
The R2 ranges from 0.36 (at the 50% coverage level) to 0.59 (at the 70% coverage 
level). As the p-value is less than 0.05 at each coverage level, the model failed to reject 
the null hypothesis that all the slopes are zero at the 95% confidence interval. Moreover, 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) are used to test for multicollinearity. According to 
Wooldridge (2010), VIF’s less than 10 indicate that multicollinearity is not a significant 
problem. Table 36 reports the results of the VIF test at each coverage level. The results of 
VIF test show that multicollinearity is not a significant problem for the Pacific Northwest.  
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Table 35. Estimation Results for Wheat APH Pacific Northwest 
 
 
Note: Standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables 50% 60% 65% 70% 75%
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.105 -0.302 -0.365*** 0.031 -0.175
-0.206 -0.231 -0.122 -0.173 -0.113
lg_mean_lag_yd3 0.848** 1.238*** 0.793*** 0.705** 0.640***
-0.315 -0.410 -0.231 -0.258 -0.231
lg_cv_yield -0.069 -0.221 -0.083 0.206 -0.133
-0.289 -0.505 -0.136 -0.229 -0.185
lg_acreplt -0.004 -0.002 0.038 0.128* 0.058
-0.063 -0.108 -0.049 -0.063 -0.052
lg_crp_acre 0.083 0.046 -0.089* -0.235*** -0.094*
-0.060 -0.099 -0.048 -0.064 -0.048
irr_per 0.664 0.235 0.316 -0.353 0.251
-0.477 -0.584 -0.269 -0.348 -0.237
fe_per 2.934 6.315 1.408 0.444 1.651
-2.146 -4.312 -1.712 -1.792 -1.562
Constant 0.068 -1.341 2.098** 3.739*** 2.660***
-1.363 -1.650 -0.914 -1.015 -0.914
Observations 41 25 51 33 52
R-squared 0.363 0.531 0.5510 0.5880 0.513
F-stats 2.69 2.75 7.54 5.10 6.63
[p-value] 0.0255 0.0421 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000
Coverage Levels
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 Table 36. VIF of the Independent Variables for the Pacific Northwest 
 
 
 
The demand equations are estimated in log-log form in the Pacific Northwest, so 
the beta coefficients are elasticities (table 35). The signs of the elasticities of demand with 
respect to the net premium are in line with expectations with one exception (table 35). The 
exception is the elasticity of wheat APH insurance demand with respect to the net premium 
per dollar of wheat value at the 70% coverage level (0.031) (table 35). Although the beta 
coefficient of the net premium is positive at the 70% coverage level, it is statistically 
insignificant. The elasticity of demand for wheat APH insurance with respect to net 
premium per acre per value is statistically significant at the 65% coverage level for the 
Pacific Northwest and it is price-inelastic (-0.37). With a ten-percent increase in the net 
premium per acre per dollar of wheat value, the purchase of liabilities are expected to 
decrease by 3.70%. In 2002, the total liabilities at the 65% coverage level was about $18.7 
million in the Pacific Northwest. Therefore, with a ten percent increase in the premium 
subsidy at the 65% coverage level, the liabilities would increase $691,900. The results 
indicate the importance of separating coverage levels in the study of the demand for wheat 
insurance as the elasticities of demand vary by coverage level from -0.10 to -0.37 (table 
35). 
Variables 50% 60% 65% 70% 75%
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price5.55 4.18 4.28 3.67 3.76
lg_mean_lag_yd3 2.21 1.97 2.42 2.17 2.56
lg_cv_yield 2.51 1.76 2.12 2.55 2.33
lg_acreplt 3.28 5.03 3.73 2.93 4.19
lg_crp_acre 5.20 6.10 5.93 3.33 6.67
irr_per 5.93 3.69 3.95 4.01 2.89
fe_per 2.40 1.53 1.47 1.49 1.43
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The demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to expected yield is elastic at 
the 60% coverage level (1.238) while the demand is inelastic for the other coverage levels 
(0.848, 0.793, 0.705, and 0.640 at 50%, 65%, 70%, and 75%, respectively). The results 
indicate that wheat producers with higher expected yield would purchase more wheat yield 
insurance at each level of coverage in the Pacific Northwest (table 35).  
There is no statistically significant relationship between the demand for wheat 
yield insurance and the relative yield risk, the percentage of irrigated cropland, and the 
percentage of cropland operated by females in the Pacific Northwest (table 35). Also, the 
total wheat planted area does not have statistically significant effects on the demand for 
wheat yield insurance, except at the 70% coverage level (table 35). At the 70% coverage 
level, with a 10% increase in the planted acres, the purchase of liabilities would be 
expected to increase by 1.28%.  
The enrolled acres in the CRP have statistically significant and negative effects at 
the 65%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels, and the effects are modest (table 35). The 
negative signs are in lines with expectations as the CRP reduces the number of acres that 
can buy crop insurance. The elasticities of demand for wheat yield insurance with respect 
to the enrolled acres in the CRP are -0.089, -0.235, and -0.094 at the 65%, 70%, and 75% 
coverage levels, respectively.  
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The Northern Plains 
 The Northern Plains is a major wheat growing region. In the present study, the 
Northern Plains include Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, and South Dakota. 
The estimation results for the Northern Plains are reported in table 37 and the results of 
VIF test are in table 38. The estimation at the 50% coverage level is rejected by the null 
hypothesis of the “Specification Link Test” and a linear-linear model is used to address 
the problem. Estimation results of the linear-linear model and the results of the 
corresponding VIF tests are reported in table 39 and table 40. The “X”s in the row of 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook Weisberg test at the 55% and 65% coverage levels (table 37) and at 
the 50% coverage level (table 39) indicate that the models failed the null hypothesis of the 
homoscedasticity test at these three coverage levels. Robust regressions are applied and 
robust standard errors are reported below the parameters estimated for the three coverage 
levels. All VIF’s are less than 3 (table 38 and 40) indicate that the multicollinearity 
problem is not noteworthy.   
  
113 
 
Table 37. Estimation Results for Wheat APH in the Northern Plains 
 
 
Note: (Robust) standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Table 38. VIF of the Independent Variables for the Northern Plains 
 
  
Variables 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85%
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.165*** -0.026 -0.174** -0.271*** -0.154*** -0.264*** -0.279** -0.274*
-0.046 -0.093 -0.07 -0.038 -0.047 -0.041 -0.131 -0.147
lg_mean_lag_yd3 0.445*** 0.540*** 0.619*** 0.490*** 0.380*** 0.412*** 0.390** 0.468**
-0.064 -0.140 -0.116 -0.041 -0.062 -0.053 -0.173 -0.174
lg_cv_yield -0.093* -0.163 -0.217** -0.140*** -0.087 -0.147*** -0.037 -0.402*
-0.053 -0.107 -0.090 -0.041 -0.054 -0.046 -0.131 -0.219
lg_acreplt 0.014 0.098** 0.035 0.011 0.031*** 0.020** 0.036 0.020
-0.012 -0.038 -0.022 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.029 -0.032
lg_crp_acre -0.013 -0.069* -0.018 -0.019** -0.025** -0.033*** -0.030 -0.029
-0.013 -0.035 -0.021 -0.008 -0.012 -0.010 -0.033 -0.039
irr_per 0.203*** -0.010 0.095 0.048 0.149** 0.114** 0.197 -0.008
-0.062 -0.1280 -0.130 -0.044 -0.059 -0.048 -0.170 -0.223
fe_per -1.765*** -2.232** -1.430* -0.046 -0.868* -1.356*** 2.366* 4.998
-0.567 -1.062 -0.853 -0.430 -0.487 -0.428 -1.319 -2.962
Constant 2.614*** 1.899** 1.811*** 2.888*** 3.201*** 3.476*** 3.475*** 2.926***
-0.315 -0.768 -0.608 -0.190 -0.305 -0.253 -0.922 -0.841
Observations 300 99 147 398 256 333 66 31
R-squared 0.310 0.363 0.332 0.416 0.309 0.398 0.278 0.477
F-stats 18.73 9.06 9.87 36.57 15.87 30.75 3.20 3.00
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 0.0216
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test X X
Variables 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85%
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price 1.20 1.23 1.16 1.37 1.35 1.29 1.46 1.38
lg_mean_lag_yd3 1.35 1.51 1.8 1.26 1.38 1.34 1.54 1.74
lg_cv_yield 1.14 1.1 1.24 1.17 1.17 1.18 1.28 1.18
lg_acreplt 1.55 1.46 1.45 1.97 1.58 1.76 1.81 1.64
lg_crp_acre 1.85 1.67 2.11 2.05 1.77 2.02 2.47 2.06
irr_per 1.23 1.24 1.27 1.38 1.47 1.45 2.22 1.35
fe_per 1.12 1.3 1.17 1.1 1.21 1.13 1.36 1.99
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Table 39. Estimation Results for Wheat APH in the Northern Plains (50%) 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
Variable 50%
liab_cpi_acre
netprem_cpi_acre_price -8.478**
-3.600
mean_lag_yd3 0.908***
-0.164
lg_cv_yield -7.654
-5.048
lg_acreplt 0.932
-1.135
lg_crp_acre -1.125
-0.921
irr_per 15.585***
-5.474
fe_per -131.744**
-54.637
Constant 45.797***
-14.710
Observations 300
R-squared 0.269
F-stats
[p-value]
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test X
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Table 40. VIF of the Independent Variables at the 50% Coverage Level 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Elasticities of demand for wheat yield insurance at the 50% coverage level in the Northern 
Plains are computed following equation (2) at the means based on estimation results 
shown in table 40. Elasticities at each coverage level in the Northern Plains are reported 
in table 41.  
  
Variables 50%
liab_cpi_acre
netprem_cpi_acre_price -8.478**
-3.600
mean_lag_yd3 0.908***
-0.164
lg_cv_yield -7.654
-5.048
lg_acreplt 0.932
-1.135
lg_crp_acre -1.125
-0.921
irr_per 15.585***
-5.474
fe_per -131.744**
-54.637
Constant 45.797***
-14.710
Observations 300
R-squared 0.269
F-stats
[p-value]
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test X
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Table 41. Estimated Elasticities of Wheat APH in the Northern Plains 
 
Note: Robust standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
The demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to premium per acre per dollar 
of wheat value is statistically significant at each coverage level except the 55% coverage 
level (table 41). The elasticities of demand with respect to net premium per acre per dollar 
of wheat value are -0.127, -0.174, -0.271, -0.154, -0.264, -0.279, and -0.274 at the 50%, 
60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage level, respectively (table 41). The 
magnitude of the elasticities is small at the relatively low coverage levels, such as the 50%, 
55%, and 60% coverage levels and are larger at the relatively high coverage levels, such 
as the 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage levels. Therefore, the demand for wheat yield 
insurance in the Northern Plains is more price-responsive at high coverage levels than low 
coverage levels.  
Similar as the Pacific Northwest, the demand for wheat yield insurance would be 
expected to increase if the expected yield increases (table 41). As shown in table 41, the 
relative yield risk has negative and statistically significant effects at the 60%, 65%, 75% 
and 85% coverage levels on the demand for wheat yield insurance in the Northern Plains 
(-0.217, -0.140, -0.147, and -0.402, respectively). With a ten-percent increase in the 
relative yield risk, the demand for wheat yield insurance is expected to decrease by 4.02% 
Variables 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85%
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.127** -0.026 -0.174** -0.271*** -0.154*** -0.264*** -0.279** -0.274*
mean_lag_yd3 0.421*** 0.540*** 0.619*** 0.490*** 0.380*** 0.412*** 0.390** 0.468**
cv_yield -0.101 -0.163 -0.217** -0.140*** -0.087 -0.147*** -0.037 -0.402*
acreplt 0.012 0.098** 0.035 0.011 0.031*** 0.020** 0.036 0.020
crp_acre -0.015 -0.069* -0.018 -0.019** -0.025** -0.033*** -0.030 -0.029
irr_per 0.207*** -0.010 0.095 0.048 0.149** 0.114** 0.197 -0.008
fe_per -1.745** -2.232** -1.430* -0.046 -0.868* -1.356*** 2.366* 4.998
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at the 85% coverage level in the Northern Plains. The wheat planted acres only have 
modest effects on the demand for wheat yield insurance in the Northern Plains (table 41). 
At the 55%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels, the demand for wheat yield insurance would 
increase by 0.098%, 0.031%, and 0.020% with a one-percent increase in wheat planted 
acreage. As expected, the demand for wheat yield insurance would decrease if more acres 
are enrolled in the CRP (table 41). The effects of CRP are statistically significant at the 
55%, 65%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels and the elasticities of demand for wheat yield 
insurance with respect to enrolled acres in the CRP are -0.069, -0.019, -0.025, and -0.033, 
respectively. The percentage of irrigated cropland has statistically significant effects on 
the demand for wheat yield insurance at the 50%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels and the 
corresponding elasticities are 0.207, 0.149, and 0.114, respectively (table 41). The 
percentage of cropland operated by females has statistically negative effects at the 50%, 
55%, 60%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels, and the effects are statistically positive at the 
80% coverage level in the Northern Plains (table 41). The elasticities of demand for wheat 
yield insurance with respect to the percentage of cropland operated by females 
are -1.745, -2.232, -1.430, -0.868, -1.356, and 2.366 at the 50%, 55%, 60%, 70%, 75%, 
and 80% coverage levels. Therefore, as the percentage of cropland operated by females 
grows, the demand for wheat yield insurance at the 80% coverage level is expected to 
increase by 2.366% while the demand at the lower coverage levels (50%, 55%, 60%, 70%, 
and 75% coverage levels) is expected to decrease. So women prefer to buy higher levels 
of insurance which is consistent with the risk aversion assumption.  
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Southern Plains 
 The estimation results in the Southern Plains are reported in table 42 and the results 
of VIF test are presented in table 43. The model at the 65% coverage level is rejected by 
the null hypothesis of the homoscedasticity test. Therefore, the robust test is applied and 
the robust standard errors are presented below the parameters estimated at the 65% 
coverage level. The regression at the 50% coverage level is rejected by the null hypothesis 
of the specification test. A log-linear model is used at the 50% coverage level to solve the 
misspecification problem and estimation results are presented in table 45. The VIF’s are 
less than 3 (table 43 and 44) and imply that there is no severe multicollinearity problem at 
each coverage level in the Southern Plains.  
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Table 42. Estimation Results for Wheat APH in the Southern Plains 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Table 43. VIF of the Independent Variable for the Southern Plains 
 
  
Variables 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75%
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_liab_cpi_a
cre
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.196*** -0.318*** -0.223*** 0.027 -0.186*** -0.145*
-0.046 -0.084 -0.069 -0.261 -0.059 -0.082
lg_mean_lag_yd3 0.577*** 1.021*** 0.677*** 0.314** 0.519*** 0.490***
-0.068 -0.127 -0.12 -0.126 -0.095 -0.115
lg_cv_yield -0.247*** -0.14 -0.114 -0.184** 0.002 -0.346***
-0.079 -0.172 -0.122 -0.09 -0.109 -0.123
lg_acreplt 0.017 0.008 0.070* 0.07 0.039 0.03
-0.018 -0.045 -0.037 -0.061 -0.029 -0.033
lg_crp_acre -0.021** 0.024 -0.052*** -0.037* -0.013 -0.009
-0.01 -0.02 -0.019 -0.021 -0.014 -0.016
irr_per 0.262** 0.015 0.165 0.111 0.186 0.038
-0.103 -0.196 -0.187 -0.133 -0.139 -0.168
fe_per 0.037 -0.318 1.191 0.185 -0.163 1.04
-0.533 -0.884 -0.863 -0.532 -0.752 -0.934
Constant 1.827*** 0.439 1.504*** 2.528*** 2.531*** 2.204***
-0.25 -0.602 -0.498 -0.49 -0.371 -0.48
Observations 228 74 90 266 121 89
R-squared 0.430 0.576 0.478 0.250 0.365 0.330
F-stats 23.72 12.79 10.71 12.63 9.29 5.71
[p-value] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test X
Variables 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75%
lg_netprem_cpi_acre_price 1.40 1.39 1.18 1.46 1.63 1.44
lg_mean_lag_yd3 1.32 1.24 1.18 1.37 1.25 1.18
lg_cv_yield 1.19 1.19 1.13 1.24 1.27 1.22
lg_acreplt 1.84 1.50 2.09 1.31 2.37 2.22
lg_crp_acre 1.83 1.81 2.35 1.85 2.00 2.16
irr_per 1.29 1.30 1.57 1.31 1.23 1.62
fe_per 1.09 1.16 1.15 1.13 1.11 1.27
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Table 44. Estimation Results for Wheat APH in the Southern Plains (55%) 
 
 
Note: Standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 45. VIF of the Independent Variables (Southern Plains, 50%) 
 
  
Variables 50%
lg_liab_cpi_ac
re_price
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.020
-0.018
mean_lag_yd3 0.030***
-0.002
lg_cv_yield -0.148**
-0.062
lg_acreplt 0.027*
-0.014
lg_crp_acre -0.018**
-0.008
lg_irr_per 0.016
-0.011
lg_fe_per 0.004
-0.030
Constant 1.407***
-0.161
Observations 228
R-squared 0.633
F-stats 54.16
[p-value] 0.0000
Variables 50%
netprem_cpi_acre_price 1.28
mean_lag_yd3 1.22
lg_cv_yield 1.18
lg_acreplt 1.83
lg_crp_acre 1.78
lg_irr_per 1.28
lg_fe_per 1.13
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The model is in log-linear form at the 50% coverage level, thus the beta 
coefficients are not corresponding elasticities. The elasticities of demand for wheat yield 
insurance with respect to each independent variable are calculated following equation (4) 
at the means at the 50% coverage level in the Southern Plains. The elasticities of demand 
for wheat yield insurance at each coverage level are reported in table 46. 
  
Table 46. Estimated Elasticities of Wheat APH in the Southern Plains 
 
Note: Standard errors presented below the parameters estimated. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Although the elasticity of demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to net 
premium is positive at the 65% coverage level, it is statistically insignificant. The 
elasticities of demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to net premium per acre per 
dollar of wheat value are -0.318, -0.223, -0.186, and -0.145 at the 55%, 60%, 70%, and 
75% coverage levels, respectively (table 46). In the Southern Plains, the demand for wheat 
yield insurance is price-inelastic among all coverage levels, and it is more price-sensitive 
at the 55% coverage level than other coverage levels. For example, the elasticity of 
demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to net premium at the 55% coverage level 
is about 9 times the elasticity at the 50% coverage level.  
Variables 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75%
netprem_cpi_acre_price -0.035 -0.318*** -0.223*** 0.027 -0.186*** -0.145*
mean_lag_yd3 0.838*** 1.021*** 0.677*** 0.314** 0.519*** 0.490***
cv_yield -0.148** -0.140 -0.114 -0.184** 0.002 -0.346***
acreplt 0.028* 0.008 0.070* 0.070 0.039 0.030
crp_acre -0.018** 0.024 -0.052*** -0.037* -0.013 -0.009
irr_per 0.0899 0.015 0.165 0.111 0.186 0.038
fe_per 0.056 -0.318 1.191 0.185 -0.163 1.040
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The demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to expected yield is elastic at 
the 55% coverage level in the Southern Plains and the elasticity is 1.021 (table 46). With 
a one-percent increase in the expected yield, the demand for wheat yield insurance is 
expected to increase by 1.021% at the 55% coverage level in the Southern Plains. Among 
all the other coverage levels, the demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to 
expected yield is inelastic and the elasticities are 0.838, 0.677, 0.314, 0.519, and 0.490 at 
the 50%, 60%, 65%, 70%, and 75% coverage levels (table 46).  
The relative yield risk has statistically significant and negative effects at the 50%, 
65%, and 75% coverage levels and the elasticities of demand for wheat yield insurance 
with respect to the relative yield risk are -0.148, -0.184, and -0.346, respectively (table 
46). The amount of acres enrolled in the CRP has statistically significant effects on the 
demand for wheat yield insurance at the 50%, 60%, and 65% coverage levels 
(-0.018, -0.052, and -0.037, respectively) (table 46). 
Although the irrigated cropland has higher expected yield and lower relative 
production risk, it does not significantly affect the demand for wheat yield insurance in 
the Southern Plains (table 46). The percentage of cropland operated by females does not 
significantly influence wheat producers’ purchase decisions on yield insurance either 
(table 46).  
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Summary 
The elasticities of demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to net premium 
per acre per dollar of wheat value are summarized in table 47. Overall, the elasticities 
change across coverage levels and regions. Take the 60% coverage level as an example. 
The elasticity of demand for wheat yield insurance is statistically insignificant at the 60% 
coverage level in the Pacific Northwest (-0.302), and the elasticities are -0.174 and -0.223 
in the Northern Plains and Southern Plains, respectively (table 47). At the 65% coverage 
level, in the Southern Plains, the relationship between the net premium and the liability 
purchases is statistically insignificant, while the relationship is statistically significant in 
the Pacific Northwest and Northern Plains (table 47). Specially, the magnitude of the 
elasticities of demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to net premium also 
decreases from the Pacific Northwest to the Northern Plains at the 65% coverage level 
(elasticities are -0.365 and -0.271, respectively). The elasticity of demand for wheat yield 
insurance at the 65% coverage level in the Pacific Northwest is about 14 times of the 
corresponding elasticity in the Southern Plains (-0.365 and -0.027). 
Table 47. Estimated Elasticities of Wheat APH with respect to Net Premium 
Table 48 summarizes the elasticities of demand with respect to producers’ 
expectations of yield in the three major wheat producing regions. With higher expected 
Variables 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85%
Pacific Northwest -0.105 - -0.302 -0.365*** 0.032 -0.175 - -
Northern Plains -0.127** -0.026 -0.174** -0.271*** -0.154*** -0.264*** -0.279** -0.274*
Southern Plains -0.035 -0.318*** -0.223*** 0.027 -0.186*** -0.145* - -
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wheat yield, producers are expected to purchase more wheat yield insurance at each 
coverage level. The expected yield effects vary across coverage levels and regions. The 
magnitude of the elasticities is the largest in the Pacific Northwest at each coverage level 
(table 48). Consider the 65% coverage level as an example. The elasticity of demand for 
wheat yield insurance with respect to wheat expected yield is 0.793 at the 65% coverage 
level in the Pacific Northwest, while the corresponding elasticities are 0.490 and 0.314 in 
the Northern Plains and Southern Plains (table 48). Thus, the elasticity of demand for 
wheat insurance in the Pacific Northwest is about three time of the elasticity in the 
Southern Plains (0.793 and 0.314, respectively). The large magnitude of the elasticities of 
demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to expected yield maybe related to the 
higher expected wheat yield of wheat in the Pacific Northwest.  The wheat average yield 
in 1995-1997 is used to estimate producers’ expected yield for 1998 and the average yield 
in 1999-2001 is used to estimate producers’ expected yield for 2002. Figure 21 shows the 
weighted average yield of wheat in 1995-2002. During the period, the Pacific Northwest 
had the highest expected yield compared to the other two regions (figure 21).  
  
Table 48. Estimated Elasticities of Wheat APH with respect to Yield Expectation 
 
Variables 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85%
Pacific Northwest 0.848** - 1.238*** 0.793*** 0.705** 0.640*** - -
Northern Plains 0.421*** 0.540*** 0.619*** 0.490*** 0.380*** 0.412*** 0.390** 0.468**
Southern Plains 0.838*** 1.021*** 0.677*** 0.314** 0.519*** 0.490*** - -
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Figure 21. County Average Yield of Wheat in 1995-2002 
Source: USDA’s NASS. 
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Policy Implications 
 
 Crop Insurance has been targeted for cutting since the 2008 Farm Bill, especially 
when the federal budget is a concern. In this section, we estimate the possible changes of 
demand for wheat yield insurance if the government reduces wheat yield insurance 
subsidy rates by 10 percentage points, and the estimated changes in demand for each 
coverage level are listed in table 49. 
 
Table 49. Expected Changes of Wheat Insurance Demand  
  50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
Pacific 
Northwest - - - 
-
6.186% - -   
Northern Plains 
-
1.896% - 
-
2.719% 
-
4.593% 
-
2.610% 
-
4.800% 
-
5.813% 
-
7.211% 
Southern Plains - 
-
4.969% 
-
3.484% - 
-
3.153% 
-
2.636%   
 
Note: “-” denotes statistically insignificant change. 
 
  
A 10 percentage points reduction in federal crop insurance premium subsidy rates 
will result in different changes in demand for wheat yield insurance across coverage levels 
(table 49). In the Pacific Northwest, the demand for wheat yield insurance is expected to 
decrease by 6.186% given a 10 percentage points reduction in premium subsidy rates 
(table 49). The expected changes in demand for wheat yield insurance are statistically 
insignificant among other coverage levels in the Pacific Northwest (table 49). In the 
Northern Plains, wheat producers are expected to reduce their demand for federal wheat 
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yield insurance by 1.896%, 2.719%, 4.593%, 2.610%, 4.800%, 5.813%, and 7.211% at 
the 50%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85% coverage level, respectively, given a 10 
percentage points cut in premium subsidies (table 49). The estimated change in demand 
at the 80% coverage level is 3.8 times greater than it is at the 50% coverage level in the 
Northern Plains (table 49). In the Southern Plains, wheat producers are expected to reduce 
their demand for federal wheat yield insurance by 4.969% at the 55% coverage level, while 
they will reduce the demand by 2.636% for the 75% coverage level (table 49). Thus, the 
same reduction in premium subsidy rates would result in different changes in demand for 
wheat yield insurance across coverage levels.  
 In the Northern Plains, wheat producers are more sensitive to the changes in 
premium subsidies for high coverage levels. For example, wheat producers are expected 
to reduce their demand for federal wheat yield insurance by -5.813% and -7.211% for the 
80% and 85% coverage level, respectively, while they would reduce their demand for 
insurance slightly for the 50% and 60% coverage levels (-1.896% and -2.719%, 
respectively, see table 49). Therefore, a 10 percentage points reduction in premium 
subsidy rates would result in greater decreases in the demand for federal wheat yield 
insurance among high coverage levels in the Northern Plains. This result is counter to the 
major purpose of the 2000 ARPA, which intended to encourage producers to purchase 
crop insurance at relatively high coverage levels (Babcock and Hart 2005).  
 However, in the Southern Plains, wheat producers are more responsive to the 
premium changes at the 55% coverage level than other coverage levels. The demand for 
federal wheat insurance at 55% coverage level is expected to decrease by 4.969%, while 
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the changes in demand for wheat insurance at the 80% and 85% coverage levels are 
statistically insignificant (table 49).  
 Moreover, the expected changes in demand for wheat yield insurance are different 
across regions. At the 75% coverage level, wheat producers would decrease their demand 
for federal yield insurance by 4.800% and 2.636% in the Northern Plains and Southern 
Plains, respectively (table 49). And the expected changes in wheat yield insurance demand 
for the 75% coverage level is statistically insignificant in the Pacific Northwest.  
 Overall, wheat producers would have different responses to the changes in subsidy 
rates across coverage levels and regions. The same reduction in federal premium subsidy 
rates would result in different decreases in the demand for wheat insurance. Therefore, the 
differences in elasticities across coverage levels and regions should be considered when 
the government applies a federal premium subsidy adjustment.  
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Conclusions 
 
 The present study is the first to explore the demand for wheat yield insurance 
across coverage levels and major producing regions. The results show that the demand for 
wheat yield insurance with respect to net premium per acre per dollar of wheat value is 
inelastic and the net premium effects vary across coverage levels and regions. The 
elasticity of demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to net premium is statistically 
insignificant at the 55% coverage level in the Northern Plains (-0.026) and it is -0.365 and 
statistically significant at the 65% coverage level in the Pacific Northwest. The estimated 
elasticities are basically consistent with the findings in previous studies. The elasticities 
of demand for wheat insurance are reported as -0.12 and -0.27 by Goodwin, Vandeveer, 
and Deal (2004) and O'Donoghue (2014), respectively.  
The results find a strong relationship between the demand for wheat yield 
insurance and the expected yield of wheat. As expected yield increases, the demand for 
wheat yield insurance increases at each coverage level in the three regions, but the yield 
effects change over coverage levels and regions. The demand for wheat yield insurance 
with respect to expected yield is elastic at the 60% coverage level in the Pacific Northwest 
at 1.238 (table 48). The demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to expected yield 
is inelastic among other coverage levels and the elasticity of demand for wheat yield 
insurance with respect to expected yield ranges from 0.390 (80% coverage level in the 
Northern Plains) to 0.848 (50% coverage level in the Southern Pains).  
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The present study points out the importance of separating coverage levels and 
regions in the analysis of demand for wheat yield insurance. The net premium, the 
expected yield of wheat, the relative yield risk, the total planted acreage of wheat, the 
percentage of irrigated cropland, and the percentage of cropland operated by females have 
different effects on the demand for wheat yield insurance across coverage levels and 
regions. For example, the elasticity of demand for wheat yield insurance with respect to 
net premium at the 65% coverage level is about 14 times of the elasticity at the 55% 
coverage level. The percentage of cropland operated by females has statistically 
significant effects among relatively low coverage levels in the Northern Plains and the 
effects change to positive at the 80% coverage level in the Northern Plains. 
 The federal crop insurance is an integrate part of the farm safety net since passage 
of the 2014 Farm Bill. Although there is no reduction or restriction on the premium 
subsidies in the current farm bill, considering the expensive spending, there could be 
future adjustments on premium subsidy rates. The different elasticities across coverage 
levels and regions derived provide detailed insights into the effects of changing federal 
subsidy. 
 The objective of the study is to get an approximation of the demand for wheat 
insurance based on available data. One caveat of this study is that adverse selection is not 
included in the model. Considering the potential existence of adverse selection, further 
studies on the effect of adverse selection on the demand for wheat yield insurance would 
be useful.  
 146 
 
CHAPTER IV  
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON FEDERAL  
 CROP INSURANCE LOSS RATIOS 
 
Introduction 
 
 Farming is risky due to the impacts of climate conditions, especially in rain-fed 
agricultural regions. Studies show that climate change is inevitable and climate variability 
increases with global warming (Thornton et al. 2014). As a result, farming is more risky 
and historical yield patterns are less reliable for the estimation of future production. The 
Risk Management Agency (RMA) designs and regulates the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program (FCIP) to help farmers manage risks. The FCIP has experienced rapid 
development since the 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act. In 2015, approximately 300 
million acres were insured in the FCIP and the corresponding liabilities were more than 
$102 billion. Figure 22 shows the total ensured acreage under the FCIP.  
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Figure 22. Total Ensured Acreage in the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) 
Source: USDA, RMA, Summary of Business Reports. 
 The FCIP has undergone scrutiny regarding regional disparities (Glauber 2004; 
Babcock 2008; Woodard et al., 2011), overpricing (Babcock, Hart, and Hayes 2004) and 
government spending (Goodwin and Smith 2013). However, the impacts of climate 
change on the FCIP received very little attention. Figure 23 displays the national crop 
insurance gross loss ratios for all crops, all plans and all coverages. Relatively large gross 
lose ratios occurred in 1988 at 2.45 (indemnity/gross premium), 1993 at 2.19, 2002 at 1.39 
and 2012 at 1.58 and these losses were mainly due to weather extremes. Figure 24 shows 
corn and soybean production in the U.S. during 1985-2015. The drought in 1988 was 
nationwide and cost $15.6 billion in losses of agriculture (Riebsame, Changnon, and Karl 
1991; Wu and Wilhite 2004). In 1988, corn and soybean production were reduced by 45% 
and 26%, respectively, compared to the 1985-87 average (Wu and Wilhite 2004).  In 1993, 
spring-seeded crops in the Midwest were destroyed by floods (Cassidy and Althaus 1994). 
According to Cassidy and Althaus (1994), more than 6 million acres of corn and soybean 
production were significantly affected by the 1993 floods. In 2002, western and eastern 
agricultural regions had severe droughts. The gross loss ratios of corn crop insurance were 
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greater than three in Colorado (3.72), Kansas (3.46) and Ohio (3.85), and the loss ratios 
were greater than four in Pennsylvania (4.08) as well as Delaware (4.28). The high loss 
ratio in 2012 was also related to droughts and the damage mainly occurred in the Corn 
Belt. Figure 26 shows crop insurance loss ratios by county. The FCIP experienced high 
losses mainly in the Corn Belt, and the severe damage did not occur in the western and 
eastern counties in year 2012.  
 
 
 
Figure 23. National Crop Insurance Gross Loss Ratios 
 
Source: USDA, RMA, Summary of Business Reports. 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
 149 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Corn Production in the U.S. 
 
Source: USDA, NASS. 
 
 
 
 
            
Figure 25. 2002 Corn Crop Insurance Gross Loss Ratios 
 
Source: USDA, RMA, Summary of Business. 
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Figure 26. 2012 Crop Insurance Gross Loss Ratios by County 
 
Source: Schnitkey and Sherrick 2013. 
 
 
 Moreover, these historical loss ratios were constructed based on gross premium, 
which are the ratios of crop insurance indemnities to gross premium. When examining the 
net loss ratios, which are the rates of crop insurance indemnities to net premium (gross 
premium - government subsidies), the losses of crop insurance were even higher when 
extreme weather happened. For example, the national net loss ratios were 3.25, 2.98, 3.46, 
and 4.22 in 1988, 1993, 2002, and 2012, respectively. In 2002, the net loss ratios were 
6.77, 6.28, 6.73, 8.91 and 9.45 in Colorado, Kansas, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Delaware, 
respectively. Therefore, the losses of crop insurance were extremely high when natural 
disasters occurred. 
 When weather extremes happened, crop insurance indemnities also increased 
significantly because of the increased participation in the FCIP. Figure 27 presents crop 
insurance indemnity costs and liabilities for all crops, all regions and all contracts. In 1988, 
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only 25% of eligible acreage participated in the FCIP (Glauber 2007). Although the natural 
disaster in 1988 had bigger range and more intensive than the weather extremes in the 
other three years (1993, 2002, and 2012), the indemnity payments of crop insurance in 
1993 were the lowest. In 1988, the total crop insurance indemnity payment was 
approximately $1.07 billion, and the indemnity payment was more than $17.45 billion in 
2012. The FCIP would have significantly large losses in the future if weather extremes 
occur considering the high participation in the crop insurance program.  
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Figure 27. National Crop Insurance Indemnities and Liabilities 
 
Source: Glauber 2002; USDA, RMA, Summary of Business. 
  
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to test the ability of APEX to be used for climate 
change analysis in a crop insurance setting. The analysis will be a proof of the concept for 
a methodology to analyze the impacts of climate change on the loss ratio of crop insurance 
for a representative farm. A more comprehensive analysis using the method can be 
undertaken for multiple crops and regions once the methodology has been tested and 
validated. 
 This chapter is constructed as the followings. In the first part, a crop and soil 
productivity simulation model (APEX) is parameterized and calibrated to estimate grain 
sorghum yields for an actual farm. A grain sorghum farm in Sherman, Texas is selected 
as a representative farm. The weather information projected by different weather models 
are used in the crop growth model to simulate the yield of grain sorghum for 25 years in 
the second part. In the third part, the simulated crop yields are applied in the crop insurance 
ratemaking procedures to estimate crop insurance premiums for alternative weather 
models.  
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Crop Yield Estimation 
 
 As the IPCC emphasized that the impacts of climate change on agriculture should 
be focused on regional models (Tan and Shibasaki 2003), a representative farm is selected 
to use local features to estimate the effects of climate change on the loss ratios of crop 
insurance in this study. A non-irrigated grain sorghum farm in Sherman County, Texas is 
randomly selected from the Agricultural Food and Policy Center (AFPC) database. The 
farm’s ten years of annual yields, planted acreage, and RMA’s T yield are available in the 
dataset. Table 50 lists the summary statistics of annual yields of non-irrigated grain 
sorghum for the selected farm. Figure 28 shows annual grain sorghum yields for the farm. 
The yield of non-irrigated grain sorghum in 2013 at the county level is missing in the 
NASS data base.  
 
 
Table 50. Summary Statistics of Non-Irrigated Grain Sorghum Yields 
 Farm 
Sherman 
County Texas 
Mean 43.222 37.513 48.778 
StDev 16.890 10.277 8.827 
Min 13.000 19.000 34.000 
Median 42.000 37.150 49.000 
Max 77.000 56.800 60.700 
CV 39.078 27.395 18.097 
 
Source: USDA, NASS and private data. 
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Figure 28. Annual Yields of Grain Sorghum at Different Levels 
 
Source: USDA, NASS. 
  
 
 Among the three yield series, the coefficient of variation for non-irrigated grain 
sorghum is the largest at the farm level (39.078), which implies that the yield of grain sorghum 
is more variable at the farm level. During the ten years of available data, the farm’s grain sorghum 
yield reached its maximum in 1997 and reached its minimum in 2006 at each level. The yield trend 
at the farm level is roughly consistent with the yield trend at the county level, but with larger 
variance.  
 The Agricultural Policy Environmental eXtender (APEX) model was used to 
estimate future crop yields in this study. Historical crop yields for the farm were used to 
calibrate and validate the APEX model. The APEX model is built on the Environmental 
Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model (Williams et al. 1995) and it is developed and 
maintained by the Blackland Research and Extension Center in Temple, Texas. The APEX 
model can be used to estimate the effects of temperature, precipitation, farm management, 
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and fertilizer and pesticide use on crop yields for areas with homogeneous soils and 
management (Gassman et al. 2010). It has been widely tested and recognized as a reliable 
tool for crop yield simulation (Roloff, Dejong, and Nolin 1998; Bryant et al. 1992; 
Edwards et al., 1994; Wang et al. 2012). Fourteen main components are incorporated in 
the APEX model including: climate inputs, routing, crop growth and competition, 
hydrologic balance, livestock grazing, phosphorous and nitrogen cycling and losses, water 
and wind erosion, carbon cycling routine, manure management inputs, manure erosion, 
feedlot dust, reservoir and economic components. In this study, two interfaces (ArcAPEX 
and APEXeditor) of the APEX model are used.  
 ArcAPEX is a user interface which combines the Geographic Information System 
(GIS) and the APEX model (Tan and Shibasaki 2003). It is built as an extension to the 
ArcGIS software. In the APEX model, each research area should be relatively 
homogeneous regarding soils, land use, topography, weather and management. The 
homogeneous area is called a subarea or a Hydrologic Response Unit (HRU) in the APEX 
model. According to Wang, Tuppad, and Williams (2011), “Each sub-area is associated 
with a channel for routing.” Generally, the delineation of subarea is difficult due to the 
complexity unless the boundaries of subareas are well known by researchers. In this study, 
the boundaries of the representative farm are unavailable due to limitations in the data 
source. Therefore, following Tuppad et al. (2009), the GIS platform (ArcMap) as well as 
the routing component in the APEX model are used to analyze and parametrize geometric 
and topographic characteristics, channel dimensions and slope distributions in order to 
delineate subareas. In addition to delineation, the integration of ArcGIS with the APEX 
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model simulates crop yields and exports input data as well as parameters for future 
modeling.  
 APEXeditor (version APEX0806) is another interface of the APEX model. A 
series of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros are built in a Microsoft Excel file. 
The APEXeditor interface can be used to read and revise input datasets as well as 
parameters and run the APEX model. It is a convenient tool to manipulate input datasets 
required by the APEX model. The datasets extracted from the ArcAPEX interface are 
revised in the APEXeditor interface to better fit local characteristics. A flowchart of the 
GIS- and Excel- based APEX interfaces is shown in figure 29.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. The Flowchart of ArcAPEX and APEXeditor 
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Subarea Delineation 
 
 Delineating of subareas is the first step in developing an APEX model. In this 
study, the boundaries of subareas are delineated based on a Digital Elevation Model 
(DEM). A 30-meter DEM for Sherman County, Texas is downloaded from the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) Earthexplorer site (table 51). A projection of the DEM is 
generated by using tools in ArcMap (figure 30). A single-flow direction algorithm 
available in ArcMap is used to generate required flow information for subarea delineation 
(figure 31).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. A DEM-based Projection of Sherman, Texas 
 
Source: USGS. Available at: http://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/ 
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Table 51. Data Source of the APEX Model 
Input Resolution Source Location/time period 
Digital Elevation 
Model (DEM) 
30m U.S. Geological Survey EarthExplorer Sherman County, Texas 
Soils 1000m Harmonized World Soil Database 
(HWSD) 
Sherman County, Texas 
Temperature Daily 
Climate Forecast System Reanalysis 
(CFSR) 
1/1/1979 - 7/31/2014 
Precipitation Daily 
Solar radiation, 
relative humidity 
and wind  
Daily 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Flow Raster for Sherman County, Texas  
 
 An outlet is manually added on a randomly selected channel, and then a subarea 
associated with the outlet is automatically delineated by ArcAPEX (figure 32).  The 
subarea delineated in ArcAPEX is 147.8 acres, which matches with the size of a field unit 
on the representative farm (148.9 acres). The latitude and longitude are 36.376 
and -101.988 at the centroid of the subarea. Because the trend of non-irrigated grain 
sorghum yields in Sherman County, Texas is basically consistent with the corresponding 
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trend in the representative farm, the delineated subarea is used to represent the farm in this 
study. Parameters in the APEX model are calibrated based on the farm’s characteristics. 
 
 
 
Figure 32. DEM-Based APEX Subarea Delineation 
 
 
Subarea Analysis 
 
 After delineation, APEX parameters and datasets are defined based on the 
representative farm’s characteristics. ArcAPEX has default folders for weather data. The 
closest weather station is selected by the algorithm in ArcAPEX and the weather data 
collected by this weather station are used in this part. The weather data are revised in the 
next part in the APEXeditor interface. Similarly, default soil data in ArcAPEX are applied 
in this part and revised in the APEXeditor interface. A single slope is assumed for the 
subarea, and the slope information is computed and analyzed by ArcAPEX. The APEX 
model is run in the ArcMap platform, and more than 40 datasets are generated by the 
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interface. These datasets are exported into the APEXeditor interface in the next step for 
future adjustments to better fit the local features.  
 The input datasets and parameters required by the APEX model are extracted from 
ArcAPEX interface and imported into the APEXeditor for adjustments. The major 
changes in the datasets and parameters are related to soil data and weather data.  
 Soil information for Sherman County, Texas is extracted from the Harmonized 
World Soil Database (HWSD) (table 52). Instead of using the HSWD Viewer to manually 
query the dataset, the HWSD is accessed and queried in the open-source R project. 
Detailed code for R version 3.1.0 is attached in Appendix II.  
 The latitude of Sherman County, Texas ranges from 36.055 to 36.501, and the 
longitude ranges from -101.623 to -102.163. The boundary map for Sherman is shown in 
figure 33. A corresponding rectangular bounding box is created in R regarding the range 
of latitude and longitude of Sherman County, Texas. Based on the HWSD dataset, 
Kastanozems and Calcisols are the two soil types in this region (figure 34) and they 
account for 98.90% and 1.10% of the land, respectively. Because the latitude and 
longitude of the centroid of the subarea are 36.376 and -101.988, the corresponding soil 
type in the subarea is Kastanozems. The associated soil data file is extracted from the 
HWSD database by using the R project. There are three soil layers in the subarea, and all 
the three layers are loam. Detailed soil information is listed in Appendix III.  
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Figure 33. The Boundary Map for Sherman County in Texas, U.S. 
 
Source: https://www.maptechnica.com/us-county-boundary map/county/Sherman/state/TX/countyid/48421 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Soil Classes in Sherman County, Texas 
 
  
 
 The soil parameters collected from the HWSD dataset are not enough for running 
the APEX model. The soil albedo value is set at 0.17 at the beginning to test the model 
because the soil albedo ranges from 0.1 to 0.23 for clay loam (Orsini et al. 2000) and clay 
loam is the dominant soil in Sherman County, according to the Soil Survey of Sherman 
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County, Texas (1975). Soil hydrologic group could be set at 2 or 3 because loam soil 
belongs to group 2 and clay loam is in group 3. Another soil parameters, such as soil water 
tension, conductivity and water holding capability, are calculated in the Soil Water 
Characteristics Program (SWCP) based on the soil texture, organic matter, gravel content, 
salinity and compaction extracted from the HWSD (figure 35). The units in the SWCP are 
changed to metric unit to match with units in the APEX model. The computed results are 
shown in table 52. The soil parameters are used in the APEXeditor (version 0806) to revise 
the soil data generated by ArcAPEX.  
 
 
 
Figure 35. Soil Water Characteristics  
 
Table 52. Soil Characteristics of Sherman County, Texas 
Sequence Sand Clay Silt Gravel Salinity Organic 
Matter 
Texture 
Class 
Wilting 
Point 
Field 
Capacity 
Saturation 
 %Wt %Wt %Wt %Vol dS/m %Wt  %Vol %Vol %Vol 
1 36 23 41 8 0.1 1.3 Loam 15.3 30.0 46.4 
2 32 25 43 8 1.1 1.4 Loam 16.4 31.5 47.0 
3 34 21 45 8 1.6 1.3 Loam 14.6 29.6 46.6 
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Table 52. Continued. 
Sequence Available 
Water 
Saturated 
Hydraulic 
Conductivity 
Bulk 
Density 
Moisture Matric 
Potential 
Matric+Osmotic Hydraulic 
Condition 
 cm/cm mm/hr g/cm^3 %Vol kPa kPa mm/hr 
1 0.13 10.39 1.42 15.3 1500 1500 1.48E-6 
2 0.15 9.79 1.41 24.6 141 141 7.60E-4 
3 0.15 13.43 1.41 14.6 1316 1500 2.31E-6 
 
 
Weather Information 
  
 The APEX model requires daily solar radiation (J/m2), maximum temperature 
(°C), minimum temperature (°C), precipitation (mm), relative humidity and wind speed 
(m/s). In this study, weather data are requested from the National Centers for 
Environmental Information (NOAA) (requests can be submitted at 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/) and the database of Global Weather Data for SWAT 
(GWDS) (request can be submitted at http://globalweather.tamu.edu). The NOAA 
weather data for Sherman County, Texas starts from July 1, 1911 and ends at May 2, 2016. 
Solar radiation, relative humidity and wind speed are missed in the NOAA dataset. An 
example of the NOAA dataset is shown in table 53. In the dataset, -9999 represents 
missing values.  
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Table 53. An Example of the NOAA Weather Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 165 
 
 Weather data collected from the GWDS covers the time period from January 1, 
1979 to July 31, 2014. Although the time period in the GWDS datasets is shorter compared 
with the NOAA dataset, the GWDS data have all the weather variables required by the 
APEX model (solar radiation, maximum temperature, minimum temperature, 
precipitation, relative humidity and wind speed). Therefore, weather data requested from 
the Global Weather Database are used in this study.  
 In the GWDS, two weather datasets are available for Sherman County, Texas. The 
two datasets are collected from two weather stations. Both of the weather datasets cover 
the time period from January 1, 1979 to July 31, 2014. The latitude and longitude for the 
two weather stations are 36.062, -101.875 and 36.375, -101.875, respectively. The 
locations of the two weather stations are shown in figure 36.  
 
 
Figure 36. Two Weather Stations in the Subarea 
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 According to figure 36, station 2 is much closer to the subarea in this study, 
compared with station 1. Therefore, weather data collected by weather station 2 is applied 
in the APEX model. Summary statistics of weather variables are shown in Appendix VI.  
 The setup of the APEX model is sensitive to format. The format of weather data is 
converted by using a component in the APEX Weather Generator (APEX WXGM). All 
input datasets associated with maximum temperature, minimum temperature, 
participation, wind, relative humidity and solar radiation are updated by the weather data 
collected from GWDS in APEXeditor interface.  
 Figure 37 shows the file structure in APEXeditor. Not only the input datasets and 
parameters, but all related files should be adjusted when changes have been made in the 
inputs. The APEX model is run for 17 years to represent the years in the farm dataset. 
Summary statistics of simulated yields and historical yields for non-irrigated grain 
sorghum are presented in table 55. The simulated yields are converted to busheles per acre 
to match with the units in the original yield dataset. Figure 38 shows the observed yields 
and simulated yields by the APEX model.  
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Figure 37. APEX Files Structure 
 
Source: Steglich and Williams 2008. 
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Table 54. Summary Statistics of Farm Historical Yields and Estimated Yields 
  Simulated Yields Historical Yields 
Mean 43.222 47.885 
StDev 16.890 15.280 
CV 39.078 31.910 
Min 13.000 28.061 
Median 42.000 45.600 
Max 77.000 73.821 
 
 
 
Figure 38. Historical Farm Yields and Simulated Yields  
 
Calibration 
  
 The representative farm’s historical yields data are used to calibrate the APEX 
model. The APEX model is calibrated by adjusting the parameters that are found sensitive 
in experts’ opinions and literature (Gassman et al. 2009). Appendix VII shows the selected 
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parameters for the calibration process. Figure 39 illustrates some simulations during the 
calibration process. Table 56 shows an example of the APEX output file.   
 
 
 
Figure 39. Examples of Simulation Results 
 
 
The major difficulty for the calibration lays on the data limitations. Important 
information, such as operation schedules, the leaf area index, root depth and weight, and 
crop height, is missed in the database. Fortunately, experts at the Blackland Research and 
Extension Center (BREC) give great assistance in this section.  
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 Irrationally high water stress is initially observed in the simulation outputs. For 
example, in year 2001, grain sorghum has water stress for 58 days during the 128 growing 
days. Although the low yields caused by water stress can be offset by adjusting other 
parameters, such as applying more fertilizer, the APEX model simulations did not initially 
reflect the observed yields well (figure 39). Therefore, weather information collected from 
weather station 1 is also tested in the APEX model in case the weather data provided by 
weather station 2 is biased (see “Weather Information” section for descriptions of the 
weather information). However, changing weather information and adjusting sensitive 
parameters did not improve the accuracy of the APEX model. The simulated yields could 
only reflect the representative farm’s observed yields in year 2001 and 2003 (figure 39).  
 After careful experimentations and literature review, the poor fit problem is 
attributed to the weather data collected from the GWDS. The weather information in the 
GWDS is collected from the CFRS. The precipitation data in the CFRS is satellite-based 
estimates, not gauged rainfall data. Worqlul et al. (2014) discuss the error in daily 
precipitation data between the point-gauged data and the satellite-predicted precipitation 
data. Considering the irrationally high water stress in the APEX simulation outputs, the 
weather information is substituted by the gauged precipitation information provided by 
the BREC. The weather data provided by the BREC contains weather information in 1960 
– 2010. Thus, the APEX model is adjusted to simulate grain sorghum yields through 2010.  
 The APEX model is built based on hundreds of parameters. However, only limited 
information is available in the representative farm’s dataset. Fortunately, the APEX model 
is able to calculate and fill in the unknown parameters, and the process is referred to as 
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“warm up.” Therefore, the crop yields in 1997 and 1998 are used to “warm up” the APEX 
model according to experts’ opinions.  
 Different sources of weather data are used in the APEX model, but none of them 
could predict the extremely low yield in year 2006 for the representative farm. Without 
detailed information to be incorporated in the APEX model (e.g., insect disasters, different 
operation schedules), the APEX model cannot capture the extremely low yields by only 
relying on the weather change in year 2006. Besides, the representative farm’s yield in 
year 2006 (13 bushels/acre) is 46% lower than the 2006 average yields in the Sherman 
County (19 bushels/acre), and 207% lower than the average 2006 grain sorghum yields in 
Texas (40 bushels/acre). Therefore, the observed yield in year 2006 is excluded and 
observed grain sorghum yields in 1999 – 2005 are selected to calibrate the APEX model.  
 The performance of the APEX model is evaluated by statistical comparisons and 
tests. The difference between the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the observed 
yields and simulated yields is measured by using the CDFDEV( ) function in Simetar©. 
The sum of the squared difference between two CDFs and a penalty for differences in the 
tails is calculated by the function (Richardson, Schumann, and Feldman 2006): 
 𝐶𝐷𝐹𝐷𝐸𝑉 =  ∑ (𝐹(𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 )−𝐺(𝑥𝑖))
2 + 𝑤𝑖 
 Where 𝐹(𝑥𝑖) is the CDF of the observed yields and the 𝐺(𝑥𝑖) is the CDF of the 
simulated yields by the APEX model, and 𝑤𝑖 represents the penalty function. The best 
calibrated model is selected based on the smallest results of the CDFEDV( ) function. 
Because the unit of simulated yields from the APEX model is ton/hectare, the observed 
yields (bushel/acre) are converted to tons/hectare, and all the calculations are based on 
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yields as ton/hectare for convenience. Figure 40 shows the observed grain sorghum yields 
and the simulated yields by the calibrated APEX model. The CDF difference between the 
observed yields and simulated yields is 0.41, and it is 0.35 between the representative 
farm’s yields and the average yields of Sherman County, Texas in 1999 – 2005. The CDF 
difference is 0.24 between the observed yields and the simulated yields by the selected 
calibrated model, while the difference is 0.82 between the farm’s observed yields and the 
average yields of Sherman County, Texas in 1997 – 2005. Therefore, considering the 
limited data availability, the calibrated model is considered to a good fit of the observed 
yields.  
 
  
Figure 40. Comparisons of Grain Sorghum Yields  
 
 The Student’s t-test and F-test are used to test the simulated grain sorghum yields 
generated by the calibrated APEX model. Statistical test results are presented in table 55. 
The Student’s t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the means of the observed yields 
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and the simulated yields are equal at the 95% confidence level. The F-test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the variances in the observed yields and the simulated yields are 
equal at the 95% confidence level. Therefore, there is no statistical difference between the 
means and variances in the observed yields and simulated yields. Overall, the calibrated 
model is considered as a good fit. 
Table 55. Statistical Test Results 
Distribution Comparison of Two Data 
Series 
Confidence Level 95.00% 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value 
2 Sample t 
Test -0.40 2.97 0.700 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal 
F Test 2.38 6.39 0.211 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances 
are Equal 
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Impactions of Climate Change on Federal Crop Insurance 
 
 The focus of this part is on describing how to project climate change impacts on 
federal crop insurance through the effects on crop yields. To do so, a) weather projections 
are generated through the use of multi-model ensembles under three scenarios; b) daily 
precipitation and temperature (both minimum and maximum) simulated by the weather 
projections are incorporated into the calibrated APEX model to estimate annual grain 
sorghum yields for the representative farm; c) federal crop insurance premiums, 
indemnities, and loss ratios are constructed based on the simulated grain sorghum yields 
for the farm.  
 The Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) provides a standard protocol 
for climate change groups from around the world to collaborate for the next several years 
(Taylor, Stouffer, and Meehl 2012). It is developed by the World Climate Research 
Programme (WCRP), and is followed by more than 20 modeling groups (Brekke, Thrasher, 
and Pruitt 2013).  
 A set of climate projections is generated by climate modeling groups under the 
CMIP. The climate projections are released through the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment. For example, the IPCC Fourth and Fifth Assessment 
released the climate projections generated by the CMIP phase 3 (CMIP3) and 5 (CMIP5), 
respectively. Considering that the CMIP5 has more models and higher-spatial-resolution 
models (Taylor, Stouffer, and Meehl 2012), climate models proposed by CMIP5 are used 
in this chapter. 
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 Previous studies found that multi-model ensembles are better than a single-model 
forecast, especially for regional studies (e.g., Palmer et al. 2005). For example, Tebaldi 
and Knutti (2007) discuss the sources of model uncertainty and the benefits of using multi-
model ensembles for regional studies. Asseng et al. (2013) found that multi-model 
ensembles are preferred for crop yields simulation under climate change because a single 
model cannot adequately describe the uncertainty in climate change. Therefore, rather than 
using a single model, multi-model ensembles are used in the study to generate climate 
projections. Table 56 lists the models used in this chapter and the institutions where the 
models are developed. Model names, modeling centers, mainly developed institutions, and 
major reference are listed in the table. Detailed differences among these models are not 
discussed in this chapter due to the objective of this chapter.  
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Table 56. The List of Climate Models Used in this Chapter 
Model Modeling Center Institution Reference 
ACCESS1.0 CSIRO-BOM 
CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation, 
Australia), and BOM (Bureau of 
Meteorology, Australia) 
Collier, Mark and Peter Uhe(2012) 
BCC-CSM1.1 BCC 
Beijing Climate Center, China 
Meteorological Administration 
Wu et al.(2010);Xiao-Ge et al.(2013) 
CanESM2 CCCma 
Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling 
and Analysis 
Chylek et al.(2011) 
CCSM4 NCAR 
National Center for Atmospheric 
Research 
Danabasoglu et al.(2012);Meehl et 
al.(2012) 
CESM1(BGC) NSF-DOE-NCAR 
National Science Foundation, 
Department of Energy, National Center 
for Atmospheric Research 
Long et al.(2013);Lindsay et al.(2014) 
CNRM-CM5 CNRM-CM5 
Centre National de Recherches 
Meteorologiques / Centre Europeen de 
Recherche et Formation Avancees en 
Calcul Scientifique 
Voldoire et al.(2013);Oueslati et 
al.(2013) 
CSIRO-
Mk3.6.0 
CSIRO-QCCCE 
Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation in 
collaboration with the Queensland 
Climate Change Centre of Excellence 
Collier et al.(2011) 
GFDL-CM3.1 
NOAA GFDL 
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics 
Laboratory 
Massonnet et al.(2012) 
GFDL-ESM2G 
Dunne et al.(2013);T Kuhlbrodt and JM 
Gregory(2012) 
GFDL-ESM2M  Ng et al.(2014) 
INM-CM4.1 INM Institute for Numerical Mathematics Volodin et al. (2010) 
IPSL-CM5A-
LR 
IPSL 
Institute Pierre-Simon Laplace Dufresne et al.(2013);Persechino et 
al.(2013) 
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Table 56. Continued. 
Model Modeling Center Institution Reference 
IPSL-CM5A-
MR 
 
 
Smith et al.(2013) 
MIROC-ESM 
MIROC 
Japan Agency for Marine-Earth 
Science and Technology, Atmosphere 
and Ocean Research Institute (The 
University of Tokyo), and National 
Institute for Environmental Studies 
Watanabe et al.(2011) 
MIROC-ESM-
CHEM 
University of Tokyo 
Guilyardi et al.(2012) 
MIROC5 MIROC 
Atmosphere and Ocean Research 
Institute (The University of Tokyo), 
National Institute for Environmental 
Studies, and Japan Agency for Marine-
Earth Science and Technology 
Watanabe et al.(2010);Hirota et 
al.(2011) 
MPI-ESM-LR 
MPI-M 
Max Planck Institute for Meteorology 
(MPI-M) 
Ilyina et al.(2013) 
MPI-ESM-MR Giorgetta et al.(2013) 
MRI-CGCM3 MRI Meteorological Research Institute Yukimoto et al.(2012) 
NorESM1-M NCC 
Norwegian Climate Centre Tjiputra et al.(2012); Bentsen et 
al.(2013) 
 
Source: Friedlingstein et al. 2014, World Climate Research Program. Available at: http://cmip-pcmdi.llnl.gov/cmip5/availability.html, and updated by 
author. 
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 The CMIP5 also proposed four Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) 
which characterize “radiative forcing of the atmosphere by 2100 relative to preindustrial 
levels, expressed in units of W m-2: RCP2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5” (Field et al. 2014; Vuuren 
et al. 2012). The four RCP scenarios are independently designed by climate modeling 
groups based on variables that are relevant to climate change, such as greenhouse gas 
emissions and concentrations, social-economic characteristics, technological development, 
and land-cover change projections (Vuuren et al. 2011). The four scenarios are used as a 
basis for modeling experiments across the world. More detailed information for the four 
scenarios is listed in table 60. Figure 38 presents the different projections across the four 
RCPs, such as population, gross domestic product (GDP), and main greenhouse gasses. 
Figure 41 shows the projected changes in the 20-year return value of annual minimum and 
maximum daily surface air temperatures (2081 – 2100), compared with the recent past 
(1986 – 2005) (Wuebbles et al. 2014).  
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Table 57. Information on Individual RCPs 
RCPs Institution Information Reference 
RCP 
2.6 
Netherlands 
Environmental 
Assessment Agency 
(NEAA) 
The emission pathway is representative for scenarios in the literature leading to very low 
greenhouse gas concentration levels. It is a so-called "peak" scenario: its radiative forcing 
level first reaches a value around 3.1 W/m2 mid-century, returning to 2.6 W/m2 by 2100. 
In order to reach such radiative forcing levels, greenhouse gas emissions (and indirectly 
emissions of air pollutants) are reduced substantially over time. The final RCP is based 
on the publication by Van Vuuren et al. (2007). 
Van Vuuren et al. 
(2007). 
RCP 
4.5 
Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory's 
Joint Global Change 
Research Institute 
(JGCRI) 
It is a stabilization scenario where total radiative forcing is stabilized before 2100 by 
employment of a range of technologies and strategies for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
Wise et al (2009). 
RCP 
6.0 
National Institute for 
Environmental 
Studies (NIES) 
It is a stabilization scenario where total radiative forcing is stabilized after 2100 without 
overshoot by employment of a range of technologies and strategies for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Fujino et al. (2006) 
and Hijioka et al. 
(2008). 
RCP 
8.5 
International Institute 
for Applies Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) 
The RCP 8.5 is characterized by increasing greenhouse gas emissions over time 
representative for scenarios in the literature leading to high greenhouse gas concentration 
levels.  
Riahi et al. (2007). 
 
Source: Vuuren et al. 2011, Chaturvedi et al. 2012; Bernie, Lowe, and Smith 2013; and RCP Database, available at: 
http://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at:8787/RcpDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=welcome 
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Figure 41. Population, GDP, Emissions of Main Greenhouse Gases Projections  
Source: Wayne 2013. 
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Figure 42. Projected Changes (°C) in the Daily Surface Air Temperature  
Source: Wuebbles et al. 2014. 
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 The climate projections generated by global climate models (GCMs) normally 
have grid scales range from 1° - 6° (approximately 111km – 666km) (see Appendix IV 
for detailed resolution for each model). Although the climate projections provide valuable 
information for global climate change studies, large errors have been found at fine scales 
for regional studies (Hewitson and Crane 1996). To solve the low resolution problem, 
Bureau of Reclamation, Climate Analytics Group, Climate Central, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, Santa Clara University, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Geological Survey, and National Center for Atmospheric 
Research collaboratively developed the downscaled CMIP3 and CMIP5 climate 
projections (Brekke et al. 2013). The downscaled climate projections are available on the 
“Downscaled CMIP3 and CMIP5 Climate and Hydrology Projections” website (DCHP 
website) at http://gdo-dcp.ucllnl.org/downscaled_cmip_projections/ for requests. At the 
monthly level, downscaled monthly total precipitation and monthly mean daily 
temperature are available on the DCHP website. Daily precipitation, minimum and 
maximum temperatures can also be simulated by the DCHP based on requests. 
 Table 61 shows the 132 weather projections generated by the 20 models and RCP 
scenarios available in the DCHP. 20 Climate models (table 60) are used to generate daily 
downscaled weather projections for Sherman County, Texas under CMIP5. Three RCP 
scenarios are selected: RCP2.6, RCP4.5, and RCP8.5 because few runs are available under 
the RCP6.0 scenario (table 60). Daily precipitation (mm/day), minimum surface air 
temperature (°C), maximum surface air temperature (°C) from 2017 - 2040 are generated 
and saved into three data sets (three NetCDF files) by the DCHP, respectively.  
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Table 58. Weather Projection Generation 
 
Source: http://gdo-dcp.ucllnl.org/downscaled_cmip_projections/  
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 In this chapter, the 132 weather trails generated by the DCHP (table 60) are 
grouped into four scenarios based on the RCP values, and are referred to as RCP2.6, 4.5, 
6.0, and 8.5 scenarios in this section. Twenty climate models (indicated in table 60) are 
used to generate daily weather characteristics.  However, not all of the 20 models are used 
in each RCP scenario, and more than one trial could be generated by one model under a 
RCP scenario. For example, under the RCP2.6 scenario, no weather projection is 
generated by the model “cesm1-bgc,” while five trials are generated by the model 
“canesm2” (table 60). Because only 13 weather trials are generated by RCP6.0 scenario, 
weather trials created under the RCP6.0 scenario are not included in this study. Overall, 
119 weather trails which are generated for three RCP scenarios and 20 models are used so 
simulate grain sorghum yields. 
 The downscaled weather trails are saved in three NetCDF files (requested from the 
DCHP). The first NetCDF file includes date and daily precipitation information. More 
specifically, for each day (a row in the NetCDF file), there are 119 precipitation 
projections generated by the 119 weather trials.  Therefore, the dimension of the 
pricipitation data set is 8760 (number of days) * 120 (119 weather trials plus date). 
Similarly, the second and the third NetCDF file contians daily minimum and maximum 
temperature, and its dimention is 8760 * 120, respectively.  
 The weather information saved in the three NetCDF files are reorganized to better 
fit the research objectives. 119 weather files are genreated by using the open-source R 
project based on the weather information saved in the three NetCDF files. Each of the 119 
weather files contains the daily precipitation, minimum and maximum temperatures which 
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are generated by one weather trail (see table 60 for the 119 weather trails). Therefore, there 
are 36 weather files under the RCP2.6 scenario, 42 weather files under the RCP4.5 
scenario, 41 weather files under the RCP8.5 scenario. Figure 43 shows the first 10 
observations of a weather file which is generated by the model “ACCESS1.0” under the 
RCP4.5 scenario.  
 
 
 
Figure 43. An Example of Weather Projections  
  
 Because the APEX model has a strict requirement for the data format, the format 
of the 119 weather projection files are further revised to fit the model. Daily precipitation, 
minimum and maximum temperatures are generated directly from the DCHP. Other 
weather information, such as solar radiation, relative humidity, and wind speed are 
generated by the APEX model. It is programmed in Python (version 3.3.0) to 
automatically change weather projections in the APEX database, revise APEX model’s 
parameters, run the model to simulate grain sorghum yields for 2017 - 2040, and save the 
simulated yield results. Figure 44 shows the trend of simulated grain sorghum yields from 
2017 – 2040 in the three RCP scenarios (RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5). Summary statistics of the 
simulated grain sorghum yields are listed in table 62. 
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Figure 44. Average Simulated Grain Sorghum Yields (RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5) 
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Table 59. Summary Statistics of Simulated Grain Sorghum Yields  
    2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 
Mean 
RCP2.6 43.98 41.17 33.31 30.05 30.67 31.25 27.99 29.95 31.28 27.13 29.09 
RCP4.5 36.42 34.62 32.28 30.00 29.70 31.97 31.95 30.13 26.98 25.83 28.49 
RCP8.5 40.64 37.27 33.55 30.74 27.18 29.45 32.27 28.98 27.10 29.27 25.66 
Standard  
Deviation 
RCP2.6 18.79 14.82 15.56 11.09 11.93 11.15 11.47 11.08 11.34 13.37 11.31 
RCP4.5 15.94 14.44 10.32 12.28 13.08 14.34 10.19 12.19 12.62 10.40 11.41 
RCP8.5 19.88 17.75 13.12 14.75 10.97 12.41 12.20 11.79 12.90 10.81 10.26 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
RCP2.6 42.72 36.00 46.70 36.92 38.89 35.69 40.98 37.01 36.26 49.29 38.88 
RCP4.5 43.77 41.71 31.97 40.93 44.04 44.85 31.88 40.47 46.79 40.24 40.06 
RCP8.5 48.92 47.62 39.11 47.99 40.37 42.15 37.80 40.67 47.61 36.93 39.99 
 
    2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 
Mean 
RCP2.6 30.60 26.52 26.57 27.77 27.25 29.05 27.86 26.20 26.04 28.40 
RCP4.5 36.42 34.62 32.28 30.00 29.70 31.97 31.95 30.13 26.98 25.83 
RCP8.5 40.64 37.27 33.55 30.74 27.18 29.45 32.27 28.98 27.10 29.27 
Standard  
Deviation 
RCP2.6 12.71 12.33 9.15 12.19 9.22 11.80 13.14 11.89 10.35 10.34 
RCP4.5 15.94 14.44 10.32 12.28 13.08 14.34 10.19 12.19 12.62 10.40 
RCP8.5 19.88 17.75 13.12 14.75 10.97 12.41 12.20 11.79 12.90 10.81 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
RCP2.6 41.53 46.51 34.44 43.89 33.84 40.64 47.16 45.40 39.73 36.40 
RCP4.5 36.27 41.26 39.17 40.39 41.19 46.04 43.98 35.91 44.69 39.28 
RCP8.5 48.92 47.62 39.11 47.99 40.37 42.15 37.80 40.67 47.61 36.93 
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 The simulated grain sorghum yields for the representative farm tend to decrease 
from 2020 to 2040 under the three RCP scenarios (table 61). The mean yield over the 
representative farm’s nine-year history is 43.22 bushels/acre, and the mean simulated yield 
in 2020 over 36 climate models is 43.98 bushels/acre in the RCP2.6 scenario, and it 
decreaseS to 28.40 bushels/acre in 2040 (table 61). The coefficients of variation are 
presented in figure 45, and the historical coefficient of variation is 39.08. 
 
 
Figure 45. Coefficients of Variation (CV) for Simulated Grain Sorghum Yields 
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 In this section, individual federal grain sorghum Yield Protection (YP) insurance 
policy is simulated at the 65% coverage level with a 100% price level coverage. The 
calculations of YP premiums and indemnities are independently constructed for each RCP 
scenario (RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5). The transitional yield (T-yield) and the projected price 
are assumed to be 20 bushels and $3.75/bushel across the period (2017 – 2040).  
 An empirical distribution is defined for each year from 2017 to 2040 by using the 
simulated grain sorghum yields generated by the APEX model based on the weather 
projections. For example, under the RCP4.5 scenario, 42 daily weather trails are generated 
by 20 models (table 60) for each year (2017 – 2040). Therefore, 42 grain sorghum yield 
simulations are generated from the APEX model based on the 42 weather trails. The 42 
grain sorghum yield simulations are further used to construct an empirical probability 
distribution for the representative farm at each year. The empirical probability 
distributions are different from year to year because the grains sorghum yields simulated 
by the APEX model are different. For each year, the empirical distribution is used to 
simulate stochastic grain sorghum yields for the representative farm.  The constructions 
of the empirical distributions and the generations of stochastic grain sorghum yields are 
implemented by using Simetar© (Richardson, Schuman, and Feldman 2006). The 
simulated stochastic grain sorghum yields are used for future calculations of the farm’s 
actual production history (APH) yields, premiums, and indemnities, and are referred as 
realized yields.  
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The APH Yield Calculation 
 
 Following RMA’s rules, the 60% of the T-yield (20 * 60% = 12 bushels) is used 
to substitute annual grain sorghum yields which are lower than the substitution (USDA, 
RMA). According to the federal crop insurance premium calculations, the APH yield is 
calculated as the average of previous four to ten years’ yields with the 60% of T-yield 
substitution. For example, to calculate the representative farm’s APH yield in year 2020, 
three years of stochastic grain sorghum yields (2017 – 2019) generated from the empirical 
probability distributions and seven years of observed grain sorghum yields are used. For 
year 2027, previous ten years simulated stochastic grain sorghum yields (2010 – 2026) are 
used to construct the APH yield. Figure 46 - 48 show the fan graphs for APH yields over 
2020 – 2040 to illustrate the changes of the representative farm’s APH yields under the 
three scenario (RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5). 
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Figure 46. Fan Graph for APH Yields under the RCP2.6 Scenario 
 
 
 
Figure 47. Fan Graph for APH Yields under the RCP4.5 Scenario 
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Figure 48. Fan Graph for APH Yields under the RCP8.5 Scenario 
 
 
 Table 62 shows the summary statistics of the simulated APH yields under each 
scenario. Overall, the APH yields decrease through 2020 – 2040. For example, under the 
RCP2.6 scenario, the simulated APH yield is 36.64 and 32.69 in year 2020 and 2040, 
respectively; and under the RCP4.5 scenario, the simulated APH yield decreases from 
37.69 (in year 2020) to 31.30 (in year 2040). Since the guaranteed yield of the individual 
YP insurance at the 65% coverage level is calculated as 65% of the APH yield, the 
decreasing APH yields will result in lower yield guarantees and lower net premiums 
(details are discussed in the “Federal Crop Insurance Premium Calculation” below).   
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Table 60. Summary Statistics of the APH Simulation 
    2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 
Mean 
RCP2.6 36.64 38.43 38.44 37.55 35.04 33.74 35.62 34.43 34.74 34.13 32.69 
RCP4.5 37.69 38.71 38.05 37.06 34.58 33.19 35.14 34.32 34.75 33.22 31.10 
RCP8.5 37.00 38.45 38.11 37.33 34.89 33.23 34.89 34.12 34.13 33.17 31.84 
Standard  
Deviation 
RCP2.6 2.96 3.46 3.70 3.97 4.04 4.23 4.31 4.38 4.25 3.97 3.74 
RCP4.5 2.90 3.28 3.58 3.65 3.83 4.06 4.30 4.30 4.28 3.94 3.61 
RCP8.5 3.07 3.61 3.89 4.11 4.35 4.52 4.65 4.71 4.61 4.40 3.92 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
RCP2.6 8.08 8.99 9.64 10.57 11.51 12.53 12.09 12.72 12.23 11.63 11.43 
RCP4.5 7.70 8.47 9.42 9.86 11.08 12.23 12.23 12.54 12.30 11.87 11.61 
RCP8.5 8.29 9.39 10.20 11.02 12.46 13.62 13.32 13.80 13.52 13.26 12.32 
 
    2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 
Mean 
RCP2.6 31.24 30.23 29.59 29.23 28.96 28.55 28.67 28.52 28.02 27.94 
RCP4.5 30.35 29.41 28.80 28.73 28.44 27.79 27.31 26.90 27.05 27.21 
RCP8.5 30.36 29.28 28.50 28.44 28.54 28.40 27.92 27.60 27.42 27.22 
Standard  
Deviation 
RCP2.6 3.44 3.35 3.35 3.34 3.30 3.32 3.25 3.32 3.36 3.27 
RCP4.5 3.46 3.29 3.24 3.15 3.12 3.05 3.10 3.01 3.00 3.06 
RCP8.5 3.70 3.52 3.59 3.33 3.42 3.44 3.47 3.40 3.41 3.44 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
RCP2.6 11.01 11.10 11.32 11.42 11.38 11.64 11.35 11.64 12.00 11.71 
RCP4.5 11.41 11.18 11.25 10.98 10.98 10.98 11.36 11.19 11.10 11.24 
RCP8.5 12.19 12.04 12.59 11.72 11.97 12.12 12.44 12.33 12.44 12.63 
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The Federal Crop Insurance Premium Calculation 
 
 According to the RMA’s “Actuarial Documentation of Multiple Peril Crop 
Insurance Ratemaking Procedures”, the basic formula to calculate the federal crop 
insurance premium is  
 Premium = liability * premium rate * adjustment factor 
and  
 Liability = acres planted * APH yield * coverage level * base price * price election 
percentage  
 The planted acre is assumed as one acre to simplify calculations. Because the 
farm’s federal crop insurance liabilities are closely related to APH yields, decreasing APH 
yields will result in lower liabilities over time (assuming the base price is constant over 
time).   
 The detailed calculations of individual YP insurance premiums for grain sorghum 
follows the RMA rules, and are generated by using the premium calculator programmed 
by AFPC. The federal crop insurance subsidy rate is 59% at the 65% coverage level for 
basic and optional units, which means producers only pay for the 41% of the gross 
premiums. The net premiums (producers paid premiums) are calculated based on the 
stochastic APH yields of the representative farm simulated by APEX. Figure 49 – 51 show 
the simulated net premiums ($/acre) under each scenario (RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5).  
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Figure 49. Fan Graph for Net Premiums under the RCP2.6 Scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50. Fan Graph for Net Premiums under the RCP4.5 Scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51. Fan Graph for Net Premiums under the RCP8.5 Scenario 
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 Table 64 presents the summary statistics of the simulated federal YP insurance 
premiums. The Student’s-t test and the F-test are used to test the three series of the 
simulated federal YP insurance premiums (generated for three RCP scenarios) in year 
2020, 2030, and 2040 (table 64 – 66). The null hypotheses assume that the averages and 
variances of the premium simulations are the same across the three RCP scenarios. In year 
2020 (table 64), the Student’s-t test rejects the null hypothesis that the means of the 
premiums for RCP2.6 and RCP4.5 scenarios are equal at the 95% confidence level. 
According to the Student’s-t tests, the means of the premiums are statistically equal 
between RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios, but they are statistically different between 
RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios (table 64). The F tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
the variances of premiums are equal among RCP2.6, RCP4.5, and RCP8.5 scenarios at the 
95% confidence level. 
 In year 2030, the means of simulated grain sorghum YP insurance premiums are 
statistically different between RCP2.6 and RCP4.5 scenarios, as well as between RCP2.6 
and RCP8.5 scenarios at the 95% confidence level (table 65).  But, according to the results 
of the Student’s t-test in table 66, the means of the simulated YP insurance premiums 
between RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 in year 2030 are statistical equal. Similarly as 2020, the F-
tests show that the variances of simulated premiums are equal among the three RCP 
scenarios (table 65).  
 In year 2040, the means of the simulated grain sorghum YP insurance premiums 
are statistically different for RCP2.6 and RCP4.5 based on the Student’s t-test (table 66) 
at the 95% confidence level. Similarly, the means of the simulated grain sorghum YP 
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insurance premiums are statistically different between RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios 
(table 66). The variances of the premium simulations are statistically equal between 
RCP2.6 and RCP4.5, and RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 in year 2040 (table 66). But the variances 
of premium simulations are statistically different in year 2040 for RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 
(table 66) at the 95% confidence level.  
 As discussed above, the simulated federal grain sorghum YP insurance premiums 
decrease as the simulated APH yields decrease over time. For example, the simulated 
mean premium is $13.59/acre at the 65% coverage level for 2020, and it decreases to 
$10.17/acre under the RCP8.5 scenario. Farmers are expected to pay less for the same crop 
insurance coverage level over time due to the impacts of climate change on the yields of 
grain sorghum.  
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Table 61. Summary Statistics of Simulated YP Net Premiums  
    2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 
Mean RCP2.6 13.46 14.12 14.12 13.80 12.88 12.40 13.09 12.66 12.77 12.54 12.02 
 RCP4.5 13.85 14.22 13.98 13.61 12.70 12.20 12.91 12.62 12.77 12.21 11.45 
 RCP8.5 13.59 14.12 14.00 13.71 12.82 12.22 12.82 12.54 12.55 12.19 11.71 
Standard  
Deviation RCP2.6 1.09 1.27 1.36 1.46 1.48 1.54 1.58 1.59 1.55 1.45 1.35 
 RCP4.5 1.07 1.20 1.32 1.34 1.41 1.48 1.58 1.57 1.56 1.43 1.28 
 RCP8.5 1.13 1.33 1.43 1.51 1.59 1.64 1.70 1.72 1.68 1.60 1.43 
Coefficient of 
Variation RCP2.6 8.10 8.98 9.62 10.56 11.48 12.40 12.04 12.57 12.17 11.57 11.24 
 RCP4.5 7.70 8.46 9.42 9.86 11.07 12.12 12.20 12.44 12.22 11.71 11.20 
 RCP8.5 8.31 9.39 10.19 11.01 12.44 13.46 13.29 13.67 13.42 13.12 12.17 
 
    2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 
Mean RCP2.6 11.49 11.14 10.91 10.79 10.70 10.56 10.60 10.56 10.40 10.38 
 RCP4.5 11.19 10.86 10.65 10.62 10.52 10.31 10.17 10.05 10.08 10.14 
 RCP8.5 11.19 10.82 10.57 10.53 10.58 10.54 10.39 10.28 10.23 10.17 
Standard  
Deviation RCP2.6 1.23 1.18 1.16 1.14 1.11 1.11 1.09 1.10 1.07 1.04 
 RCP4.5 1.21 1.11 1.09 1.06 1.03 0.97 0.96 0.90 0.91 0.94 
 RCP8.5 1.30 1.20 1.17 1.09 1.11 1.11 1.09 1.05 1.04 1.02 
Coefficient of 
Variation RCP2.6 10.68 10.56 10.60 10.57 10.41 10.48 10.27 10.40 10.26 10.01 
 RCP4.5 10.81 10.26 10.23 10.02 9.84 9.40 9.41 8.99 9.04 9.23 
 RCP8.5 11.66 11.06 11.09 10.32 10.51 10.51 10.45 10.18 10.17 10.05 
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Table 62. Comparison Results of the Distributions of Net Premiums (2020) 
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP4.5     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test -5.65 2.24 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal  
F Test 
1.05 1.16 0.303 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are 
Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP8.5     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test -1.88 2.24 0.061 Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are Equal 
F Test 1.07 1.16 0.216 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are 
Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP4.5 & RCP8.5     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test 3.65 2.24 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal  
F Test 1.12 1.16 0.096 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are 
Equal 
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Table 63. Comparison Results of the Distributions of Net Premiums (2030) 
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP4.5     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test 6.89 2.24 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal  
F Test 1.11 1.16 0.120 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are 
Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP8.5     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test 3.58 2.24 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal  
F Test 1.11 1.16 0.119 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are 
Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP4.5 & RCP4.5     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test 0.00 2.24 1.000 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal 
F Test 1.00 1.16 0.500 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are 
Equal 
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Table 64. Comparison Results of the Distributions of Net Premiums (2040) 
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP4.5     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test 3.81 2.24 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal  
F Test 1.23 1.16 0.010 Reject the Ho that the Variances are Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP8.5     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test 3.09 2.24 0.002 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal  
F Test 1.03 1.16 0.370 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are 
Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP4.5 & RCP8.5     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test -0.59 2.24 0.554 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal 
F Test 1.19 1.16 0.024 Reject the Ho that the Variances are Equal 
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 Federal crop insurance indemnities for the representative farm at the 65% coverage 
level of individual YP are simulated based on the stochastic grain sorghum yields. If the 
realized grain sorghum yield is below the guaranteed yield (65% of the APH yield), the 
federal YP insurance indemnity is triggered, and the farmer is paid by the federal 
government based on the projected price and the corresponding yield loss: 
 If realized yield < yield guarantee: 
  Federal Crop Insurance Indemnity = price election percentage * projected 
price * (yield guarantee – realized yield); 
 Else: 
  Federal Crop Insurance Indemnity = 0 
 Federal YP indemnities ($/acre) are calculated for the representative farm 
following the formula. For example, under the RCP2.6 scenario, the simulated indemnities 
range from 0 to $50/acre over 500 iterations for 2020. Under the RCP2.6 scenario, the 
maximum indemnity is $88.67/acre in year 2022. Figure 52 – 54 are the fan graphs of the 
simulated indemnities of federal YP insurance for the representative farm under the three 
scenarios (RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5).   
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Figure 52. Fan Graph for Indemnities under the RCP2.6 Scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53. Fan Graph for Indemnities under the RCP4.5 Scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54. Fan Graph for Indemnities under the RCP8.5 Scenario 
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Corresponding federal YP insurance loss ratios are calculated as the ratios of 
indemnities to net premiums, and are illustrated in fan graphs (figure 55 – 57). Table 65 
shows the summary statistics of simulated loss ratios for each RCP scenario during 2020 
– 2040. In year 2020, the expected loss ratio across 500 iterations is 0.17, 0.28, and 0.28
for RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5, respectively. The highest loss ratio across 500 iterations is 3.2, 
4.0, and 5.9 for RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5, respectively, in year 2020. In year 2020, 2030, and 
2040, the highest loss ratio is 5.9, 5.5, and 5.2 and the three highest loss ratios all occur 
under the RCP8.5 scenario. 
The Student’s t-test and F-test are used to test the distributions of the three series 
of loss ratios for RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5 scenarios (Appendix VIII). The null hypotheses for 
equal means and equal variances are rejected at the 95% confidence level between RCP2.6 
and RCP4.5 scenarios, and between RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios in year 2020, which 
implies that the means and variances of the simulated loss ratios for RCP2.6 and RCP4.5 
are statistically different, and the means and variances of the simulated loss ratios for 
RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 are statistically different. In year 2030, both the means and variances 
of the simulated federal crop insurance loss ratios are statistically different between 
RCP4.5 and RCP8.5.  In year 2040, all the means and variances null hypotheses are 
rejected by tests. Therefore, in year 2040, the means of the simulated loss ratios are 
different across the three RCP scenarios, and the variances of the simulated loss ratios are 
statistically different across the three RCP scenarios also. 
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Figure 55. Fan Graph for Net Loss Ratios under the RCP2.6 Scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56. Fan Graph for Net Loss Ratios under the RCP4.5 Scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57. Fan Graph for Net Loss Ratios under the RCP8.5 Scenario 
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Table 65. Summary Statistics of Simulated Net Loss Ratios  
    2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 
Mean RCP2.6 0.17 0.17 0.59 0.40 0.34 0.40 0.62 0.43 0.31 0.83 0.44 
 RCP4.5 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
 RCP8.5 0.28 0.59 0.39 0.67 0.62 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.92 0.33 0.57 
Standard  
Deviation RCP2.6 0.56 0.48 1.00 0.88 0.80 1.05 1.03 0.93 0.65 1.21 0.96 
 RCP4.5 0.81 0.75 0.52 1.22 1.21 1.39 0.53 1.18 1.31 1.06 0.90 
 RCP8.5 0.78 1.29 1.06 1.21 1.14 1.08 0.73 1.04 1.60 0.65 1.12 
Coefficient 
of Variation RCP2.6 332.48 284.14 170.67 218.65 233.53 262.58 166.03 216.75 212.94 146.32 217.01 
 RCP4.5 285.88 209.28 266.08 198.85 211.98 238.03 269.58 221.44 162.86 171.81 248.17 
  RCP8.5 279.77 219.93 269.62 179.55 185.61 225.82 200.86 215.52 174.36 200.15 195.35 
             
    2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040  
Mean RCP2.6 0.41 0.63 0.28 0.40 0.15 0.26 0.46 0.42 0.40 0.16  
 RCP4.5 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28  
 RCP8.5 0.89 0.66 0.15 0.40 0.54 0.44 0.38 0.46 0.34 0.59  
Standard  
Deviation RCP2.6 0.98 1.33 0.65 0.96 0.64 0.78 1.02 0.96 0.99 0.55  
 RCP4.5 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.66 0.79 0.94 1.04 0.49 0.89 0.78  
 RCP8.5 1.58 1.28 0.49 0.92 1.10 1.09 1.12 1.00 0.88 1.31  
Coefficient 
of Variation RCP2.6 238.34 211.15 231.78 242.11 424.75 300.74 219.61 232.04 246.92 337.02  
 RCP4.5 208.18 198.91 354.30 251.63 201.19 217.19 253.08 302.95 269.77 245.64  
  RCP8.5 177.69 194.03 334.42 227.83 203.75 249.42 297.59 215.40 255.03 224.34  
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Summary 
Chapter III develops the methodology to estimate the impacts of climate change 
on the federal crop insurance APH yields, premiums, indemnities, and loss ratios. A 
representative grain sorghum farm in Sherman County, Texas is used to illustrate the 
methodology. The ensembles of multiple climate models are used to generate local 
weather projections to better describe the uncertainties in climate change. Specifically, 
119 weather trials are generated based on climate model ensembles and three RCP 
scenarios (2.6, 4.5, and 8.5). The downscaled daily weather information in the 119 weather 
trials are incorporated in the APEX model to simulate annual grain sorghum yields 
through 2040 to evaluate the representative farm’s yield risks. In each RCP scenario, an 
empirical yield distribution is constructed for each year based on the simulated grain 
sorghum yields by the APEX model. Stochastic grain sorghum yields are generated based 
on the empirical distributions to calculate the federal YP insurance premiums, indemnities, 
and loss ratios at the 65% coverage level with the 60% of T-yield substitution. 
Simulated results show that climate change will result in lower grain sorghum 
yields (2020 – 2040) in each climate change scenario for the representative farm in 
Sherman County, Texas. As the realized grain sorghum yields decrease, the approved 
APH yields will decrease. Crop insurance premium costs will also decrease with the lower 
APH yields. 
208 
The study finds that the current APH formula which uses the average crop yields 
in previous ten years with the 60% of T-yield substitution will accommodate the gradual 
change in crop yields as climate change continuous. Although the simulated grain 
sorghum yields decrease from 2020 to 2040 as climate change continues, there is no 
extreme decrease occurs in the simulated yields based on the climate change forecasts. 
Therefore, the efficiency of the current APH formula will not be negated by climate 
change. 
The study also finds that the simulated federal crop insurance loss ratios and 
premiums are statistically different across the three climate change scenarios (RCP2.6, 
4.5, and 8.5) in year 2020, 2030, and 2040. Student’s t-test and F-test show that the means 
and variances of simulated insurance loss ratios are statistically different at the 95% 
confidence level across the three climate change scenarios in year 2020, 2030, and 2040 
(table 64 – 66). Therefore, which climate scenario is used in the analysis of the impacts of 
climate change on the FCIC would affect the conclusions.  
Due to the time constraint, the methodology is only applied for one crop (non-
irrigated grain sorghum) and one farm (in Sherman County, Texas). A more 
comprehensive analysis using the methodology can be undertaken for multiple crops and 
regions. The results can provide a better overview of the impacts of climate changes on 
the FCIP. 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The FCIP helps farmers to manage production and/or price risks. It is a vital part 
of the farm safety net under the 2014 Farm Bill. However, the FCIP has been subject to 
problems and criticisms, such as being an expensive government subsidized program 
(Glauber 2004), with disparities across regions (Woodard et al. 2012), and potential 
impacts of climate change on the federal crop insurance loss ratios. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to evaluate the demand for crop insurance and design and test a 
methodology to estimate the impacts of climate change on the FCIP. In particular, the first 
chapter discusses the demand for federal corn insurance (both yield and revenue insurance 
policies) at each coverage level and in each major production region. The second chapter 
estimated the demand for federal wheat insurance at each coverage level for three major 
production regions. The third chapter develops the methodology to estimate the potential 
impacts of climate change on federal crop insurance premiums, indemnities, and loss 
ratios.  
 In the first chapter, the elasticities of demand for corn yield and revenue insurance 
are estimated at each coverage level among four major production regions (the Corn Belt, 
Lake States, Northern Plains, and Southern Plains). The results find that the elasticities of 
demand for federal corn insurance are different across insurance plans (yield and revenue), 
coverage levels, and regions. At the 80% coverage level, the elasticity of demand for corn 
yield insurance with respect to net premium is -0.230, -0.158, and -0.259 in the Corn Belt, 
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Lake States, and Northern Plains, respectively. At the 75% coverage level, the elasticity 
of demand for corn yield insurance with respect to net premium is -0.654 in the Southern 
Plains (the 80% coverage level was not offered to the majority of counties in the Southern 
Plains back to 1998 and 2002). The elasticity of demand for corn revenue insurance with 
respect to net premium is -0.200, -0.208 in the Corn Belt and Lake States, respectively, 
while the elasticity of demand for corn revenue insurance is -0.670 at the 75% coverage 
level in the Southern Plains. The study also evaluates the CRS Report R43951, which 
suggests the government reduce subsidy rates by 10 percentage points at each coverage 
level. Results find that given a 10 percentage points reduction in premium subsidy rates, 
corn producers in the Corn Belt would reduce their demand for federal corn yield and 
revenue insurance by 4.792% and 4.167%, respectively, at the 80% coverage level; while 
corn producers in the Southern Plaisn are expected to reduce their corn yield and revenue 
insurance demand by 11.891% and 12.182%, respectively, at the 75% coverage level. 
More importantly, the results find that, with the suggested 10 percentage points reduction, 
the expected demand change will contradict the major objective of the 2000 ARPA, which 
intended to encourage greater federal crop insurance demand among high coverage levels.  
 The second chapter examines the demand for federal wheat insurance at each 
coverage level in three major wheat production regions (Pacific Northwest, Northern 
Plains, and Southern Plains). At the 75% coverage level, the elasticity of demand for 
federal wheat yield insurance with respect to net premium in the Southern Plains (-0.264) 
is about twice of the elasticity of demand for federal wheat yield insurance with respect to 
net premium in the Northern Plains (-0.145). In the Northern Plains, wheat farmers are 
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expected to reduce their demand for federal wheat yield insurance by 2.636%, 4.800%, 
and 7.211% at the 70%, 75%, and 80% coverage level, respectively, given a 10 percentage 
points cut on the subsidy rates. In the Southern Plains, the demand for wheat yield 
insurance is expected to be reduced by 3.153% and 2.636% at the 70% and 75% coverage 
level, respectively with the proposed reduction in the subsidy rates.  
  The third chapter develops and demonstrated a methodology to estimate the 
potential impacts of climate change on federal crop insurance in terms of approved APH 
yields, federal insurance premiums, indemnities, and loss ratios for a representative grain 
sorghum farm in Sherman County, Texas. Twenty climate change models and three 
climate scenarios (RCP2.6, 4.5, and 8.5) are used to generate weather projections for 2017 
- 2040. Downscaled daily weather information based on the ensembles of climate models 
and climate change scenarios are incorporated in used the APEX model to simulate annual 
grain sorghum yields for a representative Texas grain sorghum farm. In each climate 
change scenario, the simulated non-irrigated grain sorghum yields from APEX are used 
to construct empirical probability distributions for each year (2017 -2040). The stochastic 
grain sorghum yields simulated from the empirical probability distributions are used to 
calculate federal crop insurance APH yields, premiums, indemnities, and loss ratios, 
following RMA’s rules. The results find that climate change will result in lower APH 
yields and cheaper federal YP insurance premiums. The study also found that since no 
extreme yield change occurs based on the climate forecasts, the current APH formula 
using the previous ten years’ average yields with a T-yield substitution policy will 
accommodate the gradual change in crop yields over 2020 – 2040 period. Moreover, 
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statistical tests show that the loss ratios of federal YP insurance are statistically different 
for each climate scenario. Therefore, which climate scenario is used in the analysis of the 
impacts of climate change on the FCIP matters.  
 Overall, the three essays answer the questions about possible responses to lower 
federal crop insurance subsidy rates and climate change. With lower federal crop 
insurance subsidy rates, farmers would bear more costs of federal crop insurance and 
reduce their demand for federal crop insurance different across coverage levels, insurance 
policies, and regions. Under each of the three climate change scenarios (RCP2.6, 4.5, and 
8.5), farmers will pay lower crop insurance premiums as the actual and approved APH 
yields decrease. The current APH formula will accommodate gradual changes in crop 
yields since climate change does not result in dramatic changes for the representative farm. 
Moreover, the study finds which climate change scenario is used in the analysis affects 
the evaluation of the impacts of climate change on the FCIC with RCP2.6 has the largest 
mean loss ratios in year 2020 and RCP8.5 has the largest mean loss ratios in year 2030, 
and 2040.  
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APPENDIX I CORN USUAL PLANTING AND HARVESTING DATES 
 
 
Source: Available at http://swat.tamu.edu/media/90113/crops-typicalplanting-
harvestingdates-by-states.pdf 
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APPENDIX II R CODE FOR QUERYING SOIL DATA FROM HWSD 
 
rm(list=ls()) 
long2UTM <- function(long) { 
  return(floor((long + 180)/6) + 1) %% 60 
} 
##### function to extract and format one rectangular window 
extract.one <- function(bbox, name="window") 
{ 
  print(paste("Area name: ", name, "; bounding box: 
              [",paste(bbox,collapse=", "),"]", sep="")) 
  # extract the window 
dir.create(paste("C:\\Users\\jacky\\Dropbox\\research\\climate3\\hwsd\\HWSD_RASTE
R\\window",name,sep=""), showWarnings = FALSE) 
setwd(paste("C:\\Users\\jacky\\Dropbox\\research\\climate3\\hwsd\\HWSD_RASTER\\
window",name,sep="")) 
  hwsd.win <- crop(hwsd, extent(bbox)) 
  # find the zone for the centre of the box 
  print(paste("Central meridian:", centre <- (bbox[1]+bbox[2])/2)) 
  utm.zone <- long2UTM(centre) 
  print(paste("UTM zone:", utm.zone)) 
  # make a UTM version of the window 
  hwsd.win.utm <- projectRaster(hwsd.win, 
                                crs=(paste("+proj=utm +zone=",utm.zone, 
                                           "+datum=WGS84 +units=m +no_defs +ellps=WGS84 
+towgs84=0,0,0", 
                                           sep="")), method="ngb") 
  print(paste("Cell dimensions:", 
              paste((cell.dim <- res(hwsd.win.utm)), 
                    collapse=", "))) 
  # write the raster images to disk 
  eval(parse(text=paste("writeRaster(hwsd.win, file='HWSD_", name, 
                        "', format='EHdr', overwrite=TRUE)",sep=""))) 
  eval(parse(text=paste("writeRaster(hwsd.win.utm, file='HWSD_", name, 
                        "_utm', format='EHdr', overwrite=TRUE)",sep=""))) 
  # extract attributes for just this window 
  dbWriteTable(con, name="WINDOW_TMP", 
               value=data.frame(smu_id=unique(hwsd.win)), overwrite=TRUE) 
  records <- dbGetQuery(con, "select T.* from HWSD_DATA as T 
                        join WINDOW_TMP as U on T.mu_global=u.smu_id 
                        order by su_sym90") 
  dbRemoveTable(con, "WINDOW_TMP") 
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  # convert to factors as appropriate 
  for (i in names(records)[c(2:5,8:15,17:19,28,45)]) 
    eval(parse(text=paste("records$",i," <- as.factor(records$",i,")", sep=""))) 
  # remove all-NA fields 
  fields.to.delete <- NULL 
  for (i in 1:length(names(records))) 
    if (all(is.na(records[,i]))) 
    { fields.to.delete <- c(fields.to.delete, i) } 
  if (length(fields.to.delete > 1)) 
    records <- records[,-fields.to.delete] 
  print(paste("Dimensions of attribute table: ", 
              paste(dim(records), collapse=", "), 
              " (records, fields with data)", sep="")) 
  # write attribute table in CSV formats 
  eval(parse(text=paste("write.csv(records, 
                        file='./HWSD_", name, ".csv')",sep=""))) 
  # make a spatial polygons dataframe, add attributes 
  print(system.time(hwsd.win.poly <- 
                      rasterToPolygons(hwsd.win, n=4, na.rm=TRUE, dissolve=TRUE))) 
  # transform to UTM for correct geometry 
  hwsd.win.poly.utm <- spTransform(hwsd.win.poly, 
                                   CRS(proj4string(hwsd.win.utm))) 
  m <- match(hwsd.win.poly.utm$value, 
             records$MU_GLOBAL); hwsd.win.poly.utm@data <- records[m,] 
  # plot the map unit ID 
  print(paste("Number of legend categories in the map:", 
              lvls <- length(levels(hwsd.win.poly.utm$MU_GLOBAL)))) 
  p1 <- spplot(hwsd.win.poly.utm, zcol="MU_GLOBAL", 
               col.regions=terrain.colors(lvls), main=paste("HWSD SMU code"), 
               sub=paste("UTM zone", utm.zone), scales=list(draw = TRUE)) 
  
eval(parse(text=paste("pdf(file='C:\\Users\\jacky\\Dropbox\\research\\climate3\\hwsd\\H
WSD_RASTER\\HWSD_", name, "_SMU_CODE.pdf')",sep=""))) 
  print(p1); dev.off() 
  setwd("C:\\Users\\jacky\\Dropbox\\research\\climate3\\hwsd\\HWSD_RASTER") 
} # end extract.one 
############################################################## 
## read in HWSD raster database, assign CRS 
require(sp) 
require(raster) 
setwd("C:\\Users\\jacky\\Dropbox\\research\\climate3\\hwsd\\HWSD_RASTER") 
hwsd <- 
raster("C:\\Users\\jacky\\Dropbox\\research\\climate3\\hwsd\\HWSD_RASTER\\hwsd.bi
l") 
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#test<-raster("hwsd.bil") 
#ncol(test) 
save(hwsd,file="C:\\Users\\jacky\\Dropbox\\research\\climate3\\hwsd\\hwsd.RData") 
ncol(hwsd) 
nrow(hwsd) 
projection(hwsd)#generate a projection for the raster database 
 
require(rgdal) 
proj4string(hwsd) <-"+proj=longlat +datum=WGS84 +ellps=WGS84 +towgs84=0,0,0" 
## establish connection to attribute database 
require(RSQLite) 
m <- dbDriver("SQLite") 
con <- dbConnect(m, dbname="HWSD.sqlite") 
## other packages to be used in the function 
require(rgeos) 
## call the function for each window we want to extract 
extract.one(c(-102.163303, -101.623466, 36.055131,36.500684), "SHERMAN 
COUNTY") 
 
################################ 
hwsd.sherman<-crop(hwsd, extent(c(-102.163303, -101.623466, 36.055131,36.500684))) 
nrow(hwsd.sherman) 
ncol(hwsd.sherman) 
bbox(hwsd.sherman) 
#show the uique values in a raster for Sherman 
unique(hwsd.sherman) 
plot(hwsd.sherman,col=bpy.colors(length(unique(hwsd.sherman)))) 
 
hwsd.sherman2<-(hwsd.sherman%/%10) 
freq(hwsd.sherman2) 
require(RColorBrewer) 
plot(hwsd.sherman2,col=brewer.pal(length(unique(hwsd.sherman2)), "Accent")) 
plot(hwsd.sherman2,col=bpy.colors(length(unique(hwsd.sherman2)))) 
 
#create a projection 
print(paste("UTM zone:",  
            utm.zone <-  floor((sum(bbox(hwsd.sherman2)[1, ])/2 + 180)/6) + 1)) 
 
proj4string.utm14 <-paste("+proj=utm +zone=", utm.zone, 
                          "+datum=WGS84 +units=m +no_defs +ellps=WGS84 +towgs84=0,0,0", 
sep="") 
 
hwsd.sherman.utm <- projectRaster(hwsd.sherman2, 
crs=proj4string.utm14,method="ngb") 
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unique(hwsd.sherman.utm) 
 
(cell.dim<-res(hwsd.sherman.utm)) 
 
paste("Cell N dimension is ", round(((cell.dim[2]/cell.dim[1]) - 1)*100,1), 
      "% larger than cell dimension E", sep="") 
plot(hwsd.sherman.utm,col=brewer.pal(6,"Accent"),asp=1) 
#grid() 
 
#compute the area coverd by each code 
(cell.area<-cell.dim[1]*cell.dim[2]/10^4) 
(tmp<-cbind(freq(hwsd.sherman.utm)[,1],freq(hwsd.sherman.utm)[,2]*cell.area/10^2)) 
 
ix<-which(is.na(tmp[,1])) 
sum(tmp[-ix,2]) 
#rm(cell.dim,cell.area,tmp,ix) 
##################################################### 
require(RSQLite) 
m<-dbDriver("SQLite") 
con<-dbConnect(m,dbname="HWSD.sqlite") 
dbListTables(con) 
dbGetQuery(con,"pragma table_info(HWSD_DATA)")$name 
dbGetQuery(con, "select count(*) as grid_total from HWSD_DATA") 
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APPENDIX III HWSD FOR SHERMAN COUNTY, TEXAS 
 
Coverage DSMW   
Soil Mapping Unit 4821   
Dominant Soil Group KS - Kastanozems  
Sequence 1 2 3 
Share in Soil Mapping Unit (%) 60 20 20 
Database ID 43914 43916 43915 
Soil Unit Symbol (FAO 74) Kl Kk Kh 
Soil Unit Name (FAO74) Luvic Kastanozems Calcic Kastanozems 
Haplic 
 Kastanozems 
Soil Unit Symbol (FAO 85) - - - 
Soil Unit Name (FAO 85) - - - 
Soil Unit Symbol (FAO 90) - - - 
Soil unit Name (FAO 90) - - - 
Topsoil Texture Medium Medium Medium 
Reference Soil Depth (cm) 100 100 100 
PHASE1 - - - 
PHASE2 - - - 
Obstacles to Roots (ESDB) (cm) - - - 
Impermeable Layer  (ESDB) (cm) - - - 
Soil Water Regime  (ESDB) - - - 
Drainage class (0-0.5% slope) Moderately Well Moderately Well 
Moderately  
Well 
AWC (mm) 150 150 150 
Gelic Properties No No No 
Vertic Properties No No No 
Petric Properties No No No 
Topsoil Sand Fraction (%) 36 32 34 
Topsoil Silt Fraction (%) 41 43 45 
Topsoil Clay Fraction (%) 23 25 21 
Topsoil USDA Texture Classification loam loam loam 
Topsoil Reference Bulk Density 
(kg/dm3) 
1.38 1.36 1.39 
Topsoil Bulk Density (kg/dm3) 1.2 1.26 1.29 
Topsoil Gravel Content (%) 8 8 8 
Topsoil Organic  Carbon (% weight) 1.27 1.44 1.28 
Topsoil pH (H2O) 7.3 8.1 7.4 
Topsoil CEC (clay) (cmol/kg) 66 60 81 
Topsoil CEC (soil) (cmol/kg) 23 19 21 
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Topsoil Base Saturation (%) 100 100 100 
Topsoil TEB (cmol/kg) 18.4 18.4 18.4 
Topsoil Calcium Carbonate (% weight) 4.5 5 5.4 
Topsoil Gypsum (% weight) 0 0 0 
Topsoil Sodicity (ESP) (%) 3 3 1 
Topsoil Salinity (ECe) (dS/m) 0.1 1.1 1.6 
Database ID 43914 43916 43915 
Subsoil Sand Fraction (%) 29 30 36 
Subsoil Silt Fraction (%) 42 46 43 
Subsoil Clay Fraction (%) 29 24 21 
Subsoil  USDA Texture Classification clay loam loam loam 
Subsoil Reference Bulk Density 
(kg/dm3) 
1.33 1.36 1.39 
Subsoil Bulk Density (kg/dm3) 1.18 1.22 1.42 
Subsoil Gravel Content (%) 5 5 5 
Subsoil Organic  Carbon (% weight) 0.57 0.57 0.51 
Subsoil pH (H2O) 7.9 8.1 7.9 
Subsoil CEC (clay) (cmol/kg) 68 78 97 
Subsoil CEC (soil) (cmol/kg) 24 18 19 
Subsoil Base Saturation (%) 100 100 100 
Subsoil TEB (cmol/kg) 21.1 21.1 19.1 
Subsoil Calcium Carbonate (% weight) 10 14.3 10.4 
Subsoil Gypsum (% weight) 0 0 0 
Subsoil Sodicity (ESP) (%) 3 3 3 
Subsoil Salinity (ECe) (dS/m) 3.6 2.5 2.2 
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APPENDIX IV RESOLUTIONS OF CMIP5 CLIMATE MODELS  
 
Model Atmospheric Grid 
Latitude Longitude 
ACCESS1.0 1.25 1.875 
ACCESS1.3 1.25 1.875 
BCC-CSM1.1 2.7906 2.8125 
BCC-CSM1.1(m) 2.7906 2.8125 
BNU-ESM 2.7906 2.8125 
CCSM4 0.9424 1.25 
CESM1(BGC) 0.9424 1.25 
CNRM-CM5 1.4008 1.40625 
CNRM-CM5-2 1.4008 1.40625 
CSIRO-Mk3.6.0 1.8653 1.875 
CSIRO-Mk3L-1-2 3.1857 5.625 
CanESM2 2.7906 2.8125 
INM-CM4 1.5 2 
IPSL-CM5A-LR 1.8947 3.75 
IPSL-CM5A-MR 1.2676 2.5 
IPSL-CM5B-LR 1.8947 3.75 
MIROC-ESM 2.7906 2.8125 
MIROC-ESM-  CHEM 2.7906 2.8125 
MIROC5 1.4008 1.40625 
MPI-ESM-LR 1.8653 1.875 
MPI-ESM-MR 1.8653 1.875 
MPI-ESM-P 1.8653 1.875 
MRI-CGCM3 1.12148 1.125 
MRI-ESM1 1.12148 1.125 
NorESM1-M 1.8947 2.5 
 
Source: available at https://verc.enes.org/data/enes-model-data/cmip5/resolution 
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APPENDIX V NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  
 
    50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 
Corn Yield 
Insurance 
Corn Belt 399 141 225 456 376 363 98 73 
Lake States 283 170 186 286 180 153 39 - 
Northern 
Plains 
288 103 131 335 239 241 64 38 
Southern 
Plains 
111 31 39 143 54 35 
- - 
Corn Revenue 
Insurance 
Corn Belt 182 91 187 422 363 330 163 143 
Lake States 141 57 128 240 148 126 55 28 
Northern 
Plains 177 78 157 319 250 226 97 76 
Southern 
Plains 61 16 44 85 54 27     
Wheat Yield 
Insurance 
Pacific 
Northwest 41 - 25 51 33 52 - - 
Northern 
Plains 300 99 147 398 256 333 66 31 
Southern 
Plains 228 74 90 266 121 89 - - 
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APPENDIX VI. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF WEATHER DATA 
 
 Variable 
Max 
Temperature 
Min 
Temperature 
Precipitation Wind 
Relative 
Humidity 
Solar 
Mean 22.672 9.068 1.199 4.549 0.444 18.633 
StDev 11.142 9.953 4.152 1.567 0.192 7.301 
CV 49.145 109.757 346.44 34.455 43.257 39.181 
Min -16.361 -23.578 0 0.905 0.048 0.709 
Median 23.502 8.985 0 4.319 0.412 18.311 
Max 47.18 29.417 87.104 11.902 0.991 32.904 
Skewness -0.352 -0.198 7.415 0.722 0.595 -0.034 
Kurtosis -0.674 -0.789 83.909 0.41 -0.279 -0.874 
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APPENDIX VII. Selected Parameters for APEX Yield Calibration 
Parameter Symbol Unit 
Model 
Default 
Set 
Value 
Recommended 
Range 
Reference 
Harvest Index HI - 0.5 0.45 - 0.60 
Akarsh, Patel, and Kumar 
(2013) 
Maximum Potential 
Leaf Area Index 
DMLA - 5.5 5.0 - 6.0 Doraiswamy et al. (2003) 
Potential Heat Units PHU °C 2200 1200 - 2400 
Kiniry, Benson , and 
Williams (1991); Akarsh, 
Patel, and Kumar (2013) 
Water Stress  PARM(3) Percentage 0.5 0 - 1 
Steglich an and Williams 
(2013) 
Initial Organic Nitrogen 
Concentration 
WN 
g N/Mg or 
ppm) 
N/A 100-5000 
Steglich an and Williams 
(2013) 
Initial organic P 
Concentration 
WPO g/t N/A 50 - 1000 
Steglich an and Williams 
(2013) 
Fertilizer - kg/ha - - Experts' Opinions 
Plant Population OPV5 plants/m2 8 - Experts' Opinions 
Beginning Year of 
Simulation 
IYR - - - Experts' Opinions 
Planting Date - - - - Experts' Opinions 
Harvest Date - - - - Experts' Opinions 
Potential 
Evapotranspiration 
IET - 0 0 - 5 Wang et al. (2012) 
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APPENDIX VIII. Comparison Results of Net Loss Ratios (2020, 2030, and 2040) 
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP4.5 (2020)     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test -2.67 2.25 0.008 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal  
F Test 2.14 1.16 0.000 Reject the Ho that the Variances are Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP8.5 (2020)     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test -2.62 2.25 0.009 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal  
F Test 1.98 1.16 0.000 Reject the Ho that the Variances are Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP4.5 & RCP8.5 (2020)     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test 0.10 2.24 0.918 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal 
F Test 1.08 1.16 0.186 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are 
Equal 
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APPENDIX VIII. Continued. 
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP4.5 (2030)     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test 1.39 2.24 0.165 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal 
F Test 1.15 1.16 0.060 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are 
Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP8.5 (2030)     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test -1.97 2.24 0.049 
Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal 
F Test 1.36 1.16 0.000 Reject the Ho that the Variances are Equal 
         
Distribution Comparison of RCP4.5 & RCP8.5 (2030)     
Confidence Level 95.00%       
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value      
2 Sample t Test -3.30 2.24 0.001 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal  
F Test 1.56 1.16 0.000 Reject the Ho that the Variances are Equal 
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APPENDIX VIII. Continued. 
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP4.5 (2040)    
Confidence Level 95.00%      
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value     
2 Sample t Test -3.65 2.25 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal 
F Test 2.04 1.16 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Variances 
are Equal 
        
Distribution Comparison of RCP2.6 & RCP8.5 (2040)    
Confidence Level 95.00%      
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value     
2 Sample t Test -6.65 2.25 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal 
F Test 5.78 1.16 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Variances 
are Equal 
        
Distribution Comparison of RCP4.5 & RCP8.5 (2040)    
Confidence Level 95.00%      
 
Test 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
P-
Value     
2 Sample t Test -3.92 2.25 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Means are 
Equal 
F Test 2.84 1.16 0.000 
Reject the Ho that the Variances 
are Equal 
 
